

We have received during the week the *Maulmain Chronicle* for 24th February and 3rd March; and we are also in the possession of private advices of an intermediate date from Rangoon. No new indications of active hostility on the part of the Court of Ava had transpired—but it would seem to be the impression of a good many British residents at both places, that the use of force by ourselves is the only road to a permanent peace, as long as the new King is on the throne. Our government is pronounced culpable by some, for having allowed him so much time to secure his popularity, as he evinced his enmity to the English name as soon as he had gained the throne—and the best way to remedy the consequences of this omission, in the opinion of those who entertain this view, would now be to become the aggressors upon a system which would either bring on a revolution and precipitate the usurper from power, or leave his Capital open to the easy advance of our army. The plan proposed to effect this is, to take possession of Rangoon during the rains, and declare it a Free Port—to station two men-of-war off the town, two Steamers just below Prome, and a squadron of gun-boats above Sitang, and to declare in favour of the old king or his son. By thus compelling the Usurper to concentrate his forces to attack us during the rains, his followers would be driven to declare in favour of the old King, and his fighting men would be drawn off from the north, a movement which would open the road to our Munnipad division to advance on the Capital as soon as the rains were over—if in the interim the revolution had not been completed. Whatever may be the merits of this plan as a military operation, it is not we think likely to be adopted by our government, which does not seem disposed to resort to the alternative of arms unless actually compelled in self defence. A war would certainly be a very expensive way of settling whether we were to have a Resident at Ava, instead of Rangoon—which is a question at any rate that may be disposed of at a little more leisure than is implied by plunging at once into a war. To avoid recourse to that, it is not perhaps altogether impolitic to leave the popularity the king has acquired among his new subjects to the test of some little time—the “fickle reek of popular breath,” on which he has been wafted into the seat of power, may ere long receive a contrary direction, and be turned in favour of those whose rights he has usurped.

The Siamese it appears keep an attentive eye upon our Burmese relations. A new Woogyee having been appointed to Toung-rgoo, they had taken up the idea that it was in contemplation to intercept the communication between Siam and Maulmain, and a party of Siamese who lately arrived at the latter place, were the bearers of a letter from the minister at the Court of Siam, remarking upon the circumstance, and containing the following observation: “The Burmese and Siamese are enemies of long standing, and if the people of Siam visiting Maulmain are seized by the Burmese, we should lose our honor. About this matter we request information—should the Burmese come to stop the roads towards the English boundaries, and station men to prevent our passing, we should not care—we will prepare and send out troops to fight and destroy them, and never allow them to be so posted.” No doubt, with management, the Siamese might be made useful allies in the event of a war with Ava.