

SIAM.—By the *Dudaloy* which has arrived from Siam during the week, we have received advices from Bangkok to the 19th ultimo. Accounts of business are not very favourable; there was some demand for muskets and Gunpowder; Piece Goods continued scarce, but without any advance in prices, and there seemed little disposition to buy, notwithstanding the prevailing scarcity in the market. Produce was high, and in general little business going on. The new Sugar Crop was expected to be very fine and very plentiful—the cane being stated to be finer and larger than was ever before seen in Siam.

The King was busy with his preparations for war against the Quedah Malays—and his resentment for the loss of that province had manifested itself in an extensive process of decapitation. The late governor of Quedah is among the list of victims, being thus condemned to expiate the offence of permitting the territory to fall once more into the hands of the Malays. The Rajah of Ligor, as well as the governor of Sangora, had already been despatched with orders to retake Quedah at whatever cost, and in defiance of every obstacle; and His Majesty was assembling a further force of about 7,000 men, which he proposed to send under the command of PHYA LEE PEEPAT, the father of the unfortunate young noble who had been beheaded, and some other chiefs of high rank. A general belief that the Malays would be assisted by the British government in the Straits had caused considerable alarm, having we understand originated in some story about the seizure and subsequent release at Pinang of a certain quantity of warlike stores which were shipping at that port to supply the Malays in Quedah.—The feelings towards European residents in Bangkok with which any confirmation of this rumour would have inspired his Siamese Majesty, would, it is believed, have operated considerably to their inconvenience, perhas danger.—But fortunately for them, if such were the case, and very unfortunately for the Malays, there is not the remotest probability of our government encouraging, much less assisting, the efforts of the latter,—as the despatches from the authorities in the Straits, which would

suortly after reach Bangkok, would fully satisfy the royal mind. It is understood the Straits government, in the present juncture of the affairs of Quedah, recommend the adoption of a neutral course. The Siamese are no doubt sufficiently powerful to reduce the revolted province to subjection without any assistance from us—and, as it is of some consequence that the British name and government should be favourably regarded by the Malayan states in the neighbourhood, among whom the cause of the Quedans is of course popular, we at least trust that in their further operations against Quedah the Siamese will be left to themselves, and that the active co-operation of our government will be altogether withheld in the approaching struggle. It seems that our neutrality is all that is either expected or required by the Siamese themselves; and their government must feel satisfied that, whatever the Treaty may contain, the English cannot be called upon to take up arms on every occasions that Quedah may be lost by their own carelessness or negligence, in failing to maintain within the province a sufficient force for its protection—a neglect to which the late successful *coup de main* of the Malays was wholly owing. These circumstances, it appears to us, not only fully authorise our neutrality, but leave scarcely any fair or decent pretext for our engaging at all in the contest. To be sure, if the struggle be protracted, and a strong confederacy of the Malayan states should enlist themselves on the side of Quedah, involving half the Peninsula in the war, interrupting commerce, and giving rise to predatory expeditions undertaken under the colour of hostilities, it may be necessary and proper for our government to interfere for the sake of the general tranquillity. But there is little or no prospect of any thing of this sort. The Malay bands that retook Quedah are already weakened by dissensions among themselves, and one of their principal leaders has apostatized to the Siamese—the ex-king ostensibly discountenances the insurrection, and if his good wishes are with the insurgents, as we have no doubt they are, he does not possess the means to render them *sub rosa* any effectual assistance, while the Malay states in the neighbourhood will be deterred from engaging in the business by their recollection of the active and decisive part taken by us during a similar attempt under TUNAN KU KODEN.—There seems therefore no probability of a long struggle, involving the other states of the Peninsula—and nothing which in the circumstances of the case requires the British to take an active part in it on the side of Siam.