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
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sumed till the 15th November. At the Cape of Good Hope she was detained three weeks in obtaining supplies, and replacing her foremast, discovered to be sprung. The *Diomedé* did not reach Madras until some time in April 1794. Colonel Stuart immediately laid before the government of Fort St. George the dispatch from the secret committee of the court of directors, and also his own instructions from the war department. The king's ministers had expected that the *Diomedé* would have arrived at Madras early in February. As so much time had been lost by the accidents of the voyage, extraordinary efforts became necessary to prepare the troops and stores which the presidency of Madras had to supply for the intended expedition. Sir William Medows had been appointed by the government at home to the command in chief, and it had been arranged that he should follow Col. Stuart with a large body of troops from England. Meanwhile the public departments at Fort St. George compensated by their active proceedings for the inevitable delays which had retarded the dispatches. Every thing that depended on the resources of India was provided in sufficient time for the important enterprize. The season, however, passed away without any appearance of co-operation from Europe, and the ultimate arrangements in India were suspended. The state of affairs in the mother country had required that another destination should be given to the forces at home; and in the beginning of 1795, the supreme government in India, learning this, directed, that the projected expedition should be relinquished.

Col. Stuart now considered the object of his return to India to be finished, and he applied to the commander-in-chief in that country for a renewal of his furlough to Europe, at the same time offering to remain if the public service required it. The commander-in-chief complied

with this request; but while Col. Stuart was preparing for his voyage, information was received in India of the hostile turn which affairs had taken in Holland, accompanied with orders from the king's ministers and the court of directors, to secure and occupy the Dutch establishments in the island of Ceylon. In the event of the Dutch government refusing to receive the assistance and protection of the British troops, on behalf of the Prince of Orange, their settlements were to be taken possession of by force, in the name of his Britannic majesty. The government of Madras selected Col. Stuart to command this important expedition. Two divisions of troops were to combine in the service. The first division embarked from Madras on the 30th of July 1795. A squadron of his majesty's ships, under Admiral Rainier, conveyed them to Negapatam, where they were joined by the *Diomedé* and the transports, with troops from the southern division of the coast army. On the 1st of August this armament anchored in Back Bay, Trincomalee.

The object for which the British authorities had sent it, was immediately explained to the Dutch commandant of Trincomalee; at the same time, letters were delivered to him from Mr. Van Anglebeck, the governor of Columbo and of Ceylon, directing the commandant to give up the fort of Ostenburg to the custody of a British detachment. The commandant, however, declining to comply with these requisitions, Admiral Rainier and Col. Stuart resolved on compelling the surrender of the place. The troops were landed on the 3d with their artillery, equipage, and stores. Batteries were constructed and opened against the fort of Trincomalee. It surrendered, together with fort Ostenburg, by capitulation, on the 26th of August 1795. The attack had been planned with judgment and pursued with spirit. The defence was chiefly remarkable for

the obstinacy and valour of the Malays, who headed some desperate sallies on the besiegers, and would have persevered in maintaining the breach, when it was open to an assault, had they not been abandoned by the prudence or pusillanimity of the Dutch part of the garrison.

Soon after this event, Batticaloa, Mānār, Mallatice, and the island of Calpentine, surrendered without resistance to detachments which Col. Stuart sent for their reduction. Jaffnapatam, a regular fort of considerable strength, submitted with the same facility to a force conducted by the Colonel in person. These transactions finished the campaign of 1795 in Ceylon. We thus acquired possession of the northern and north-eastern skirts of the island; an extent of coast of nearly 300 miles was reduced in the space of about five months.

In November the government of Madras signified to Col. Stuart their intention of reducing the whole island, and that he should receive a reinforcement of troops adequate to the magnitude of the service. The whole force, when thus augmented, consisted of the following details. A complete equipment of mortars, battery, and field train; one company of royal artillery, two of Bengal, one of Madras, and two of Bombay, with the proportion of gun lascars; his majesty's 52d, 73d, and 77th regiments. Of native infantry in the Hon. Company's service, the 7th, 9th, and 35th battalions of the Madras army, with the grenadier battalion; and the 3d from that of Bombay. There were also a corps of 500 pioneers, and stores and ordnance for a siege. These forces were in a high state of discipline, and had been long inured to the dangers and fatigues of war. In January 1796, they were directed by Col. Stuart to assemble at Negumbo, a fort about 22 miles to the northward of Columbo, the seat of the Dutch government in the island. The first division that

should arrive was to take possession of this fort. It is to be explained, that one of these divisions, under the command of an excellent officer, Lieut. Col. Petrie, was to embark from the coast of Malabar; another from Trincomalee, conducted by Col. Stuart himself; and a third proceeded in boats from Manar under Major Barbutt. So accurately, however, were these movements concerted, that the two last-mentioned divisions arrived almost at the same instant, and the first on the next morning. The whole were landed on that and the following day, 3d and 4th February, without opposition. The road leading from Negumbo to Columbo is through a flat country, and offers few natural impediments to the march of troops, except such as occur from several deep and unfordable rivers. The first river is seven miles from Negumbo: the back was immediately occupied by a detachment. On the 7th February Col. Petrie moved forward with additional forces, and on the next day advanced to the Mutwāl river. On the 9th Col. Stuart with the main body joined Col. Petrie. The Mutwal is about 300 yards broad; dispositions were made to cross it in face of the enemy, posted with artillery on the opposite bank, with an apparent determination to dispute the passage. Flat boats and rafts received the troops; the artillery covered the embarkation. A frigate, commanded by Capt. Gardener, entering the mouth of the river, held an easy communication with the army, and assisted in these operations. It was however discovered on the morning of the 11th that the enemy had precipitately abandoned their strong position, thrown their artillery into the river, and retired to Columbo. Col. Stuart directed the first division with some field pieces to cross immediately. By four o'clock the whole army were ferried over, and encamped at the village of Passpitale. The village of Mutwal was on our right;

Major Barbutt, with the flank companies of the European regiments, formed a piquet on the right of the line, and a little in advance at the village. At 6 o'clock next morning, this post was attacked by a strong body of the enemy, consisting of European and Malay troops. Against this sudden and vigorous effort, the post was maintained until Col. Stuart arrived with the 52d regiment for its support. The rest of the forces were ordered to follow; but, before they could reach the ground, Col. Stuart led the advance to the charge. The Dutch troops were covered by the bank of a road and a jungle; but they soon gave way, and the 77th coming up at the moment, the enemy were briskly pursued, firing occasionally on our troops as they retreated. The pursuit continued until the enemy reached a post within view of Columbo, called the Company's Gardens, where the country begins to open.

At this spot they formed under the cover of a slight fence, and gave our troops a general discharge of musketry. Col. Stuart ordered Major Barbutt, with the flank companies, to charge with the bayonet, without loading. The fence was instantly carried, and the enemy put again to flight. The chief loss fell amongst the Malays, who, on this and many other occasions, displayed more activity and gallantry than the Dutch European troops. Some prisoners were made. The British detachment took a position in the rear of the gardens, where it commanded a fine view of the pettah and fort of Columbo. At three o'clock in the afternoon, the whole of the forces arrived, advanced from this ground, and assumed their intended position for the siege. The line extended along the heights, by the church of Wolphendorph and the house of the Dessavine at Husseldorph. The right was on the sea, in the rear of the pettah; and the left was covered by the lakes, which communicate with the ditch

of the fort. The head-quarters of Col. Stuart was in the centre of the line, at the house usually occupied by the Candian ambassadors when deputed to Columbo. After an interval of two days, preparations were made for commencing the siege. The battering train was landed from the shipping. The engineer's materials, including fascines ready made, were brought in boats from Manar. Having it in his power to take possession of the suburbs, which must have involved the loss of much valuable property, and probably the lives of some of the inhabitants, Col. Stuart was willing to try the effects of negotiation; accordingly, on the 14th of February, Major Agnew, the adjutant-general, was sent into the fort with a flag of truce. The summons was conveyed in the name of Col. Stuart, and of Capt. Gardiner, as the senior naval officer. It simply demanded the surrender of the fort to the arms of His Britannic Majesty, promising protection to the inhabitants and security to private property. In the evening, Major Agnew returned, bringing a proposal for a cessation of hostilities, as a prelude to a capitulation. On the next day definitive articles were concluded and ratified. The capitulation of Columbo, besides making us masters of this important fortress, provided that the rest of the Dutch possessions in Ceylon should be surrendered to the British arms. Under this title, detachments occupied the forts of Calitura, Point de Galle, and Mattura.

Such was the able management of Col. Stuart, winning advantages in the field, and improving them by negotiation; with this facility were the important territories of the Dutch in Ceylon transferred to the British dominion. They comprised many strongly fortified places, rich, and populous towns. These possessions are highly valuable in a political and military view; but they are scarcely less so for the purposes of commerce, by securing