

Naming and Collective Memory in the Malay Muslim World*

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The study is based on three principal sets of data: subscriber names in telephone directories, historical genealogies of royal families, and genealogies of contemporary, ordinary Muslims in the Malay Muslim world. These data sets on naming enable us to explore the concept of collective memory, and to explain differential tensions between absolutist Islamic symbolism and symbolic aspects of local cultures.

Naming has been examined in the anthropological literature in relation to genealogy, landscaping, and identity formation. There have been few comparative studies, and this paper takes this approach, focusing on the collective memory of the Islamic solidarity as expressed through use of the names of Allah, Prophet Muhammed, and the great Imams. We find that historically Malay Muslims have tended to adopt Islamic names, particularly from name clusters around these three categories of names. Javanese Muslims, by contrast, have adopted Islamic names inconsistently.

The collective memory has been constantly reinterpreted in local cultures, as indicated in the substantial use by Muslims of non-Islamic names and titles. Structural amnesia and capitalist influences may explain both general and differential reconstructions of the Islamic collective memory. The study also finds that the Malay and Javanese Muslims do not normally commemorate their ancestors through the succession of names within the lineage.

Keywords: collective memory, naming, Malay Muslim world, universality of naming, naming taboo

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Introduction

Collective memory is a mental repertoire of things of the past that related people choose to remember (Halbwachs 1992:37-40; Hobsbawn 1983:1-14). It is in itself not true history, for it contains also legends, hearsays or fictitious symbols. Neither is its reconstruction synonymous with historical reconstruction that necessitates verifiable written records, relics or artifacts (Connerton 1989:6-21). Despite the lack of historical rigor, a collective memory is both a target for and agent of change. It can be reconstructed to follow political changes in the larger society, as is evident in reinvented histories and genealogies. It can also grant itself legitimacy to facilitate social change. There are no data here to compare such changes between two periods. Instead, this study offers patterns of collective memory for the first period.

A collective memory will come to an end when all its sharers have passed out. Thus the memory of the time-specific collectivity, such as the former captives of a wartime concentration camp, will disappear forever in a single generation. In general, a tribe's memory of their ancestors may take many generations to vanish. But when the tribe is a spatially specific collectivity, it might suffer a loss of memory from an involuntary relocation that separates its members from a familiar landscape (Huang Y. 2001:41-54; Yang 2003). In other cases, the reconstruction of collective memory is an ongoing process that responds to external political changes. This is exemplified by the Hakkas of Taiwan, who constantly refocus their collective memory to fit the mainstream political vision (Wang 2003).

Among the mechanisms that perpetuate reconstructed memories are performative rites, literary narratives, and social movements. Naming, which also implies titling (Bourdieu 1991:105), has received less attention. Along with clan ties and ethnicity, naming can be a constituent in collective memory and used to forge a collective identity. In many cultures, names are a general classifier of things (Lévi-Strauss 1966:182-200), which bonds as well as divides. Likewise, personal names can both categorize identities and create collective identity. For example, the coastal Ami tribe in Taiwan (Huang S. 1999) adopted names such as Dipog (Japan) and Payrag (Han Chinese) to forge a collective identity in response to forced governance. In the Caroline Islands, residents of Truk demonstrate extreme individuality in naming. While four people there share a similar name, each of the other 789 Trukese has an exclusive personal name. By contrast, the individuality among the Lakalai peo-

ple is highly suppressed through extensive name sharing (Goodenough 1965: 266-267).¹

Together with the custom of clan burial grounds, naming, or more specifically, succession of names within a tribe such as practiced by Taiwan's Paiwan, is an effective imaging mechanism of the tribe's ancestors (Chiang 1999:339-406). In the view of Paiwan, "to adopt names of ascendants is the best way to preserve the memory of their own tribe . . . and this is also how the tribe could keep in touch with the past" (ibid.:399). Elsewhere, in the Solomon Islands, the Langalanga people also take names of ancestors as a way to remember them (Guo 2003:196-198). This vertical (generational) succession of personal names is aimed at forging a collective identity. There is also a developmental succession of personal names through life that moves persons toward individuality. The Ilongot in the Philippines (Rosaldo 1984:11-24) display two movements in the tribe's naming system: "individuation movement" and "differentiation movement." In the former, people change their names at significant moments in their life up until the time when they marry. After marriage, a second movement begins—one's final name before marriage is known as one's "true name," and all names acquired thereafter are retained in order to reflect "a history of social relations" (ibid.:12). The anthropological literature is filled with reports of people dropping older names either because of lifecycle changes or a name's inauspicious implications. For instance, the Buginese in Luwu (Errington 1989) and the Minangkabau (Loeb 1935:118) progressively drop previous names for just about the same reasons.

Globalization or capitalism has been creating tremendous cultural tensions within non-capitalist economies. It has caused people to review their primordial symbolism, including how they dress, their mannerisms, and musical expressions. Naming has not been spared. People under the sweeping influences of capitalism have begun to re-evaluate their naming systems, and are probably in the process of deconstructing their collective memories. Not all societies respond to these global pressures in the same way. As one would expect, stronger Western ties will expedite the process of memory reconstruction, or even deconstruction. In some places, Turkey and Iran for example, national leaders have decisively transformed traditional naming systems.

The above review highlights two salient types of memory content: ethnicity and clan ties. Such memory is typically and methodologically constructed through oral history from among the related respondents, for example the

¹ A compensation theory explains that high individuality is compensated for in a collectivist polity, while low individuality suits a capitalist and competitive culture (Goodenough 1965).

surviving members or descendants of a collectivity. Those remembered may have personal names in a clan's genealogy, or they may be imaginary figures or totemic creatures, as is commonly found in tribes, minorities, or secret societies. Neither ethnicity nor clans seems to play a part in Islamic symbolism. Naming, on the other hand, has long been a significant component of the Muslim collective memory. The documentary material and ethnographic data that follow will help to establish naming as a key facet of collective memory.

In the Malay Muslim world, naming is at once the content to be memorized and a memory-perpetuating mechanism.² The former comprises three domains of naming requirements: Allah's call for Muslims to adopt His ninety-nine Beautiful Names, the universal adoption of Islamic names, and a specific naming taboo.

Allah rewards Muslims who do beautiful things, for He is pleased with beautiful things and in particular those who glorify and praise Him.³ So He says, "Then do you remember Me; I will remember you."⁴ In order to remember Him, parents are eager to give their children one of His ninety-nine Beautiful Names, for the Prophet says in a *hadith*:⁵ "You will be called on the day of resurrection by your names and the names of your fathers, so make your names beautiful." Other chapters of the Koran also mention that adopting one of Allah's Beautiful Names is rewarding.⁶

Also included in the list of rewarding names are His 20 attributes and about 35 other greater Islamic names (al-Ghazali 1970).⁷ The two well-

² The Malay-Muslim World is loosely defined as that part of Insular Southeast Asia where the Muslim population is significant. Historically, it covers areas that fell under the rule of the many Malay Muslim kingdoms (Milner 1982). On controversy regarding the definition of the Malay World, see Benjamin and Chou (2003:7-76).

³ For Allah's pleasure with beautiful things, refer to Chapters 7:180, 13:28, 17:110, 20:8 and 73:8 of the Koran.

⁴ This is from the Koran (2:152). Also referred to in Arabic as "Quran," or "Qur'an." The edition in use is translated by Abdullah Yusuf Ali (1996).

⁵ This is from Bukhari (Adab no. 6178), as quoted in Ahmed Salahuddin (1999:xi). Such writings are aplenty. For another popular source, see <http://www.greatbooks.org/library/religious/islam/god/Hadith99Names.html>.

⁶ For example, Koran 13:28 says: "Those who believe, and whose hearts find satisfaction in the remembrance of God: for without doubt in the remembrance of God do hearts find satisfaction." Chapter 17:110 urges Muslims to "Call upon Allah, or call upon Rahman: by whatever name ye call upon Him: for to Him belong the Most Beautiful Names." Further mention of His names can be found in Koran 20:8: "God! There is no god but He! To Him belong the Most Beautiful Names." Koran 73:8 also states, "And remember the Name of your Lord and devote yourself to Him with a complete devotion."

⁷ The above is just a general version of Allah's reward. Another version provides a more detailed, or graduated scale of rewards, in terms of the quality of the Beautiful Names and the frequency in reciting them. Rewards are given according to the following frequency of citation: Reciting the name 7 times, 10 times, 15 times, 16 times, 21 times, 40 times, 41 times, 70 times, 75 times, 100 times, 160 times, 1,000 times, 3,000 times, 70,000 times, and other unspecified times. One who recites "Sabur" (the Patient) 3,000 times will

known names of the Prophet, Muhammad and Ahmad, have been a favorite choice for Muslim boys (Ahmed Salahuddin 1999:x). The Prophet himself makes it clear that the two most Beautiful Names to God are “Abd Allah” (or “Abdullah,” meaning “Servant of God”) and “Abd al-Rahman” (or “Servant of the Merciful”). And the Prophet also gave his two grandsons, or Ali’s sons, the Beautiful Names: Husyan (Hussein) and Hassan. A hadith thus states that: “Whosoever knows these Names, will enter paradise.” (Schimmel 1989:124-125)

As one would expect, using His name in a profane manner is prohibited, as the Koran says (7:180): “And (all) the Most Beautiful Names belong to Allah, so call on Him by them, and leave the company of those who belie or deny (or utter impious speech against) His Names. They will be requited for what they used to do.” The use of secular titles, clan names, or a refusal of Islamic names could well indicate an association with undesirable gross materialism (Abdullah Yusuf Ali 1996:382, note 260). For example, Chapter 23, Section 101 says that: “Then, when the Trumpet is blown, there will be no kinship among them that Day, nor will they ask of one another.” Since in the afterlife no Muslims should relate to each other via kin ties, they should in their present life prepare for this by keeping away from earthly and secular ties. Muslims should refrain from inheriting secular titles and statuses to distinguish themselves from others.

The reward on adopting an Islamic name is also extended to the converts, and this constitutes the second component of naming. The changing of names as a result of converting to Islam was widespread among the early rulers in maritime Southeast Asia, including Melaka, Pasai, Mataram, Palembang, Patani, Kedah, Kutai, Sanggau (both West Kalimantan) and Ternate (Maluku). A classical and well-circulated incident of name change after embracing Islam took place in the fifteenth-century Malay Kingdom. The founder of the Kingdom, Sri Parameswara Dewa Shah, adopted the name Muhammad Iskandar Shah (1400-1414 or 1424).⁸ His successor Sri Maharaja was given the

be delivered from any difficulty; to recite “Samad” (the Eternal) frequently, one’s needs will be answered; and to recite the Beautiful Name of “Qadir” (the Able) helps in getting one’s wishes fulfilled. In some cases, recitation must be done after some event such as Friday Prayer, or after praying for the sick. For example, one who recites “Khafid” (the Abaser) 70,000 times in a gathering after fasting for three days will be safeguarded from the enemy. Also, if one recites the more popular names like “Rahman” (the Beneficent) 100 times, one will be endowed with sharp memory; if one recites “Aziz” (the Mighty) 40 times after morning prayers for 40 days, one will be self-sufficient; if one recites “Ghaf-far” (the Forgiver) one will have his sins forgiven. See <http://www.duas.org/nallah.html>.

⁸ The names of the early rulers and their periods of reign vary from source to source. One that departs most from the cited ones may be found in Finestone and Shaharil (2002:306).

Muslim name Muhammad Shah (1424-1444). The third ruler, Abu Said or Raja Ibrahim (1444-1445), and the fourth, Raja Kassim (1445-1459) (de Graaf 1970: 125), began to assume Islamic names without simultaneously showing the Hindu equivalents.

The legend, as described in the *Malay Annals* (A. Rahman Haji Ismail 1998:105-128), is that Marah Silu was installed as the ruler of a settlement named Samadra (or Semudra, Sumatra) by a Sheikh Ismail sent by Prophet Muhammed from Mecca. Upon installation, the ruler's name is changed to Sultan Malik al-Salih. The two other great residents in Samadra, after converting to Islam, also changed their native names to Saidi Ali Ghiyasduddin and Saidi Semayad, respectively. A similar tale appears in another famous *hikayat* entitled *The Chronicles of Pasai* (Winstedt 1938).

In the sixteenth century, King Agung of the Javanese Mataram adopted an Islamic name of Abdurachman, and was also known as Sultan Abdul Muhammad Maulana Matarani. The Sultan named his first son Sayidin, according to *Babad Tanah Djawi* (Moedjanto 1986:21-23, 135-136). In Palembang, in the second half of the seventeenth century, the first ruler, named Sunan or Suhunan Candhibalang, also adopted the title of "Sultan" and an Arabic name Abdurrahman, presumably after embracing Islam (Florida 1995: 102, n. 30). It is also told in the *Hikayat Patani* (Teeuw and Wyatt 1970:146-152) that the king named Phaya Tu Kerub Mahajana changed his name to Sultan Ismail Syah Zillullah Fil-Alam (or Muhammad Syah) after embracing Islam. At the same time, his three children changed their names to Islamic ones.

Similarly, the Kedah ruler Raja Phra Ong Mahawangsa and his three sons changed their ethnic names to Islamic ones after conversion (Hawa Hj Salleh 1991:100ff). The Raja and his ancestors had previously ruled Kedah for five generations with Hindu-Buddhist names (ibid.:Appendices II and III; Abdullah Musa Lubis 1965:217).

In addition to the *hikayat* sources, documented genealogies also recorded rulers' taking Muslim names in place of their ethnic names, probably upon their conversion to Islam (Finestone and Shaharil 2002:288-289, 352-353). These were rulers of the kingdoms at Kutai (1732) in Kalimantan, at Ternate (1486) in the Moluccas (Maluku), and at Sanggau along West Kalimantan's Upper Kapuas River, in the thirteenth century (Yusuf 1998:367-368).⁹

In addition to Allah's calling and these name changes among rulers of early Southeast Asian kingdoms, the Karbala tragedy, which caused the Mus-

⁹ If Yusuf had given the due regard to the much shorter life expectancy of that period, his estimate would have been more accurate. The sultanate system was abolished during the Japanese invasion in 1941.

lms to split into Shiites and Sunnites, also forms part of the collective memory. After this, the Shia Muslims made it a taboo to adopt names of the first three Caliphs: Abu Bakr, Umar, and Usman (Schimmel 1992:99). This avoidance behavior must have contributed to the Shiites' many subsequent reconstructions involving universal naming.

The aforementioned incidents apparently constituted the very basis of the Southeast Asian Muslim prototype of collective memory when Islam was first brought into the region. Since then, the images of these events revolving around naming—Allah's call, the Karbala tragedy, and the legendary conversion of local rulers—have been reconstructed time and again among the Malay and Javanese Muslims. Given the far-reaching Indic influence and the pride of glorious Javanese empires, there is little reason to expect the Javanese reconstruction to closely approximate the prototype.

Field data supplied by our respondents support the view that their names are religiously and socially significant. When asked how they got their names and whether they would change them if given a chance, the Malay Muslim answer is standard: their parents gave them the names and they were told that these are good names for the Muslims. Or they state simply that all Muslim names are good names. The core meaning of "good name" is that "Allah would give strength to the name bearers." There are a few cases of name change, but the new name is merely a variant form of the original, as from Ahmad to Mat. Reasons for the changes include wanting to avoid repeating names from lineage ancestors, and an association between the name and an illness suffered by the bearer. In any case, whatever Malay Muslims change their names to, the new name must retain Islamic symbolism.

Those Javanese Muslims who do not have Islamic names cite other naming traditions as the reason. The respondent may tell one that, "What you believe is more important; a name can change." Indeed, Javanese are given a Javanese name at birth (e.g., Widoyo), but may adopt another name of their own choice (e.g., Bambang), upon reaching adulthood, or at some other significant point in their lifecycle, or even due to a career change. A Javanese will sometimes adopt Islamic name as a prefix (e.g., Achmed Sukarno), usually for a political reason. Some common Islamic prefixes are Abdullah, Ahmad, Haji, Noor, and Mohamad.¹⁰ Of course, some Javanese Muslims do

¹⁰ A technical note on the most popular Islamic clusters of names is instructive, for it will provide more accurate information for any attempt to derive meaning from the distribution of Islamic names. The three names, viz. Abdullah, Ahmad, and Mohamad, may be adopted as a personal name by itself or as a prefix to a personal name. For instance, Ahmad in Ahmad Ali bin Badawi is a religious prefix to the personal name Ali. A substantial proportion of Muslims have adopted Mohamad for the same purpose. Another

adopt Muslim names, notably Amien Rais and Abdurrahman Wahid.

Batak Muslims are clannish or tribal, and most of them retain tribal names such as Nasution and Tandjung, even after embracing Islam or other religions. A well-known example is Akbar Tandjung, where Akbar is Islamic.

Across these cultures, older respondents commented on an emergent trend in name-changing: younger Muslims are becoming more interested in Western songs and movies, “and hence they want to adopt Western names.” But these non-Islamic names are not part of the official names on government documents such as identity cards or driver’s licences. Many in south Thailand “disguise” their Islamic names in some way, for example, by using “Dollah” instead of “Abdullah.”

Few respondents are knowledgeable when it comes to the symbolic meaning of having a non-Islamic title. Some Malays even regard royal family titles—for example, Nik, Wan, Raja, and Tengku—as an aspect of Islamic naming. This is probably because they still see Sultans and royal families as keepers of Islam.

Among Muslims who are given or adopt an Islamic name, they know what this symbol means to themselves: religiously they share with their family and their community a link to Allah, the Prophet, and the great Imams. Such shared beliefs about a protector overarching one’s collectivity, is similar to tribal totemic beliefs. A tribe’s members might construct a landscape, through a succession of names, or by erecting totem poles, in order to remember the ancestors. But while these systems are grounded in a particular territory, Islamic solidarity is a global collectivity, and the symbolism of Islamic naming transcends specific times and places.

Our field data presented here may not allow us to generalize or compare across the Muslim worlds, but our historical and statistical data on names do illuminate regional Islamic collective memory that is expressed in patterns of name adoption.

Literature, Data, and Analytical Methods

Persons adopting Muslim names after embracing Islam has over the centuries evolved into a sacred tradition in Southeast Asia. Technically speaking, our literature review found only five clusters of Muslim names—less than 1 per-

factor is the diverse use of Abdullah: apart from its use as a prefix to personal names, it is a common personal name for converts to Islam and for males adopted by a Muslim. To differentiate the personal names from the religious prefixes for the abovementioned three names is an extremely tedious task, for these names are voluminous.

cent of the total enlarged name pool (e.g., Ahmed Salahuddin 1999)—to be most frequently used in everyday life. These five consist of Allah's ninety-nine Beautiful Names (the Abdul Cluster), the two principal names of the Prophet (Muhammed¹¹ and Ahmad), the names of the first three Caliphs (Abu Bakr, Umar, and Usman), the names of the three earliest Shia leaders (Ali, Hassan, and Hussein), and a mixed cluster of other names (e.g., Mahmud). These name clusters have been well-studied (Buliet 1979:45-47; Geertz 1979:342-343; Gulick 1983:216-221; Hassan 1986; Mak 2002:61-107; Maxwell 1984:29).¹² Our inquiry here is confined to the following names: Abdul-Abdullah, Ahmad, Muhammed, Abu Bakar, Omar, Osman, Ali, Hassan, Hussein and Mahmud.¹³ The Abdul cluster comprises principally Allah's ninety-nine Beautiful Names. The Prophet cluster primarily consists of Muhammed and Ahmad; other symbolically meaningful ones like Amat, Mat and Rahmat are numerically too few to mention.

Three major kinds of data on male Muslim names¹⁴ were collected. The first consists of names of telephone subscribers, and it is supplemented by genealogical reports of modern families in the region. The third kind of data is published records of royal family members and aristocrats of the past.

¹¹ The conventional spelling of the Prophet's name is "Muhammed," but local renderings of it such as Muhamed, Mohamed and Mohammad are plenty. Sometimes it also appears as Amat, Mat or Rahmat; but these other forms are far less popular.

¹² For more details, see the following: (1) Buliet (1979:45-47) measures Islamization of the old Persia by counting the increase of Islamic names. He discovers that in the year 1260 about 60 percent of Iranians were named Ali, al-Hasan, or al-Husayn, and more of them were named Ahmad and Muhammed. (2) In a name list of 982 residents in a Moroccan town named Sefrou, Hildred Geertz (1979:342) found that, in the 1960s, 15 percent (or 156) of them, were named Muhammed. (3) Allan Maxwell's general impression of Brunei Kadayan names is that "most words that are used exclusively as personal names in Brunei Malay are Arabic borrowings" (1984:29, 33). Of the 243 Kadayan personal names, Maxwell is confident that about 69 percent (167), are Arabic and the remaining 31 percent are Malay words traceable to Arabic source (*ibid.*:25-39). (4) Hassan's (1986) study of 9,000 male Muslim students in Yarmouk University during 1984-1985 shows that 12 percent (1,080) are named Muhamad; 5 percent (480) Ahmad; and about 8 percent had names from the ninety-nine Beautiful Names such as Abdul (5.5 percent) and Mahmud (2.5 percent). (5) Having in one's name just one element that is of Islamic origin can be insufficient for some Muslims, and so they add prefixes and suffixes, or epithets such as Mohamad, Nur, Ahmad, Abdullah, Ali, or al-Din. Others add religious or ethno-religious titles such as Haji, Syed, Syarif, and Shaikh (Mak 2002:61-107). (6) The most striking divine names fall into two sets: one prefixed with "Abd" (Abdul, Abdel, etc.), the other a suffix set such as al-Din or simply "Din." The "Abdul" set is normally prefixed with Allah's ninety-nine Beautiful Names (Gulick 1983:216-221).

¹³ We have also taken into consideration possible variations of these names such as Abdel, Ahmed, Mahmood, Muhammed, Omar, and Osman.

¹⁴ This gender bias accords with related aspects of Islamic tradition. For instance, all of the ninety-nine Beautiful Names are for males, and so are those of the first three Caliphs and the first three Shiite leaders. Most of the rulers of early kingdoms in the region were male.

Local telephone directories contain information useful to our inquiry, particularly now that telephones have become easily affordable in most if not all of the towns under study. Telephone directories in the region publish most Malay names in the teknonymic system, and include both the subscribers' personal names and those of their fathers. A large number of subscribers also use filial connectors such as "bin" and "anak," or their variants such as "b" and "ak."

Telephone directories have some limitations as a data source. First, one may be able to identify Muslim subscribers by their Islamic names, but not those who have none. Second, telephone directories display the names of the present generation only (as in the mono-name system) and/or that of the immediate past generation (as in the given-name and given-name system).¹⁵ It was necessary to collect supplementary data to partially address this shortcoming, and for this we employed upon genealogical information.

We collected 176 Muslim genealogies of four generations¹⁶ from the designated six localities: Brunei (20 cases), Indonesia (62), Malaysia (31), The Philippines (16), Singapore (27), and Thailand (20).¹⁷ These genealogies provide information on patrilineal chains, which are lists of names that a man can recite that include his father, his father's father, his father's father's father, and so on (Geertz 1979:343, 352). The chain contains useful information including patterns of name succession and generational differences in naming.

Our principal source for historical genealogies was a source book compiled and edited by Finestone and Shaharil (2002) entitled *The Royal*

¹⁵ The three common naming systems in the region, in terms of structure, are "Given-name and Given-name (gn-gn)," "Given-name and Surname (gn-sn)," and "Mono/Duplex name (ngo)" (Mak 2002:67).

¹⁶ In principle, only cases that provide a minimum of three generations were selected, and most have four or more. The generations listed are the respondent, his son, his grandson, the respondent's father, the grandfather (father's father), great-grandfather (father's father's father), and great-great-grandfather (father's father's father's father). We shall examine naming variations between generations by using an age interval of 20 years; these variations include sharing or succession of names, change in religious and secular names, concentration of names by cohort, and change in both religious and secular honorific titles. The semi-structured interview, coupled with a short questionnaire, focuses only on the patrilineal chain or the male line of the Muslim respondents. The key questions asked include the following: full name as in official documents, the name that the respondent would like to be addressed officially, religious and other titles, ethnic origin, birth order, age, birthplace, and change of name and year of the change. The genealogical data were collected and verified between August 2002 and February 2003.

¹⁷ All of the respondents in Patani (Thailand) are of Malay origin. Of those in Singapore, 20 are Malay, and the rest are Javanese, Minangkabau, and Boyanese. In the Mindanao area, respondents are all local residents who relate themselves to Tausug, Yakan, Maguindanaon, Iranon, and Filipino. In Malaysia, six are Javanese and the rest Malays. In Indonesia, there are 20 Acehnese who claim to be Malay, 22 Javanese and Sundanese, 10 Malays, and 10 Bataks. Except for two Kedayans, the rest of the Brunei respondents are Malays. Altogether, for all generations, there are about 876 names.

Families of Southeast Asia. The volume brings together genealogies of the region's royal families, including, of particular interest to us, those of Muslim kingdoms and sultanates. For the Malay Peninsula, these genealogies cover Perlis, Kedah, Perak, Selangor, Negeri Sembilan, Melaka, Johor, Kelantan, Terengganu, Pahang, and the then Tumasik (Singapore). Kingdoms in Sumatra include Asahan, Deli, Langkat, and Siak. In Java, court genealogies are available from the three *kraton* (palaces) of the powerful Mataram Empire: Surakarta before the split or partition, Kartasura (Paku Alam), and Jogjakarta (Hamengku-buwana and Mangku Nagoro). From the old Borneo or Kalimantan four sultanates are included: Brunei, Kutai, Pontianak, and Abang Awal Dynasty at Sanggau.¹⁸ Finally, there is the royal family's genealogy of the Moluccas' (Maluku) Ternate. Some of these genealogies can be verified by available independent or criterion sources, such as Khoo (1991), Lee (1995), Ricklefs (1981, 1998) and Shaharil (1984).

The Findings: Patterns of Naming

Using the data collected we can examine naming patterns of both the present and the past. Our historical data relates to the male members of royal and noble families. But our data from genealogies and male telephone subscribers reflect little class bias, since they represent people from across social strata. In either case, when the Islamic name pool remains restricted, Islamic names form distinct concentrations. These patterns indicate attempts by Muslims in the region to reproduce, refocus, or re-invent the images that they identify with.

The following analysis will focus on naming patterns related to the three domains of the collective memory in the Malay Muslim world. We can assume that these three domains are stable, but not stationary. Over the past six centuries, reconstructions of the prototype must have taken place, either toward a closer approximation of the prototype or away from it. For instance, the incorporation of Irian Jaya into Indonesian territory led to the emergence of names like Irianto. Secular names of great nationalist heroes or rulers such as Hadiningrat and Sukarno also entered into people's choice of names. Further, some religious revival movements, for example the Malaysian *dakwah* movements of the 1970s, brought a shift toward closer approximations of the prototype. The primary objective of these movements has been to impel Muslims back to Islamic basics, and this has included the adoption of more

¹⁸ The Abang Awal Dynasty is taken from Yusuf (1998:367-368).

traditional Islamic naming elements, including Allah's ninety-nine Beautiful Names and religious affixes such as Abdullah, Ahmad, Mohammad, Noor, and Din. The Shiites and more conservative elements in Aceh, Kelantan, and Terengganu, for example, came to resist adopting the names of the first three caliphs and proud of having the names of the three martyrs at Karbala.

Noble and Ordinary Families in History

The earliest *hikayat* narratives highlight the rulers' common experience of conversion to Islam, and also the accompanying change of their personal names from ethnic to Islamic ones. During the dynastic period, to adopt an Islamic name was not only a religiously rewarding act, but also a political prerequisite for the rulers. The divinization practices of the rulers, like the Hindu-Buddhism's notion of Devaraja and Sufism's concept of Perfect Man, may have rendered name-change a political requirement (Coedès 1968:97-103; Milner 1985).

The adoption of an Islamic name by the many rulers of the kingdoms in Aceh, Brunei, Deli, Melaka, Pasai, Patani, and Sarawak undoubtedly reflected a quest for Islamic identity. But the strength of that identity hinged upon personal motivation. A strong Islamic identity requires a complete replacement of ethnic names and titles with Islamic ones, including the teknonymic system.

The principal historical source regarding naming is genealogies of rulers, and royal and aristocratic families (Finestone and Shaharil 2002; Khoo 1991; Lee 1995). The data cover 33 kingdoms, courts, and locations in insular South-east Asia from year 1136 to 1991. Key locations include Borneo, Java, Maluku, Sulu, Sumatra, Timor, and the Malay Peninsula.

These historical genealogies show that a high proportion of royal and noble family members of the major Muslim kingdoms adopted Islamic names as early as the twelfth century, and only 14 percent (78 people) did not adopt Islamic names. This proportion of non-Islamic names is still smaller if we exclude the Javanese names of the Mataram royal families. Of the names of Javanese rulers, the Mangkurat family contributes five cases; Hamengku-Buwana 10 cases; and Paku-Buwana 12 cases. Most, if not all of the Javanese kings' naming affixes (e.g., Nagara) are tribal, ethnic, or Sanskrit rather than Islamic. Even names of sultans, such as Hamengku-Buwana (which translates as "Sovereign of the World") and Paku-Buwana ("Axis of the World"), are not of Islamic origin. Other distinguished affixes not of Islamic include "di-nata" (e.g., Demang Tirtanata, Pangeran Buminata), "Ningrat" (e.g., Sema-ningrat, the ancestress of the Majapahit rulers), Hadiningrat (which means "the Finest

of the World”), “Kesuma” or “Kusuma” (e.g., Adipati Natakusuma), and “Nagara” or “Negara” (e.g., Dipanagara and Cahranagara).¹⁹

Siblings and offspring of the Mataram rulers also assumed merely Javanese names, and many such names, or parts of each name, have become names of potency in modern Indonesian and particularly Javanese society. The most notable ones include Kusumo-diningrat, Noto-kusumo, Suryo-sosro-diningrat, Ambar-kusumo, and Mangku-diningrat. Elsewhere, certain names of rulers of Kutai, a Javanese-based kingdom (Finestone and Shaharil 2002), have also become names of political potency in modern Indonesian and Javanese society (e.g., Sosro Nagoro, Mangku, Nagoro). Mataram should probably not be classified as an Islamic name or a Sultanate. Like Muslim names in other parts of the world, Muslim names in Southeast Asia form patterns, especially among the royal families.

From among the designated ten names (Table 1), we find that, beginning from the time of the earliest data in 1136, more than 75 percent of the 243 noble Muslims adopted names from two main clusters, namely Abdul (35.8 percent) and Mohamad (39.2 percent). While Mohamad accounts for 71 (29.2 percent) of the 243 cases, Ahmad’s share is 10 percent. The Shiite Imams cluster (Ali, Hassan, and Hussein) makes up 10 percent, and the remaining names constitute less than 10 percent. Of the 87 members in the Abdul cluster, 37.9 percent have the name Abdullah or Allah-uddin, 16.1 percent Abdul Jalil, 9.2 percent Abdul Rahman, and 5.8 percent Abdul Aziz (Table 2).

Other than the designated popular names, eight other Muslims names were also popular among celebrities in history. These, when combined with the most popular 10, cover a total of 323 noble individuals. The distribution of these 18 popular Muslim names among the 323 nobles, in descending order, is as follows: the Abdul-Abdullah cluster (26.9 percent), Mohammad (22 percent), Ahmad (7.4 percent), the Ali/Hussein/Hassan cluster (7.4 percent), the Abu Bakar/Omar/Osman cluster (6.2 percent), and Mahmud (5.3 percent). Names that account for less than 5 percent of the 323 cases include Ibrahim, Iskandar, Ismail, Mansur, Musa, Muzaffar, Omar, Osman, Sulaiman, and Zain (Zain-al). These eight less popular Muslim names, of which there are 80 in all, account for 15.7 percent of the 510 Muslim cases.

When all the 510 celebrities in the database are considered, based on the same counting principle, the two most popular name clusters across Southeast Asian cultures and societies over the past 10 centuries have been the ninety-

¹⁹ The sources are as follows: *Babad Jaka Tingkir* (in Florida 1995), *Babad Tanah Djawi* (in Moedjanto 1986), *Hikayat Deli* (in Milner 1982), *Nine Saints of Java* (Rinkes 1996) and *Sejarah Melayu* (Brown 1970).

TABLE 1. Distribution of Muslim names of the royal families in Insular Southeast Asia since year 1136.*

Name Clusters	Total	As % of 10 Designated Names (N = 243)	As % of 18 Popular Names (N = 323)	As % of All Muslim Names (N = 510)
Abdul/Abdullah Cluster	87	35.8	26.9	17.0
The Prophet's Cluster:				
Mohamad	71	29.2	22.0	13.9
Ahmad	24	10.0	7.4	4.7
Three Shia Imams Cluster:				
Ali/Hassan/Hussein	24	10.0	7.4	4.7
Three Early Caliphs Cluster:				
Abu Bakar/Omar/Osman	20	8.4	6.2	4.0
Mahmud Cluster	17	7.0	5.3	3.3
Non-Clustered Names:				
Ibrahim	11		3.4	2.1
Iskandar	8	—	2.5	1.6
Ismail	11	—	3.4	2.1
Mansur	10	—	3.1	2.0
Musa	8	—	2.5	1.6
Muzafar	10	—	3.1	2.0
Sulaiman	11	—	3.4	2.1
Zain (Zainal)	11	—	3.4	2.1
Less popular names	265	—	—	52.0
Secular Names	78	—	—	4.0*

* Based on a total of 588 cases, both Muslim (510) and secular (78).
Source: Finestone and Shaharil (2002); Khoo (1991); and Lee (1995).

TABLE 2. Distribution of names in the Abdul cluster among the royal families since year 1136.*

Names	Number	Percentage
Abdullah/Allah-uddin	33	37.9
Abdul Jalil	14	16.1
Abdul Rahman	8	9.2
Abdul Aziz	5	5.8
Others	27	31.0
Total	87	100.0

* Source: Derived from Table 1.

nine Beautiful Names (17 percent) and the two names of the Prophet (18.6 percent).

The findings presented above fit well with the general naming patterns in this region of the Muslim world, if we excluded royal family members of the Javanese Mataram courts. Adoption of Islamic names during Mataram's few hundred years of reign is, surprisingly, only an ephemeral phenomenon. Sultan Agung and Sultan Hamengkubuwana of Jogjakarta only changed the dynastic title from *Susuhunan* (King) to *Sultan*, and the regal names remained ethnic, for example Agung and Hamengkubuwana. Rulers in other courts of the Mataram, not only retained customary Javanese regal names, for example Paku Alam, Amangkurat, Mangku Nagoro, and Pakubuwana, but their dynastic titles were also addressed as "king" or its Javanese equivalents. The complexity of this naming pattern signals the uneasy religious course that was pursued by the Mataram kings. Over their few-hundred-year reign, there were a few authoritative attempts to transform the empire into an Islamic regime, but they were short-lived. The case of Mataram's Pakubuwana II's court may explain some of the complexities involved. For the most part, Hindu-Buddhist-Javanese and Islam are the two essential sources that competed for the spiritual authority of the Mataram. Ricklefs' (1998:337) observation underscores the root of the complexity: "These two had always been mixed . . . and labeled Islamic overall." His comment is more broadly applicable to the religious and social structure of Javanese society over the past hundred years or so.

With regard to our genealogical survey, of the 876 personal names collected from the Muslims in the region, with cases dating as far back as the 1870s, 63.7 percent were Islamic names but 36.3 percent were not (Table 3). When we compare the six societies—namely Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand—the highest percentages of Muslims who adopted secular names were found in the Philippines (52.5 percent) and Indonesia (51.1 percent). By contrast, a very high percentage of Muslims have Islamic names in Thailand (89.6 percent), Singapore (86.3 percent), Brunei (77.7 percent) and Malaysia (68.7 percent). Among those who acquired Islamic names, 240 or 43 percent of the 558 Muslims actually adopted one of the 10 designated popular Islamic names. Again, the Abdul and the Mohamad clusters account for nearly 80 percent of the cluster total.

Muslim Individuals across Cultures

From the lists of telephone subscribers (Table 4) we learn that Islamic names adopted by Muslims form patterns regardless of their nationality or ethnicity,

TABLE 3. Distribution of types of genealogy names and most popular Islamic names in six societies, 1870s-2002.*

Societies	Types of Names		Total
	Secular Names	Islamic Names	
Brunei	23 (22.3%)	80 (77.7%)	103
Indonesia	188 (51.1%)	180 (48.9%)	368
Malaysia	41 (31.3%)	90 (68.7%)	131
Philippines	42 (52.5%)	38 (47.5%)	80
Singapore	16 (13.7%)	101 (86.3%)	117
Thailand	8 (10.4%)	69 (89.6%)	77
Total	318 (36.3%)	558 (63.7%)	876
The Ten Designated Names (N=240)			
Abdul-Abdullah		72 (30.0%)	—
Ahmad-Mohamad		119 (49.6%)	—
Other Names		49 (20.4%)	—

* Source: Genealogical survey, 2002-2003.

or even their naming system. As we would expect, the outstanding pattern is one that concentrates on the ninety-nine Beautiful Names and the two well-known names of the Prophet. Other popular names include Osman, Omar, Mahmood, Hussein, Hassan, Ali, and Abu Bakar. These designated Muslim names, which are grouped into five clusters, are spread over 10 societies: Brunei, Singapore, and Indonesia (Aceh, Bali, Jakarta Pusat, and Jogjakarta); Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur, and Pahang, Kelantan, and Terengganu combined); the southern Philippines (Mindanao) and southern Thailand (Patani).

The five clusters of designated Muslim names in the 10 societies also show patterns of concentration (Table 4), with some territorial variation. Names that predominate are Allah's ninety-nine names, including Abdullah, which account for slightly over half, or 50.7 percent (32,521 cases).²⁰ This cluster of Allah's Beautiful Names displays a range from Kuala Lumpur's high of 57.3 percent (5,387 Muslims) to Jogjakarta's low of 21 percent (265 Muslims). In absolute numbers, the cases of Pahang, Kelantan, and Terengganu (P/K/T)

²⁰ The base for calculating percentages of telephone subscribers is the sum total of the subscribers with the 10 designated names. These percentages would be much smaller if subscribers with other names were taken as a base. However, the distribution so obtained is by-and-large nationally representative. The same computational principle also applies to both types of genealogical data.

TABLE 4. Contemporary naming among Muslims in Southeast Asia, 2002.*

Societies	Abdul- Abdullah	The Prophet		Grand Shiite Imams			First Three Caliphs			Mahd	Total No.
		Ahmad	Mohd	Ali	Hassan	Husein	Abu Bakar	Omar	Osman		
Brunei	1,358 47.6%	349 12.2%	328 11.5%	118 4.1%	100 3.5%	97 3.4%	147 5.1%	128 4.5%	175 6.1%	55 1.9%	2,855
Singapore	5,396 54.9%	1,202 12.2%	774 7.9%	353 3.6%	364 3.7%	315 3.2%	318 3.2%	303 3.1%	633 6.4%	172 1.8%	9,830
Indonesia: Jogjakarta	265 21.0%	347 27.5%	451 35.8%	80 6.3%	40 3.2%	10 0.8%	8 0.6%	31 2.5%	16 3%	12 1.0%	1,260
Indonesia: Aceh	525 35.1%	87 5.8%	254 17.0%	147 9.8%	118 7.9%	62 4.2%	63 4.2%	41 2.7%	153 10.2%	44 3.0%	1,494
Indonesia: Bali	176 41.1%	78 18.2%	1 0.2%	58 13.6%	41 9.6%	29 6.8%	6 1.4%	27 6.3%	11 2.6%	1 0.2%	428
Indonesia: Jakarta	885 35.9%	679 27.6%	19 0.8%	276 11.2%	208 8.4%	134 5.4%	38 1.5%	92 3.7%	114 4.6%	19 0.8%	2,464
Malaysia: K. Lumpur	5,387 57.3%	2,008 21.3%	67 0.7%	207 2.2%	239 2.5%	233 2.5%	362 3.9%	262 2.8%	538 5.7%	103 1.1%	9,406
Malaysia: P/K/T	18,331 51.2%	4,367 12.2%	5,630 15.7%	872 2.4%	1,209 3.4%	1,263 3.5%	948 2.7%	875 2.5%	1,821 5.1%	475 1.3%	35,791
Philippines: Mindanao	74 27.1%	23 8.4%	27 9.9%	20 7.3%	32 11.7%	19 7.0%	25 9.2%	24 8.8%	28 10.2%	1 0.4%	273
Thailand: Patani	124 35.9%	35 10.2%	91 26.4%	22 6.4%	8 2.3%	8 2.3%	—	10 2.9%	30 8.7%	17 4.9%	345
Total No	32,521	9,175	7,642	2,153	2,359	2,170	1,915	1,793	3,519	899	
Percentage	50.7%	14.3%	11.9%	3.3%	3.7%	3.4%	3.0%	2.8%	5.5%	1.4%	64,146
Ranking	(1)	(2)	(3)	(7)	(5)	(6)	(8)	(9)	(4)	(10)	

* Notes: P/K/T=Pahang, Kelantan and Terengganu. The percentages are based on the total number of bearers of the designated 10 names, and not the population of the nation. Mohd=Mohamad, Mohammed, Muhamed, etc.; Mahd=Mahmud, Mahmuud, Mahmood, etc.; Husein=Hussein, Husain, Husin, Hosyan.

Source: Telephone directories, 2002.

together top the list with 18,331 Muslims, followed by 5,396 Singaporean Muslims and 5,387 Muslims in Kuala Lumpur.

The second most popular name is Ahmad, which is Mohamad's other name; it accounts for 14.3 percent (9,175 individuals) of the designated 10 names in the 10 regional societies. In Jakarta Pusat, people named Ahmad make up 27.6 percent of the 679 cases; in Jogjakarta 27.5 percent (347 cases); in Kuala Lumpur 21.3 percent (2,008); in Bali 18.2 percent (78); in Brunei 12.2 percent (349); in both Singapore (1,202) and P/K/T (4,367), 12.2 percent; in Patani, 10.2 percent (35), in Mindanao, 8.4 percent (23), and lastly in Aceh, 5.8 percent (87). Mohamad ranks third among the region's most popular Muslim names, applying to 11.9 percent or 7,642 Muslims. Among the 10 societies in

the region, Jogjakarta has the most Mohamads, at 35.8 percent (451 Mohamads). It is also quite popular in other societies, such as Patani (26.4 percent; 91 cases), Aceh (17 percent; 254), P/K/T (15.7 percent; 5,630), and Brunei (11.5 percent; 328).

The least popular name of the 10 designated names among Muslims is Mahmud (899 people) and it accounts for only 1.4 percent. It is followed by Omar (2.8 percent) and Abu Bakar (3.0 percent). The Shiite name cluster—Ali (3.3 percent), Hussein (3.4 percent), and Hassan (3.7 percent)—accounts for about 10.4 percent of the 10 popular names. Societies that show a concentration of Ali, which is generally perceived to indicate religious conservatism, are Bali (13.6 percent) and Jakarta Pusat (11.2 percent). In terms of absolute numbers, the two names of the Prophet in P/K/T make up 9,997 cases (2,075 Muslims in Kuala Lumpur and 1,976 in Singapore). In sum, almost 77 percent of the region's Muslims adopted either Allah's ninety-nine names or the Prophet's two well-known names.

Just as there is variation across societies, there is also variation within each society, due to diverse ethnicity. Within Indonesia, there are variations in the choice of names in Jogjakarta, Aceh, Bali, and Jakarta Pusat. In Jogjakarta, the most preferred names are from the Mohamad cluster, which accounts for 63.3 percent of the 10 designated names (Mohamad is 35.8 percent and Ahmad is 27.5 percent). The Mohamad cluster is followed by the Abdul cluster (21 percent). The top three names in Aceh are the Abdul cluster (35.1 percent), the Mohamad cluster (22.8 percent), and Osman (10.2 percent). The corresponding choices in Bali are the Abdul cluster (41.1 percent), Ahmad (18.2 percent), and Ali (13.6 percent). In Jakarta Pusat, the Abdul cluster accounts for 35.9 percent, followed by Ahmad (27.6 percent) and Ali (11.2 percent). Interestingly, in both Bali and Jakarta few Muslim men are named Mohamad (only 0.2 and 0.8 percent, respectively).

In Peninsular Malaysia, the preferred Abdul cluster (57.3 percent) and Ahmad (21.3 percent) predominate in Kuala Lumpur; together, these two names account for 78.6 percent of the designated 10 names. In the three north-eastern Malaysian states that are well known for Islamic conservatism (Pahang, Kelantan, and Terengganu or P/K/T), the three most preferred names are the Abdul cluster (51.2 percent), Mohamad (15.7 percent), and Ahmad (12.2 percent); they account for 79.1 percent of all Muslim names in these three Malaysian states.

Noteworthy is that in P/K/T Mohamad (15.7 percent) edges out Ahmad (12.2 percent), which enjoys the second place in Kuala Lumpur (21.3 percent). But, surprisingly, in Kuala Lumpur only 0.7 percent of men are named Mohamad. This difference is probably random, and amounts to a mere 3.5 per-

cent. The vast difference between Mohamads (under 1 percent) and Ahmads (21.3 percent) in Kuala Lumpur is clearly more significant. Elsewhere in Indonesia, as presented above, Mohamad does not appear to appeal in either Bali (0.2 percent) or Jakarta (0.8 percent). Degrees of Islamization and urbanization may explain some of the variation in the distribution of Mohamad, especially when Patani's 26.4 percent and Jogjakarta's 35.8 percent use of the name are considered.

The above findings seem to be in line with an ecological explanation for Islamization in insular Southeast Asia (Mak 2002:108-222). Levels of Islamization vary from locality to locality within a nation. To interpret the findings in terms of collective memory is to say that each local collectivity constructs its own images of the past, or that those who identify with the same images would tend to form settlements ecologically.

The interesting feature of collective memory is not just how it is routinely passed on and perpetuated, but also how it is reconstructed when it is no longer representative of everyday life. A recollection may be sociologically real within a given frame of time and space; but it may require reconstruction when it becomes unreal in another context. Many Southeast Asian Chinese had the experience of rewriting their collective memories during and after the British colonial period, and also during the opening up of the China market. Some groups at some time de-sinicized, while in other contexts others re-sinicized. Malay and Javanese Muslims may also have had similar memory rewriting experiences (although not necessarily connected to colonial rule). Certainly in naming they have. We can make an analogy with physical gestures. When physical gestures are performed constantly in everyday life, the performance itself is an act aimed at reconstructing a prototype of rightful posture associated with one's class. The reconstruction is almost unconscious, until, that is, the performer undergoes a drastic change in class status. Routine naming in a similar way remains an unconscious reconstruction of a prototype until some tragedy or critical event occurs.

Naming itself will become an imaging device when a younger generation succeeds names of past generations. The extent of name succession is unknown for the Paiwan tribe (Chiang 1999) or the Langalanga (Guo 2003). It seems, however, that while name succession between two immediate generations is rare, across three or more generations it is not. For instance, among the Lauan in Fiji, 40 percent inherited names from their fathers' fathers, fathers' mothers, grand uncles or grand aunts (Arno 1994:25-26).

Table 5 contains genealogical survey data that the clusters of Abdul and Mohammad have been the most sought-after names in the Malay Muslim world, regardless of generation and irrespective of ethnicity and political iden-

tity. For all generations, the Abdul cluster accounts for 72 Muslim names, the Mohamad cluster 112, and the remaining names range from four Abu Bakars to 14 Huseins. The same table also shows changes in naming practice over some seven generations. The trend of change in the Abdul cluster fluctuates radically with a range difference of 27.7 percentage points since the third generation. For the seventh-generation respondents, only 4.2 percent are given the Abdul cluster of names; but since the sixth generation distribution of the name over seven generations has fluctuated from 9.7 percent (sixth generation), to 29.2 percent (fifth), 31.9 percent (fourth), 12.5 percent (third), 11.1 percent (second) and 1.4 percent for the first generation, around 1870-1890. For the Mohamad cluster, its distribution since the third generation onward appears to be more stable, fluctuating between 10.9 percent and 29.7 percent for the comparable period.

As presented, the findings give the impression that an intergenerational succession of names took place in the Malay Muslim world. But this impression is merely a product of the effect of aggregate data. The reality is that there has been almost no such succession of names *within lineages*, although names are often repeated across lineages.

TABLE 5. The most popular names/name clusters across generations and societies.*

Most Popular Names	Present/ 7th Gn: 1990-	6th Gn: 1970- 1989	5th Gn: 1950- 1969	4th Gn: 1930- 1949	3rd Gn: 1910- 1929	2nd Gn: 1890- 1909	1st Gn 1870- 1889
Estimated Age Bracket	<20	20-39	40-59	60-79	80-99	100-119	129+
Abdul and Abdullah (N=72)	3 4.2%	7 9.7%	21 29.2%	23 31.9%	9 12.5%	8 11.1%	1 1.4%
Mohamad & Ahmad (N=112)	19 16.8%	30 26.8%	22 19.6%	24 21.4%	12 11.6%	4 3.6%	1 0.9%

* Note: Gn = Generation. The estimated age bracket of our respondents is 20-59, in year 2002.

Source: Genealogical survey, 2002-2003.

One of the most painful recollections in the history of Islam is the Karbala tragedy. Muslims are well-versed in Islam's permanent ideological split when Caliph Ali, the Prophet's son-in-law cum nephew, was not appointed to succeed the Prophet as the rightful supreme religious leader, or Imam, in three instances. Ali eventually ascended to the Imamship only after Abu Bakr (632-

634 A.D.), Umar ibn al-Khattab (634–644 A.D.), and Uthman ibn Affan (644–656 A.D.). He was then assassinated five years after the ascent (656–661 A.D.). The tragedy did not end here, since Ali's two sons Hassan and Hussein (Hussayn), borne by his wife Fatimah, also became martyrs in a battle at Karbala²¹ in 680 A.D. (Hodgson 1974:217–223). The split between Caliph Ali's followers, or the Shiites, and those of the first three Caliphs, or the Sunnites, had since intensified.

With the Karbala issue as background, both the Shiites and the Sunnites began to revise Islam according to their own perspectives. Of interest to us here is a Shiite resistance to adopting the names of the first three Caliphs, due to the Karbala incident (Schimmel 1992:59–72, 99). The names of Ali, Hussein, and Hassan have special meaning for the Shiites, and they are evocative of the Karbala tragedy and the martyr spirit. The Muslims in Aceh, Kelantan, Terengganu, and sometimes Brunei are said to have experienced strong Shiite influence and hence they are more inclined to adopt these three names. On the same basis, they are less inclined to take names of the first three Caliphs. Table 4 shows that in Brunei 4.1 percent of Muslims are named Ali; 3.5 percent are named Hassan; and 3.4 percent are named Hussein. As a cluster, these names constitute 11 percent of the 10 designated popular Muslim names.

In Aceh there is a similar distribution of the historic Shiite cluster, at 21.9 percent; of which 9.8 percent have the name Ali, 7.9 percent Hassan, and 4.2 percent Hussein. Comparatively, in P/K/T, the overall distribution of the three names is 9.3 percent, which breaks into 2.4 percent (872) named Ali, 3.4 percent (1,209) Hassan, and 3.5 percent (1,263) Hussein.

If we use naming as an indicator, collective identity among Shiites appears to be strongest in Aceh, followed by Brunei and P/K/T. Few would be puzzled by such a finding regarding the Shiite naming taboo because it fits well with the commonsense view. What might defy the commonsense belief is the Shiite outlook on Bali, given that island's entrenched Hindu-Buddhist roots. In Bali, while only 10 percent of its population is Muslim, around 30 percent of those Muslims have the three Shiite historic names. That is, 13.6 percent are named Ali, 9.6 percent Hassan, and 6.8 percent Hussein. In Jakarta Pusat, 25 percent have these names: 11.2 percent Ali, 8.4 percent Hassan and 5.4 percent Hussein. These findings are convincing enough to challenge the association between Islamic conservatism and the mere presence of bearers of certain Islamic names.

A related piece of information, available only for Aceh, Brunei, and

²¹ Karbala is a town in present-day Iraq, about 150 kilometers south of Baghdad.

Kuala Lumpur, relates to Shiite parents' concerns over the naming taboo.²² This used to be an aspect of the Shiites' desire to perpetuate received traditions, but it seems to be of less importance in the modern Malay Muslim world. Table 6 shows that a few parents who bore the names of Ali, Hassan, or Hussein have already started to name their children after the three Grand Sunnite Imams. Compared to the 10 selected Muslim names in Southeast Asia, the distribution ranges from Aceh's 1.2 percent, to Jakarta Pusat's 0.2 percent, Brunei's 0.6 percent, Kuala Lumpur's 0.8 percent, and Singapore's 0.7 percent. Insignificant though these percentages may seem, the finding nevertheless signals some sort of "structural amnesia" in Shiite naming practices. Or might this be attributed to the "Muhammad Hanifah effect"?

The Karbala tragedy has been popularized in the *Hikayat Muhammad Hanafiyyah* (Brakel 1975:117-266; Winstedt 1991:182-187), or HMH. This *hikayat* is certainly an invented piece of collective memory. Like many other early *hikayats*, HMH blends history with mythology. The historical part is found in the description of Caliph Ali's two sons and the Karbala incident. The legendary part focuses on Muhammad Hanifah (i.e., Hanafiyyah) who claims to be Ali's son, or the half-brother of Husain after the latter was assassinated. The story is about how Muhammad Hanifah brings justice back to his two deceased "half-brothers" by, after killing Yazid, installs Husain's son Zain al-Abidin as the Imam. Regarding our interests here, the HMH reinvents history to heal the Shiite's wound that is attributable to the act of the Sunnites, and that probably has had some mitigating effects on the naming taboo.

In brief, our findings show first that, historically, Muslims of Malay

TABLE 6. Naming practices of the Shiite fathers in five nations, 2002.*

Muslim Societies	Ali, Hassan, and Hussein Named their Children after Abu Bakar, Omar, and Osman	As a % of the Ten Name Clusters
Aceh	18	1.2% (N=1,494)
Brunei	17	0.6 % (N=2,855)
Jakarta	6	0.2 % (N=2,464)
Kuala Lumpur	78	0.8 % (N=9,406)
Singapore	72	0.7 % (N=9,830)

* Source: Telephone directories, 2002.

²² This two-generational search is possible only for those societies using the patronymic system where a father's name is attached.

origins have on the whole tended to adopt Islamic names more than Javanese Muslims have. From the Majapahit era through the Mataram Empire, Javanese Muslims, despite some rulers' Islamic fervor, showed little desire for adopting Islamic names. A second finding is that, under the limiting effects of the onomasticon and by virtue of socio-religious exigencies, Muslim names have formed patterns. The most unique patterns are formed by names related to the God, the Prophet, and great religious mentors. A third is that a succession of names within a lineage is rare in Malay Muslim families, and yet this does not mean that names do not repeatedly appear between generations of unrelated families. This suggests that culture or ethnicity might still be playing an intervening role in reproducing, refocusing, and re-inventing collective memory. A last find is that, if we can judge by naming, Shiites' perceptions of the Karbala incident seem to have been positively refocused.

Discussion and Conclusions

The concept of collective memory has been applied to the history of ethnic minorities, tribal ancestral ties, and the kinship networks of clans (Connerton 1989; Hobsbawn 1983). The experience of the Muslim global brotherhood (*ummahship*), as reflected in the Islamic naming systems presented here, tests whether we can extend the concept's applicability further. We find that the concept has been substantiated and fine-tuned by this global solidarity.

Fentress and Wickham (1992:ix-x) differentiate collective memory from social memory on the grounds that the former tends to turn a sharing individual into a passive person, because group behavior is by and large coercive or involuntary. The prototype of the Muslim memory is collective. The collective memory of Muslims is one that is rooted in feelings toward the Supreme Almighty, the Prophet, and great Imams, whose greatness is imaged and remembered through their names. Being named after any of them is to perpetuate their memory, a practice that exists alongside other perpetuation mechanisms such as the *hikayat*, specific attire, and performative rituals. Muslims, particularly the *ulama*, have responded to Allah's demand that his ninety-nine Beautiful Names be adopted wholeheartedly. According to our findings, these names make up the top naming choices among all Muslims in insular Southeast Asia. Following them in popularity have been the names of the Prophet and the great Imams, and this has been true across both cultures and ethnicities. Like Muslim communities elsewhere, those in Southeast Asia display a conventional preference for both Allah's ninety-nine Beautiful Names and the Prophet's two principal names (Mohammad and Ahmad). Of the ninety-nine Beautiful Names, Abdullah (Abdul Allah and Allah-ud-din), Abdul Jalil,

Abdul Rahman, and Abdul Aziz are the more frequently adopted. Between the two names of the Prophet, Mohamad tends in some societies to enjoy more popularity than Ahmad.

Universal naming is a unique Islamic symbol. For a solidarity to become global, it must develop an identity free from the biases of culture, hierarchy, and ethnicity. Other aspects of Muslim behavior such as prayer, diet, attire, and mannerisms contribute to the understanding of the Islamic solidarity, but naming is a more heuristic symbol, it is capable of surmounting tensions between Islamic symbolism and those entrenched in local cultures—value elements such as ancestral worship, class, and ethnocentrism. A Muslim name of Arab tradition is essentially tekonymic, meaning that a Muslim normally has a given or personal name without family names, and that all given names must be related to Islam. However, a number of Arab-speaking Muslim countries (e.g., Turkey, Egypt, and Iran), have over the past century or so begun adopting naming structures that include family names or surnames. Some names, moreover, are rooted in their respective ethnic cultures rather than in Islam. Most Western-trained professionals have taken up Western names and want to be addressed by them (e.g., Edward Said and John Esposito).

Since Southeast Asia is characterized by extreme diversity in culture, ethnicity, and language, the Islamic principle of universal naming has sometimes met with resistance. Our findings confirm the existence of these tensions. For example, some cultures such as the Batak and the Javanese have chosen to maintain their traditional naming systems. The Bataks, regardless of their religious affiliation, remain culturally very conservative, and most of them still retain their 300 or so original lineage names. Thus, for example, a Batak Muslim would prefix his clan name with an Islamic name such as Akbar (Islamic) Nasution (ethnic-clan). This represents a very distinct case of cultural primordialism.

Javanese are noted for not adopting Islamic names, probably due to their culture's past glory and pride. From the Majapahit era through the Mataram Empire Javanese Muslims in particular showed little consistency in, or desire for adopting Islamic names. Historically, when elite Javanese Muslims did adopt Islamic names, we can explain their decisions by politico-historical advantages that the names bestowed, as is evident from the cases of Sultan Agung and Sultan Hamengkubuwana. Many powerful dynastic rulers of the past did not rule merely through naked power; they also laid claim to a divine order or to mystical power. The founders used to impress upon their subjects that only a ruler could tap the resources of the Almighty. The acquisition of a sacred name was thus a first step in the deification process. In modern times,

some leaders have adopted Islamic names for political exigency of a different kind. Many contemporary Javanese Muslims retain their ethnic names, and most significantly names of potency traceable to the glorious Mataram and Majapahit royal families. Names affixed with part of the royal family names, such as “Ningrat,” “Kusuma,” and “Nagara,” have been extracted from a memorized, historic name pool. Other names that reflect capitalist rather than historic influences—**Dr. J. B. Habibie**, Abdurrahman **Wahid**, **Dr. Amien Rais**, **Anita Sarawak**, or **Lily** Abdul Rahim—reveal tensions between the two symbolic systems.

On the other hand, Muslims of Malay origins, notably those living in Brunei, Malaysia, Aceh, Madura, the Riau Archipelago, and West Kalimantan, are by and large more inclined to adopt Islamic names than are Javanese Muslims. However, they are becoming more engrossed with social status, and some Malay celebrities are decorating their Islamic names with presumably incompatible secular honorifics such as Dato', Dato' Seri, Tan Seri, Tun, Tengku, Nik, and Wan.

Our findings confirm that a noticeable proportion of modern Muslims are forgetting the content of the Muslim collective memory. They have acquired secular honorifics or non-Islamic names, and Western names like Peter, John, or Mary. This emerging trend could well be a result of connections with capitalism that generally require convenient names of address. In the same vein, names may be decorated with secular titles due to social, political, and business requirements. That the teknonymic naming structure tends to suppress individuality or identity is another plausible explanation why people are resisting it, a point to which we shall return.

Some earlier studies (e.g., Chiang 1999) have conceptualized succession of names between generations as an effective mechanism for perpetuating the collective lineage memory. The main purpose of the practice appears to be to strengthen the clan. Among Southeast Asian Muslims, such a practice²³ has not been common, partly because what the names are intended to perpetuate is not a lineage but brotherhood across lineages. In effect, there are only two weak cases of name succession in our data from 176 genealogies covering Singapore, Patani, Peninsular Malaysia, Mindanao in the southern Philippines, and Indonesia. The two weak cases refer to the names of Zukarno Alang (a Maguindanaon, southern Philippines) and an Indonesian Batak clan named Rambe. In the first case, the respondent himself is Alang Senior and his son is Alang Junior. The shared given name “Zukarno” apparently is a remem-

²³ This refers specifically to the succession of personal names, but not religious prefixes or titles.

branch of the past Indonesian President Sukarno. In the Batak case, both the grandfather and great-grandfather share the given name "Panaluan," where the great-grandfather had earned the title "Raja." The potency of the name probably prompted his son (the respondent's grandfather) to take it as well. The succession of great ancestor names, despite the element of class it embodies, is commonly encountered among elites (e.g., descendants of Prophet Muhammed). Our findings are in line with a study on the fifteenth-century Javanese villagers among whom "cases in which a grandparent is identified with a grandchild are rare" (Christie 1983:14).

Given the naming restrictions on Muslims, it remains a puzzle why the succession of names did not take place within the individual lineages, while we find names repeated often among unrelated families. This seems to have defied a logical association between highly restrictive onomasticon and the frequent repetition of names. This does happen in the genealogies of ordinary Malay Muslims, a finding that contradicts Malay marital preferences. The Malays (Javanese too) are prone to marry close cousins (Husin 1975; Koentjaraningrat 1985:100-105), which is a sign of clannish inclinations, apart from factors of limited marriage choices.

The puzzle certainly leads one to suspect whether there may after all be a naming taboo in the Malay-Javanese community. This juxtaposes a paradox, that Muslims are more inclined toward Islamic brotherhood than they are toward clan ties. Part of the answer may lie in the Syariah law: it prohibits marriages between first cousins, and this is probably an indication that kinship has been removed from the religious solidarity (e.g., Arskal and Azyumardi 2003:286-287).

Another part of the answer lies with Malay custom (*adat*). Our field data disclose that name succession in Malay families is taboo, because Malay folks believe that carrying on the ancestors' names is too heavy a socio-spiritual burden for the younger generation to bear. They believe that if the younger generation did so they would regularly fall sick or otherwise experience misfortune. To strike a balance between the love of a particular name and the succession taboo, a common Malay practice is to slightly change the name in the younger generation, either in sound or spelling. For example, popular names such as Amat and Mat are variants of Ahmad and Mohamad. The Javanese seem to share this belief that name succession between generations is inauspicious; it might bring about a death in the intervening generation (Christie 1983:14).

In other sub-cultures that adopt teknonymic systems, for example some Minangkabau and the Toba Batak (Loeb 1935:64-66, 115), to publicly and directly expose the names of the patriarchs is taboo. The general remedial

practice among these people is to use an inverted “filial link” such as “Father of” (e.g., Abu, Ama-ni) or grandfather of (Ompu-ni) to label a personal identity. While Malay Muslims are comfortable with Islamic names and the teknonymic system, some Batak Muslims are not.

Apart from these cultural taboos, a structure of teknonym that employs a generic filial link of “being child of” is also a hindrance to the practice of name succession. There is an intrinsic contradiction between marking filial links and name succession. A very common form of filial link in the region is “bin” or an equivalent. When someone is named “X bin Y” and his father is “Y bin Z,” and grandfather “Z bin A,” it is not structurally or grammatically wrong for X to name his son as “Z” so as to maintain his grandfather in memory. In expressive relational terms, the link between generations would upset the family’s genealogical order, for Z as a grandfather of X would now be read as “the grandfather (Z) is the son of his (Z’s) grandson,” or “Z bin X.” To the incumbent X, “Z bin X” would literally read as “my grandfather Z is a son of mine (X).”

The problem of repeating names between generations may be well under control, but it is difficult to deny an incoming son-in-law just because he has a name identical to the paternal in-law’s family members. In the absence of ethnographic data, a good guess is that changes of personal names among Malay Muslims has been made flexible enough to accommodate a son-in-law.

The teknonymic impact may also explain partially why there are few cases of name succession among the Javanese *Santri* Muslims. But *Abangan* Muslims, who do not adopt Islamic names at all, do succeed to names of their ancestors, mostly through a subtle infix system. For instance, many of the *priyayi* Javanese incorporated their elite ascendants’ names as a component in their very long names. These naming components include “ningrat,” “Nagara,” “di-Nata,” and “Kusuma” (Koentjaraningrat 1985:104–105, 324), which are of either Hindu or Sanskrit origins. They are motivated here more by matters of class than remembrance.

The Muslims have over the centuries reconstructed their prototype collective memory around the principle of universal naming. One significant reconstruction must have taken place immediately after the Karbala tragedy. That reconstruction would reveal the scope as well as the direction of change in the Muslim collective memory, but naming data surrounding this historical incident are unfortunately not available. Many more reconstructions might be ongoing, unnoticed, in everyday life; the present study is one of the few that have explored such a reconstruction process.

Our findings show that through naming the cleavage between the Shiites and the Sunnites has been mitigated. There was a period when Shiite fathers

refrained from naming their sons after the first three caliphs, for to do so would mean commemorating the three caliphs. By contrast, it is not taboo for Sunni fathers to name their sons after Ali, Hassan, or Hussein. This indicates that the concept of collective memory is applicable to understanding the Islamic brotherhood, and that naming constitutes a key symbol among the Muslims.

It is of interest that, as our findings show, some Shiite fathers have also named their sons after the first three caliphs. It remains to be seen whether this indicated a "structural amnesia" in the Shiite's collective memory, expressed through naming. Data from Kelantan, Terengganu, and Aceh, which have larger communities of Shiites, affirm that the naming taboo has been relaxed, due perhaps to the Muhammad Hanifah effect.

On the whole, the three famous Shiite names are adopted by fewer Muslims in Brunei, Malaysia, and Singapore than among their counterparts in Indonesia. But, surprisingly, it is the Acehnese Alis, Hassans, and Husseins who most often name their children after the first three Sunni Grand Imams. Similar, but fewer, cases are also found in other regional Muslim societies. This finding suggests that Southeast Asian Muslims are in a process of refocusing their collective memory away from the Karbala split. If naming is any indication, the Acehnese experience could well represent a case of "structural amnesia."

All of the above suggests that embedded customs and historicity could have contributed to a tension between Islamic and local symbolic systems that lead to a reconstruction of collective memory. The Javanese Muslims benefited much from the past glory of powerful empires, and they continue to reconstruct their collective memory through incorporating past great leaders' names into their personal names. It is hard to imagine that they share a single collective memory with Muslims of Malay origins. The Malay Muslims have practiced Islam since the collapse of the powerful Hindu-Buddhist kingdoms in the fifteenth century. By contrast, the great Majapahit and Mataram were dominating a vast part of Java continuously from the early fourteenth century until the early twentieth century.

To conclude, a few words on the location of naming effects would be in order. In most naming systems, the meaning of a personal name is imposed not by the person bearing the name, but by the name-givers, who are normally the patriarchs. In this respect, it is the name-givers who reconstruct the collective memory, rather than the generation of the name-bearers. There is therefore a one-generation time-lag in collective memory that is constructed through naming. In other words, the effect of naming is theoretically confined to the preceding generation. With regard to titles and honorifics, inherited ones are

given at birth, but many more are acquired during life.

This study may not have met the rigid methodological requirement of traditional anthropology. However, it has broad anthropological implications if we use the findings to generate hypotheses for future ethnographical work. Further field studies will help further develop the concept of collective memory. So far, the collective memory in the Malay Muslim world shows a few inherent characteristics that may be fruitful for theory reformulation. First, naming can be the content, the imaging device and the perpetuating mechanism of a collective memory. Second, the Islamic collective memory is one that will not vanish, although it may change, for the sharers are not bound by space and time, according to the Islamic principles of universality of naming and egalitarianism. Third, our finding on the patterns of collective memory across societies provides a platform for future testing of collective memory's dual role as target of and agent for social change.

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馬來穆斯林世界的命名與集體記憶

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本研究擬透過馬來穆斯林（Muslim）世界的命名制度來凸顯「集體記憶」（collective memory）這概念的包含性。一般而言，歷史與人類學者多應用這個概念來探討族群與家族，其中包括了歷史的改寫，口述歷史，族／系譜記錄以及襲名風俗等等，都是常見的題材。只可惜以命名做為集體記憶的內容及機制，迄今仍鮮有學者做過跨文化的比較研究，原因之一可能是缺乏對有關資料的認識；再者，或許是該概念的運作始終受制於傳統的框架之故。

「集體記憶」的概念實際上至少蘊含三個要件：記憶的內容，攝取記憶的工具，以及延續記憶的機制。本研究側重於記憶內容，但也論及其餘兩個要件。所採用的資料主要有三個來源：電話訂戶的名字，有關歷史上皇族名字的文獻，以及田野蒐集到的族／系譜。

街道命名以懷舊，景點冠上人名以念先賢，後輩襲名為思祖，這些舉動都勾劃出命名與集體記憶的關聯性。若將此關聯性推廣至一個全球性的共同體，則將可以提昇「集體記憶」這個概念的涵蓋面。此外，伊斯蘭的特殊命名制度也可進一步地落實這個概念。

歷史原相是恆久不變地，但建構於該原相的記憶卻會隨時光的流逝而有所改變。同樣地，一個共同體的原本內容如創建條件、神諭、聖言聖行等也應該是始終如一，但對這內容的詮釋卻會因外在環境的改變而不斷地創新。本研究所涉及的共同體的內容乃其特設的名譜，由於它是神諭和聖言的產物，先輩信徒們皆努力地去銘記。只可惜歷經數個世紀的更迭，因外在環境的變遷而導致部分的記憶流失。這些變遷包含了結構性失憶，追隨者原生文化的韌性以及資本主義的衝擊等等。而在實質上這些變遷也給原有名譜提供了新的詮釋，更因此使得該集體記憶不斷地在蛻變。這種蛻變可從特定時空的命名習慣窺見一斑。在時間上，數百年來的皇室命名以及現代田野系譜的模式可提供這方面的探討。空間的情景則指不同文化下所呈現的命名事實。本研究的資料可上溯至十二世紀，範圍則涵蓋了海洋東南亞多個文化體系。

上面所指涉的共同體乃伊斯蘭團契。可蘭經要求信徒取名應依據上蒼阿拉的九十九個屬性。爾後，宗教大師們陸續加進了先知穆罕默德以及各聖賢的名字，好讓伊斯蘭信徒的子子孫孫們從中取名以懷念先賢。這個名譜很自然地遂形塑成穆斯林集體記憶的重要內容。在東南亞諸伊斯蘭社會中，命名並不是其集體記憶全部

的內容，也不是唯一解讀該內容的機制。然而在塑造集體認同或弱化個體性的過程中，它卻是一個不可或缺的環節。

本研究的重要發現有以下幾點：不論時空，一般而言散布於海洋東南亞的馬來穆斯林，或因其原生文化下的個體性並不凸顯，故大多取名自上述特殊名譜。只是原生文化中亦有強調皇室頭銜與身分的，再加上資本主義浪潮銳不可擋，一般有識之士也逐漸開始冠用非伊斯蘭頭銜。與之比較，爪哇族穆斯林則對該名譜持有不同的詮釋。爪哇人的滿者伯夷（Majapahit）與馬達南（Mataram）兩王朝一共統治爪哇達數百年之久，威震遐邇，自然堅守其原生命命名系統，對伊斯蘭特殊名譜，則多淡然處之。

另一重要發現是，在馬來與爪哇族裡的繼名禁忌乃原生文化。這個文化特質正好與伊斯蘭共同體的「去個體化」精神相符。種族與宗親乃個體化的一種表述，在名譜設限的情況下，多代名字不重複應是一種驚訝，卻同時也是一種文化行爲。

關鍵詞：集體記憶，命名，馬來穆斯林世界，去個體化，繼名禁忌。
