

MAP
TO ILLUSTRATE
THE
SIAMMEESE
QUESTION

1893



W. & A. K. JOHNSTON
EDINBURGH & LONDON

COLOURED]

[PRICE SIXPENCE

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MAP TO ILLUSTRATE THE SIAMESE QUESTION
SHOWING THE IMPROVED LIMITS OF FOREIGN CLAIMS, AND THE ADDITIONAL TERRITORY NOW DEMANDS
JULY 1893



NOTES ON SIAM

SIAM, OR Siam (The Land of the Gods), lies in the eastern part of the Indian Archipelago. It is bounded on the north by China, on the north-east by French Indochina, on the east by the Gulf of Thailand, on the south-east by the Andaman Sea, and on the west by the Malay Peninsula. The capital is Bangkok, and the principal cities are Bangkok, Siem Reap, and Vientiane. The population is about 10,000,000.

The Siamese King is Chulalongkorn (Rama V), who ascended the throne in 1893. The kingdom is divided into several provinces, each headed by a Governor, who reports to the King. The kingdom is a constitutional monarchy, and the King is the head of state.

The Siamese people are of the Malay race, and speak the Siamese language. They are a very intelligent and industrious people, and are known for their skill in agriculture and handicrafts.

To illustrate the importance of the Siamese trade with the West, the following table shows the number of the vessels calling at Bangkok, and the tonnage of the goods imported and exported, from 1880 to 1890.

Year	Number of Vessels	Tonnage
1880	100	10,000
1881	120	12,000
1882	150	15,000
1883	180	18,000
1884	200	20,000
1885	250	25,000
1886	300	30,000
1887	350	35,000
1888	400	40,000
1889	450	45,000
1890	500	50,000
Total	2,500	250,000

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GIFT
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CONFIDENTIAL.

AN ACCOUNT OF THE ORIGIN AND
PROGRESS OF SIAMESE INFLUENCE
IN THE MALAY PENINSULA,
1785 TO 1882.

F. A. Swettenham

1882

DS

596.6

M37x

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THE SIAMESE IN THE MALAY PENINSULA.

SIAM, if we may believe Native History, had on many occasions prior to the present century attempted, without success, to establish her supremacy in the Malay Peninsula.

At the time when Captain LIGHT, on behalf of the Honourable East India Company, occupied the Island of Penang with the sanction of the Sultan of Kédah, in July, 1786, the authority of Siam appears to have extended to Sěnggôra on the East Coast, and to a place called Junk Ceylon (a corruption of the name Ujong Sâlang) in almost the same parallel on the West Coast of the Peninsula, the lower and major portion of which is called the Malay Peninsula.

It is possible, indeed probable, that Siam, at this time, may have claimed suzerainty over one or more of the Malay States bordering the Southern Provinces of Siam, but there is nothing to shew that any foreign influence was exerted in any Malay State beyond what was sufficient to procure the sending to Bangkok of the " Bunga Mas " or Golden Flower, a tributary offering which, according to some, is a mere complimentary gift, but according to others must be regarded in the light of tribute and as a sign of vassalage.

The latter, however, is probably not the construction placed upon the sending of these "golden flowers" by the Court of Bangkok, for in years gone by, if now discontinued, it was the practice for Siam to make this very offering to her powerful neighbour—China.

The Malay States which at different times appear to have sent the " Bunga Mas " (or " Bunga Mas dan Pêrak "—gold and silver flowers) to Siam are Kédah, Pêrak, Trěnggânu, Kělantān, Pětāni, but if this offering were a sign of vassalage, there could hardly have been any necessity for that warlike expedition against Kédah in 1821, which led to such a change in the relations between this Malay State and its Siamese conquerors.

Flushed with success, the Siamese pushed on to Pêrak, where they met with but slight resistance; Sêlângor was next threatened, but the determined attitude of Sultan IBRAHIM of Sêlângor, and the action taken by the British Indian Government, not only kept them out of the latter State, but drove them back out of Pêrak, and in Treaties concluded by the British Government with Siam and Pêrak in 1826 provision was made to prevent the Siamese ever again interfering in Pêrak affairs.

But Kêdah fell, and, unsupported by the British, the only ally to whom the Sultan could look for protection against his northern foe, the Siamese became the dominant power in Kêdah, their influence in that State having grown from year to year, till now it is paramount in even the small details of internal government.

How all this was brought about, is clearly told in a paper written by Mr. JOHN ANDERSON, Secretary to the Government of Penang, at the request of Governor FULLERTON in 1824. The paper was afterwards recalled, and so carefully suppressed, that Mr. ANDERSON was obliged to give his word of honour that he had not retained a single copy. One copy did, however, escape, and was reprinted in the *Singapore Chronicle* in 1835.

That journal had, however, in 1854 become almost as rare as ANDERSON's original "Considerations," and Mr. J. R. LOGAN, then the Editor of the *Journal of the Eastern Archipelago*, considering the paper too valuable to be lost sight of, republished it in Vol. VIII. of the Journal.

The Journal itself is now so scarce, that probably not more than three or four complete copies could be found, and whilst the question of Siamese influence in the Malay Peninsula remains on the present doubtful basis, this paper of ANDERSON's must continue to be one of great interest, as shewing by what means a Bhuddist race from a distant land obtained a dominating influence over a portion of the Mahomedan people of the Malay Peninsula.

POLITICAL AND COMMERCIAL CONSIDERATIONS
RELATIVE TO THE MALAYAN PENINSULA
AND THE BRITISH SETTLEMENTS IN
THE STRAITS OF MALACCA.

CONSIDERATIONS ON THE SIAMESE CONQUEST OF KĒDAH AND PĒRAK.

THE intelligence of a sudden invasion, by a large Siamese force from Ligor, of the territories of the King of Kĕdah, the old ally of the British Government, which reached Prince of Wales Island in November, 1821, and the various rumours which prevailed regarding the ulterior objects of the Siamese army, spread terror throughout the island, and, although there was a considerable military force at the Presidency, the alarms of the native population were difficult to be appeased. Many of the wealthy inhabitants buried and concealed their valuable property, while others made preparations for conveying it away to other British Settlements. The supplies of grain, cattle and poultry, from the Kĕdah country, on which Penang had so long chiefly depended, were suddenly withheld, and there was considerable distress amongst the poorer classes, by the increased price of provision.

The prompt and humane measures of Government, however, not only for quieting the fears of the inhabitants, and allaying all apprehensions of an attack by the Siamese, but for obtaining supplies of grain from Bengal and other quarters; while, in the meantime, large issues of rice were made from the Hon'ble Company's stores, which was distributed to the poorer classes at a moderate price, prevented much distress, which must have otherwise ensued, and speedily restored greater confidence in the strength and resources of the Government, which could command ample aid in case of need.

For a better understanding of this unexpected event, it will be proper to take a short review of the circumstances connected with it. On Sunday, the 12th of November, 1821, about noon, a large fleet of praus, full of Siamese, was observed standing into the Kĕdah river, coming in the direction from Trang, a large river to the Northward, where the armament had been equipped. The Pĕnghûlu or Commandant of the fort instantly sent notice of its approach to the Bĕndahâra or General of the Kĕdah Army and the Laksamâna or High Admiral, who were a short distance up the river, and having some apprehensions of treachery, prepared the guns to bear upon the praus, waiting only for the orders of the Bĕndahâra to fire upon them. The General, however, who was taken by surprise, did not choose to authorize this, and determined to employ measures of pacification in the first instance.

The arrival of the Siamese was so sudden, that the Malayan

chiefs had time to assemble only a few of their dependents, with whom they proceeded to the wharf or public landing place, which is about one hundred and fifty yards beyond the fort, and which was surrounded by the Siamese fleet, well armed. The Bëndahâra, Laksamâna, Tëmënggong, and a few of the Këdah chiefs were seated on the covered wharf, and the Siamese ascended in a large body with muskets, spears and other warlike weapons in their hands. The Bëndahâra interrogated them as to the object of their visit, and was informed that they wanted rice, being about to attack the Burmans. The General promised them an immediate supply; but while the conversation was going on, the Siamese had assembled a large party ashore, and surrounded the wharf; they now threw off the mask and told the Këdah chiefs, they had come to seize them and they must submit to be bound. The Bëndahâra and Laksamâna exclaimed, with one accord, "we are betrayed, let us attack them furiously," and instantly drawing their krisses, plunged them into the Siamese who stood nearest them. A general battle now ensued.

The venerable Laksamâna and Tëmënggong, who used to boast that he was invulnerable, with several other chiefs, were soon dispatched, the Bëndahâra was disarmed and bound, and their men, dispirited and panic struck by the loss of their leaders, fled in all directions, pursued by the Siamese, who butchered them in great numbers and put them to death by means the most cruel and revolting to human nature. These operations being observed from the fort, a few guns were now brought to bear upon the Siamese vessels, and two or three were sunk. The Siamese then proceeded to set fire to some of the houses, previously dragging out any of the men who had taken refuge in them, and torturing them to death, pillaging the houses of all their contents that were of any value; and they seized, indiscriminately, all the praus and vessels in the river at the time, amongst which were several small trading boats from Penang.

Having, after a slight opposition, possessed themselves of the fort, which was garrisoned principally by a few Bengal and Chulia sepoy, they dispatched a party immediately to the Kuala Merbau, a large river to the southward, and nearly in sight of Penang fort. On the following day, Monday, they entered the Merbau and met with a slight and ineffectual opposition from a small battery near the mouth of the river, which kept them in check for a short time, and allowed an opportunity for the intelligence of the approach of a hostile fleet to reach the King of Këdah, who was residing in floating houses a few miles further up, where he was forming a new settlement and cutting a canal from that river to the Muda, another large river to the southward, which forms the northern boundary of the British territories on the main.

Hearing that the Siamese force was ascending the river, and having only a very few adherents at hand, he hurried off in the greatest consternation with all his wives and children, and mounting them, together with his most valuable ornaments, and as many dollars as he could collect, upon several elephants, which were fortunately at hand, he proceeded across the jungles, in a direction towards the Prye river, within the territory of the Honourable Company. The King left a large brig and a schooner, on board of which was a large amount of treasure which fell into the hands of the captors. Numbers of his attendants who fled with him, but were not mounted upon elephants, perished from fatigue and hunger in the woods, and particularly, several of his most respectable and venerable chiefs.

The King himself, after five days of severe fatigue and exposure, during which time he separated from several of his elephants, and much of his valuable property, which was no doubt purposely conveyed away in a different direction by his own faithless attendants, to whom he had intrusted it, arrived at a place called Kota, the residence of his brother Tunku SLĒMAN, up the Prye river, where embarking all his followers and property on board four or five praus he descended to the mouth of the river, and solicited the protection of the British Government.

The Governor of Prince of Wales Island, with that humanity and consideration which was due to an ally, instantly granted the protection sought for, and the King was not only provided with suitable accommodations, but a strong guard of Sepoys was posted at his residence, to prevent any attempt to carry him off by force, and he was granted an allowance adequate to maintain himself and numerous family comfortably. His Majesty has remained ever since, in the enjoyment of these advantages, and supports his trials with becoming fortitude and dignity.

On the morning after the King crossed over from Prye, a fleet of fourteen or fifteen Siamese praus was observed standing close along shore in pursuit of His Majesty, and they had actually the audacity to attempt to enter the Prye river, where they believed the King still was. The fleet was driven back by two of the Hon'ble Company's Cruisers, which had strict orders afterwards to prevent any Siamese vessels from coming near the harbour, without previous examination and permission. A few days after this occurrence, the Râja of Ligor sent a letter to the Governor, couched in very haughty and disrespectful terms, desiring the King of Kĕdah to be delivered up to him, a demand which was met by a dignified refusal, accompanied by a salutary admonition as to the style of future correspondence with the representative of the British Government. Some of the Siamese troops having pursued the Malays into the territory of the Hon'ble Company,

near the Kuala Muda, the Government lost no time in despatching a company of Sepoys, under an active officer, Captain CROOKE of the 20th Regt., for the purpose of expelling such daring intruders, and affording protection to such emigrants as might seek shelter under the British flag and escape the persecution of a relentless enemy. The temperate, but at the same time resolute, conduct of that officer in supporting the dignity of British Government, and in seizing and disarming a party of Siamese who made an encroachment upon Province Wellesley, was no doubt calculated to evince to the Siamese Authorities, the power and determination of the British Government to oppose such proceedings, and the moderation of the measures adopted in the first instance.

The natives from Kēdah, and the traders from other countries whose vessels had been seized, and who had been deprived of all their property, now flocked to Penang in thousands, many in small canoes formed of a tree hollowed out. It is scarcely possible to conceive the state of distress and misery in which hundreds of these poor fugitives landed at Penang; men, women and children crowded together for several days in small boats, without any provisions and scarcely any clothing; most of them escaped clandestinely, and many boats which were overloaded with passengers were lost, the emigrants finding a relief from their suffering in a watery grave. Many Malays who were detected in the attempt to escape, were put to death, and the wives and daughters were forcibly dragged from their husbands and fathers and ravished by the Siamese soldiery. The mode of execution was horrible in the extreme, the men being tied up for the most trifling offence, and frequently upon mere suspicion, their arms extended with bamboos, when the executioner, with a ponderous instrument, split them right down from the crown of the head, and their mangled carcases were thrown into the river for the alligators to devour.

The King of Kēdah's second and favourite son, Tunku YAKUB, attempted to escape like the rest, but was pursued and taken, and has since been sent in bonds from Kēdah to Siam. The Bēndahâra, or Prime Minister, after being kept in chains a long time at Kēdah and deceived with hopes of liberation, for which the Penang Government earnestly interceded with the Ligor Chiefs, was carried away and poisoned on the road to Sēnggōra. It is impossible to calculate the number of Malays who have perished by the swords of the Siamese, by the loss of praus on their way to Penang and other places, and by famine and fatigue in the woods. Every aid was administered to the refugees who fled to Penang, and beneficial regulations subsequently made by Government for affording them the means of livelihood. It is proper, in this place, to notice the highly creditable conduct of the late Governor of Malacca, Mr. TIMMERMAN TYSSEN, who

immediately on hearing of the conquest of Kēdah, and having received exaggerated accounts of the Siamese force, and the probability of an attack upon Penang, despatched one of His Netherland Majesty's Frigates, which was lying in Malacca roads at the time, with the handsome offer of co-operation, in case of the Siamese engaging in hostilities, and even the chiefs of some of the surrounding Malayan States were not backward in making respectful tenders of all the aid their limited means would admit of, which were suitably acknowledged by the Government of Penang. Such was the opinion of all the neighbouring Malayan States of the treachery and injustice of the Siamese in attacking Kēdah, and such their apprehension of becoming themselves the victims of their rapacity, that they were eager to employ their utmost efforts to expel the Siamese from Kēdah, and looked up, with full confidence, to the British Government supporting its old ally.

Having effected the complete subjugation of Kēdah, and possessed himself of the country, the Rāja of Ligor next turned his attention to one of its principal dependencies, the Lankawi Islands, and fitted out a strong and well equipped expedition, which proceeded to the principal island, which, independent of possessing a fixed population of between three and four thousand souls, had received a large accession by emigrants from Kēdah. Here too, commenced a scene of death and desolation, almost exceeding credibility. The men were murdered, and the women and female children carried off to Kēdah, while the male children were either put to death, or left to perish. That fine island, from which large supplies were derived, is now nearly depopulated, and such of the male population as did escape, driven from their homes and bereaved of their families, have been carrying on a predatory warfare both with the Siamese and peaceable traders close to Prince of Wales Island. Some of them have settled in Province Wellesley and are employed as cultivators.

Several badly planned and ineffectual attempts have, at different times, been made by small and unorganised bodies of the King of Kēdah's adherents in the country to cut off the Siamese garrison at Kēdah; but these have all been followed by the most disastrous results; not only by the destruction of the assailants, but by increased persecution towards the remaining Malayan inhabitants. The King himself, for some time, was anxious to have made an effort to regain his country, in concert with some native powers which had promised him aid in vessels and men; but he was dissuaded from so perilous and certainly doubtful an enterprise by those who were interested in his cause, and who apprehended his certain overthrow and destruction from such an attempt. There is no doubt, the Siamese were too powerful and too well prepared for any such ill-arranged expedition, as it could

have been within the compass of the Kědah Râja's means to have brought against them, to have had any chance of success ; and it would have been inconsistent with the professed neutrality of the British Government to have permitted any equipments or warlike preparations within its ports ; the more particularly so, as a mission had just proceeded to Siam from the Governor-General of India.

However much disposed the Penang Government might have been, on the first blush of the affair, to have stopped such proceedings on the part of the Siamese, and to have checked such ambitious and unwarrantable aggression ; however consistent and politic it might have been, to have treated the Ligorean Troops as a predatory horde, and expelled them, at once, from the territories of an old and faithful ally of the British Government ; the Mission from the Supreme Government of Bengal to the Court of Siam, and the probable evil consequences of an immediate rupture, were considerations which could not fail to embarrass the Penang Government and render it necessary to deliberate well before it embarked in any measures of active hostility ; while the disposable force on the island, although fully adequate to the safe guardianship and protection of the place, and sufficient to repel any force that the Siamese could possibly bring against it, was yet insufficient for prosecuting a vigorous war, or maintaining its conquests against the recruited legions which the Siamese power could have transported with facility, ere reinforcements could have arrived from other parts of India. Under all these circumstances, the policy of suspending hostilities was manifest, and it was deemed proper to await the orders of the superior and controlling authorities.

But there was a more urgent necessity than even the foregoing considerations dictated, of not acting without the consent of the Supreme Government, as that authority has always declined sanctioning any interference with Siam and Kědah, in the innumerable references which have been made from the chiefs of the Settlement of Penang since Captain LIGHT first took possession, during all which long period of 35 years, the King of Kědah has been subject to incessant alarm and apprehension from the Siamese, and suffered all the oppression they could inflict, without actually possessing themselves of any part of his dominions. The Supreme Government, admitting that Kědah has always been tributary to Siam, has ever objected to any interference that would be likely to excite a collision with the haughty power of Siam, which it appeared to be the object of the British Government to conciliate. It was expected that the Mission would have produced some results advantageous to the interests of our Ally, by the mediation of the Ambassador, and that, at all events the affairs of Kědah

would have been settled upon a proper footing. So far, however, from any of these most desirable objects, which were contemplated, being attained, the Siamese authorities not only assumed a tone of insolence and evasion to all the reasonable propositions of the Ambassador, but signified their expectation that the King of Kēdah should be delivered up to them; and the obstacles which existed to a free commercial intercourse have not been removed.

The King of Ligor, not satisfied with the conquest of Kēdah, and grasping at more extended dominions, under pretence of conveying some messengers from Pêrak, who had carried the *Bunga Mas*, or token of homage, to Kēdah, requested permission for a fleet to pass through Penang harbour, which, being conducted beyond the boundaries by a cruizer, proceeded to Pêrak, and after a short struggle, his forces also possessed themselves of that country, which had been reduced by a Kēdah force in 1818, by the orders of Siam, in consequence of a refusal to send the *Bunga Mas*; while the history of that oppressed State affords no instance of such a demand ever having been made by Siam, or complied with before.

It was understood that Sēlangor, a settlement originally peopled by Bugis, was to be the next place of attack; but the timely preparations and commanding and determined posture of defence assumed by the Râja of that country, deterred the Siamese, for a time, from making the attempt; if we are not misinformed, however, extensive preparations have been long in progress at Trang, for carrying these designs into full effect. There is little doubt, the Siamese contemplate the total overthrow and subjugation of of all the Malayan States on the Peninsula, and the subversion of the Mahomedan religion. Pētani and Trēnggānu, the principal States on the other side of the Peninsula, have long suffered from the Siamese oppressions, and, as it is generally believed, the Râja Muda, or brother of the Emperor of Siam, is about to establish himself at Trang, and the Râja of Ligor has actually proceeded to convey him thither from the capital, Bangkok; there are, no doubt, some schemes in embryo, which it is difficult to conjecture and impossible to foresee.

During the two years that have elapsed since Kēdah fell into the hands of the Siamese, the supplies of provisions to Penang have been very scanty, and everything has been prodigiously enhanced in price. The Government of Prince of Wales' Island, seeing but little prospect of a speedy termination of the disturbances at Kēdah, or a satisfactory settlement of affairs, and anxious to provide for the numerous fugitives who had voluntarily placed themselves under its protection, and become British subjects, considered it advisable to appoint a Resident at Province Wellesley, who had authority to portion out small tracts of land

to such families as might wish to settle permanently and cultivate, to make small advances of cash repayable within a certain period, in grain, and to give every encouragement to the cultivation of padi, and the rearing of cattle and poultry, by which, it was hoped, the island would, ere long, be plentifully supplied with provisions. The population there has had a large increase by the emigrants from Kēdah, and there is every probability, that in time, under good management, and by a conciliatory line of conduct towards the inhabitants, considerable supplies may be obtained from that source. As yet, however, they have scarcely exceeded what was obtained from thence before the capture of Kēdah, the new settlers being, for the most part, indolent and undetermined in their movements.

The longer experience we have had of the Siamese Government of Kēdah, the less does it appear to evince any desire to conciliate the British Government. Several atrocious murders have been perpetrated in the Kēdah river upon some inoffensive and peaceable native traders, subjects of the English Government of Penang, and the whole of their property plundered, as has been fully ascertained, by the connivance if not the direct authority of some of the principal Siamese chiefs; nor have these authorities made any atonement for such outrages, which the British Government has a right to expect, and which it will doubtless enforce. In short, instead of adopting a mild, conciliatory system of administration, calculated to engage the affections of the inhabitants whose country has been wrested from them, there has been one continued scene of the most brutal rapine and carnage, oppression and devastation, that can possibly be imagined. British subjects, with whom, it might have been supposed, they would have had some dread to interfere, have been cruelly put to death, and the British Government not only slighted and insulted by evasive replies and frivolous delays, but the population of the presidency kept in a constant state of alarm and agitation by daily reports of large armaments, destined to make an attempt upon the island, fitting out at Trang, and other rivers. How improbable soever such designs may be, still it is essential that the fears of the native inhabitants should be appeased to avert the injury which the commerce of the island would necessarily sustain.

In advocating the cause of the injured and oppressed nation of Kēdah, as I humbly profess to do, I may be permitted to notice, that the records of the Penang Government from 1785 to 1790 furnish ample evidence; first, that the right of interference of Siam with Kēdah was not acknowledged at the period of the cession of Pulau Penang to the British Government; secondly, that that cession was made upon the express condition of succour and protection against a powerful, relentless and overbearing enemy

thirdly, that we accepted the grant upon this understanding, that is, without making any objections to the proposals of the Râja of Kēdah, before possession was taken. And lastly, that we are bound by considerations of philanthropy and humanity to extend our aid to an oppressed monarch, who has long been our friend and ally, and to a defenceless multitude groaning under the most bitter tyranny, and suffering all the horrors and calamities which a ferocious enemy can inflict.

Their religion is violated, their wives and children are forcibly dragged from them, the aged parent and the helpless babe are butchered by these ruthless and sanguinary barbarians, who consider them as useless appendages, and the most wanton murders, perpetrated by means the most cruel and painful to the wretched victims, are of daily occurrence. Surely, a powerful nation which has ever been foremost to dispense justice and to succour the oppressed, will not suffer such acts of horror and cruelty at its very door, without employing its power and influence to check such enormities. The history of our possessions in Continental India affords numberless instances of our interference on many far less pressing occasions, and shall we not extend our fostering protection to our friend and ally—to the acknowledged sovereign of Kēdah whose father ceded to us one of our four presidencies, who has been overcome by an ambitious and powerful neighbour?

When we add to the many powerful and irresistible inducements for our interference, considerations of a more interested nature as regards our own prosperity and stability in this quarter, and look to the baneful effects of the Siamese conquest of Kēdah, in the stoppage of our accustomed supplies, to the distress of our inhabitants by the increased price of provisions, to the almost entire stagnation of trade, from that quarter; when we advert to the indignities and cruelties inflicted upon quiet and peaceable British subjects who ventured to continue their commercial pursuits with Kēdah; when we consider the state of disorder and confusion around us, and that piracy is daily increasing (the natural result of thousands of Malays being driven from their homes), and that a predatory warfare is carried on in our immediate vicinity, nay, sometimes within sight of our harbour; when we know that many of our own unoffending subjects have suffered in common with the enemy; when we reflect on the tone of insolence and contempt hitherto assumed by the haughty ruler of Siam, the presumption even of the lowest officers of this proud despot, with whom we have had correspondence or connexion; when we remember the uncordial reception of our mission, and the indignities and corporal punishment inflicted upon two defenceless Englishmen in the palace of the Emperor, for a trifling breach of their peculiar laws and ignorance of the customs of the country;

when we consider, in short, the unsociable propensities, if I may so term it, of the Siamese power, and its evident disinclination to treat with us upon a footing of equality, or to conciliate the friendship and good-will of a nation which has the power to crush it in a moment; when we observe that the trade of the country is by no means equal to the exaggerated statements of its importance and value, while we have the example in the history of our transactions with the no less imperious power of China, that trade, though it may be interrupted for a time, will eventually flourish more after the establishment of a proper understanding and an occasional contention for just rights and privileges; and when, moreover, we observe that the eyes of all the surrounding States are upon us, and expect us, not only to succour the King of Kēdah, our ancient ally, but to oppose a barrier between them against the unjustifiable encroachments of the Siamese,—we shall surely have incentives enough for taking a vigorous part in the defence of the Kēdah kingdom.

Do we admit the principle that the Siamese have a right to subjugate all the Malay States on this side of the Peninsula, viz., Pêrak and Sēlāngor, which have, with great inaccuracy, been stated as always tributary to Siam, we, in fact, give encouragement to the total destruction and annihilation of the valuable trade which forms the principal export of this Settlement (Penang), of the revenues of the Honourable Company, and of the means of support and livelihood of our numerous and industrious subjects. The Emperor of Siam may, in many respects, be compared to the former ambitious ruler of France, and if his projects are not nipped in the bud, there is no foretelling what the result will be, if the fruit is allowed to attain maturity.

Various are the opinions which have prevailed relative to the tributary dependence of Kēdah upon Siam, and it shall be my endeavour, as far as the paucity of materials will admit of, to deduce, from a careful examination and comparison of different authorities, evidence to shew that Kēdah has submitted only to a certain limited dependence upon Siam, in no way derogating from her sovereignty, still retaining to herself the right of administering her own Government according to her own laws and institutions, and that consequently the subjugation of the country is an act of unprovoked aggression, which it is the policy of the British Government to resent. “His Highness of Kēdah” (as justly remarked by the Honourable the Governor of Penang in December, 1821) “has certainly much misgoverned his kingdom, “yet his long close connexion with the British Government has “given us a far greater influence over his mind and character, than “what we can expect to acquire with regard to the chief who may “be placed on the throne of Kēdah by the Siamese. It appears

“ to me, that the British Government should not hesitate to endeavour to obtain the restoration of our Ally to the throne of his ancestors, because it is undoubted policy to prevent the near approach of the Siamese influence and power, and because his restoration, if effected by our means, would redound highly to the honour and reputation of the British character among the surrounding Malay-an States”; to which may be added the opinion of his respected predecessor, the late Colonel JOHN ALEXANDER BANNERMAN, who, in allusion to the difficulties in which the King of Kēdah was involved in 1818, by the demands of the Siamese, observes: “Independent of the cause of humanity which has never been disregarded by the British Government or our Honourable Employers, there are many other motives that strongly bias me at this juncture in favour of His Majesty of Kēdah’s restoration. There is no doubt but that our commerce with the neighbouring Malay States is much impeded by the dissensions subsisting between these Princes, and the trade with Pêrak in particular, from which our revenues once derived great benefit, is now almost wholly suspended.”

The following extract from the despatch to the Supreme Government, dated 28th November, 1821, from the Penang Government, clearly shews the opinion entertained of the necessity for the removal of the Siamese from Kēdah: “In apprizing your Excellency of the present state of affairs at Kēdah, it cannot be considered unimportant to observe that unless some arrangements are made by which the Siamese power may be withdrawn from our immediate neighbourhood, there will be an evident necessity for increasing our disposable force at this Presidency, in view to secure against that arrogant and formidable power, the tranquillity of the Settlement, and the freedom of its trade with the northern ports. Hitherto there has been no difficulty in this respect; the State of Kēdah has served as a barrier between the Siamese possessions and the Company’s territories, and has been bound to us by treaty and reciprocally engaged for our benefit”; and in reference to the disposition of the Siamese Government in comparison with the Malayan: “But we apprehend such would not be the case with a Siamese Government, so closely bordering on us; the natural insolence and haughtiness of the nation would be apparent in every intercourse, and they could only be held in check by the strong arm of power and a continual preparation to repel the aggressions which would be at all times too ready to be manifested.”

In adverting to the conquest of Kēdah and Pêrak by the Siamese, we are naturally led to take a brief review of the political relations which have heretofore subsisted between them. Confused and incongruous as is the history of the early settlements of

the Malays on the Peninsula, which we find narrated in the *Sejarah Melayu*, or Malayan Annals, we are enabled to gather sufficient to shew that, prior to the emigration of the Malays from Sumatra in A. D. 1160, the more northerly part of the Malayan Peninsula was partially inhabited by Siamese. The Malays pretend to derive the descent of their Sovereigns from ALEXANDER THE GREAT, and trace in a regular line of genealogy, the successive Dynasties and Kings of Hindostan, till the time of Râja SURAN, grandson of Râja SULAN, who reigned in Andam Nagara, and all the lands of the East and West were subject to him. The first place of importance he appears to have reached on the peninsula, was a fort situated on the river Dinding, in the vicinity of Pêrak. The King extended his conquests to the country of Glang Khian, which, in former times, was a great country, possessing a fort of stone, up to the river Johor. In the Siamese language, this word signifies the Place of the Emerald (Klang Khian). The ancient city of Singapore was established by Râja SANG NILA UTAMA (a descendant of Râja SURAN), who emigrated from the East Coast of Sumatra, it is supposed from the country now known by the name of Siak, which borders on the Menangkabau country. After the destruction of Singapore by the forces of the Râja of Majapahit, then a powerful State on the Island of Java, Râja ISKANDER SHAH founded the city of Malacca. He died in 1274. The conversion of the Malays to Islamism is said to have taken place about the year 1270, in the reign of Râja KECIL BESAR, who, after conversion, assumed the title of Sultan MUHAMED SHAH. In 1509, the annals represent Malacca as being one of the first cities of the East, and the King of that powerful State had successfully opposed every attempt of the Siamese to subdue them. At this time, it is said, Malacca was in a very flourishing state, "and the general resort of merchants, from Ayer Leleh, the trickling stream, to the entrance of the Bay of Muar, was one uninterrupted market place. From the Kling town likewise, to the Bay of Penagar, the buildings extended along the shore, in an uninterrupted line. If a person sailed from Malacca to Jugra (Parcelar Hill) there was no occasion to carry fire with one, for, wherever he stopped, he would find people's houses. On the eastern side likewise, from Malacca as far as Batu Pahat (Hewn Stone) there was the same uninterrupted succession of houses, and a great many people dwelt along the shore; and the city of Malacca, without including the exterior, contained nineteen *laxas* of inhabitants (190,000)." The last engagement between the Malayan and Siamese forces, which is recorded in the annals prior to the conquest of Malacca by the Portuguese, is thus described: "The Râja of Ligor was ordered by the King of Siam to attack Pahang, and Sultan MUHAMED of Malacca determined to send

“ assistance to Pahang. At this time, the subjects of the city of
 “ Malacca alone, besides those of the coast and villages, amounted
 “ to ninety lac. The Malacca people arrived at Pahang, and in
 “ a few days finished a large fort. The Râja of Ligor now
 “ advanced with all his hosts, which were innumerable, and com-
 “ menced the war in a manner which cannot be described, and the
 “ soldiers of Ligor died like hens of the pip. The men of Malacca
 “ and Pahang attacked them, and they gave way, and were broken
 “ and completely dispersed. Maha Râja DEWA SUSA fled to the
 “ uplands of Pahang, and proceeded straitly by land to Kċlantān,
 “ from whence he returned to Ligor.” This happened in 1509.
 In 1511, the Portuguese arrived and besieged Malacca. Sultan
 MUHAMED fled, and founded a fort at Bintanger. He afterwards
 retired to Pahang, and was received with great kindness. It was
 afterwards that he founded the city of Johor, and subsequently
 Rhio, on the Island of Bintang. In the subsequent year, the
 Malays made an attempt to retake Malacca from the Portuguese.
 In 1516, 17, 18 and 19, Sultan MUHAMED, Ex-King of Malacca,
 and now King of Bintang and Johor, blockaded Malacca, but in
 the last was defeated. In 1521, the Portuguese made an attempt
 upon Bintang, but were defeated by the Malays under the cele-
 brated Laksamāna. During the subsequent five years, there were
 incessant hostilities between the Portuguese and Malays, and the
 former attacked Pahang and Pċtāni, murdering and laying waste.
 In 1537, an attempt was made on Johor by the Portuguese.
 They were defeated by Sultan ALUDEN and the Laksamāna, but in
 a second attempt, they reduced and sacked the town of Johor. In
 1559, Sultan ABDUL JALIL the First, ascended the throne of Johor.
 From this period till 1610, there is little heard of Johor. Sultan
 ABDULLAH SHAH ascended the throne in this year, and in 1613, we
 find that the King of Acheen, the ancient Ally of the Ex-King
 of Malacca, possessed himself of Johor, Pahang, and other places
 on the peninsula.

It does not appear that Singapore, Malacca, Pċrak, Johor,
 Pahang, or Rhio, or indeed any of the Malay States which were
 founded by emigrants from Sumatra, ever were subject to Siam
 during the long interval from 1160, when Singapura was first
 settled, up to the period of the conquest of Malacca by the Portu-
 guese in 1511; on the contrary, there is unequivocal proof, that
 the Malays successfully maintained their position, and frequently
 repelled the attempts of the Siamese. In 1567, we are informed
 by MARSDEN, that “ Sultan MANSUR SHAH from the kingdom of
 “ Pċrak in the peninsula, ascended the throne of Acheen, after
 “ several preceding Sovereigns had been murdered by the Acheenese.”
 The same author informs us, that in 1613, the King of Acheen,
 whom the annals name ISKANDER MUDA, was known to our

travellers by the title of Sultan Paduka Sri (words equivalent to most gracious) Sovereign of Acheen, and of the countries of Aru, Dëli, Johor, Pahang, Këdah and Përak on the one side, and of Barus, Passaman, Tiku, Sileda, and Priaman on the other. Some of these places were conquered by him, others he inherited. It is supposed by Mr. MARSDEN, that during the reign of Sultan ALU-EDDIN (and the opinion has been quoted by others as an authentic fact), who ascended the throne of Malacca in 1447, the country was under the power of the Siamese during some part of his reign of 30 years; but this conjecture is by no means supported by the Malayan history of that reign, and the successful opposition by the Malays to all the attempts of the Siamese seems to contradict such a supposition, which has perhaps been inadvertently advanced by this generally correct and enlightened author. In 1619, the King of Acheen made a conquest of the cities of Këdah and Përak on the Malayan coast. At this time, Përak sent a gold and silver flower to Acheen, in token of homage. Mr. MARSDEN states, that in 1641, "the whole territory of Acheen was almost depopulated by wars, executions and oppression. The King endeavoured to uphold the country by his conquests. Having ravaged the kingdoms of Johor, Pahang, Këdah, Përak and Dëli, he transported the inhabitants from these places to Acheen, to the number of twenty-two thousand persons." In 1614 we find the Dutch complain that the Queen of Acheen gave assistance to their enemies, the people of Përak."

I shall now proceed to take a cursory and abstract view of the political connexion of the several principal Malayan States on the Peninsula, up to the period of the establishment of the British interests at Prince of Wales' Island, under their separate heads, beginning with

KËDAH OR QUEDAH.

Long prior to the conquest of Malacca by the Portuguese, the annals inform us, that the Râja of Këdah proceeded to Malacca for the Nobats,* which were granted him; he was well received, obtained his dignities direct from Malacca, and was considered tributary to that State. Whether after the conquest of Malacca, or prior to that event, is not precisely ascertained, the King of Këdah sent a *Bunga Mas*, or gold flower, to Siam, and the origin of this custom is thus accounted for by the Malays of the present day. In early years the King of Këdah sent a flower of gold to the eldest son of the King of Siam, a child, to play with, and the present being construed into a token of inferiority, or homage, the custom has been kept up triennially ever since; but

* The Drums, or Insignia of Royalty.

the King of Kédah has usually received in return a present of superior value, such as a gold *siri* stand, handsome gold wrought cloths, &c. "By long custom," says Mr. LIGHT, "the Kings of Kédah have acknowledged the King of Siam as their Lord paramount and sent triennially a gold and silver tree as a token of homage; in return for this the King of Kédah was supplied with elephants from the forests of Ligor and the provinces of Siam, which to him was matter of great profit; this was all the connexion; the present King demands a heavy tribute of money, arms, men, boats and provisions to be employed in his wars against the Burmans; to avoid this the King of Kédah seeks the alliance of the English; he has no alternative, either he must join the Siamese against the Burmans, or defend his country against the Siamese; the latter is by far the most prudent and beneficial." Kédah being a small country, as the King expresses it in one of his letters, and very near Ligor, in order to preserve a good understanding, this flower of gold (from whatever cause the custom may have originated) has always been sent periodically to Siam in token of homage, and in like manner, the haughty despot of Siam even condescends to send a similar token triennially to China by which he secures very important privileges in the way of trade and exemption from duties. In his case, the presentation of the token of homage is considered as entitling him to indulgence, whereas on the other hand, its receipt from the Malayan State by him, is made a plea for oppression. Mr. CRAWFORD states, that "the King of Siam, although the circumstance be not generally known, acknowledges himself a tributary of the Emperor of China. His doing so, does not arise from any political necessity or consideration, or out of any actual dependence of Siam upon China, but altogether from this mercenary motive, that the vessels which carry the Ambassadors may, under pretext of their doing so, be exempted from the payment of all imposts. With this view, two of the largest description of junks, amounting to nearly 1,000 tons each, sail annually from Bangkok to Canton loaded with merchandize. They carry Ambassadors annually to the Viceroy of Canton, and once in three years, the Ambassadors go to Peking, an honour, however, of which they are not considered worthy, until they receive a title of Chinese nobility from the Viceroy, and assume the costume of the Chinese. They carry the Chinese Emperor a golden flower in token of tribute, but receive in return gifts to a far greater value. The vanity of one court, and the rapacity of the other, have long rendered this intercourse a permanent one." If in this case, the presentation of a golden flower is made a pretext for obtaining very considerable immunities, does not arise from any political necessity, and does not betoken any inferiority, but is viewed merely as a com-

plimentary offering, it is difficult to discover upon what grounds Mr. CRAWFORD and others have hinged their arguments, that a similar offering on the part of the Kēdah State indicates a feudal subjection, which an occasional non-compliance with or omission of the ceremony justifies the Siamese in subjugating the whole country, and wresting the kingdom from an acknowledged rightful sovereign. But of this, more hereafter. Kēdah has occasionally sent a golden flower to Acheen and to Ava. The ceremony seems indeed to be a mere interchange of civility, or a polite acknowledgement of inferiority, like one gentleman giving precedence to a superior in rank, though both may be equally independent. In 1770, the Bugis attacked and plundered Kēdah, burning many houses. In 1785, the King ceded the island of Penang to the English, up to which period, there is no account of the Malayan State of Kēdah, which flourished under a succession of Mahomedan sovereigns many centuries, and was at one period a place of very considerable trade, never having been under the authority of Siam further than is implied from the transmission triennially of a gold and silver flower.

PÊRAK.

The old Bēndahāra of Johor was originally appointed Rāja over Pêrak, under the title of Sultan MUZAFER SHAH. He married the Princess of Pêrak, and begat Sultan MANSUR, who reigned at the time the Malayan annals were written, in the year of the Hējērat 1021. There is no tradition that this State ever did send the *Bunga Mas* to Siam, nor does it appear that any such demand was made. It acknowledged dependence upon Malacca, even prior to a King being appointed from Johor, when it was under the control of a Pēngulu, or Minister of the Malacca State, but after the year 1567, when its own King became sovereign of Acheen, a token of homage was sent to that State by his successor to the throne of Pêrak.

SĒLÂNGOR.

This Settlement was formed principally by an emigration of the Bugis from Celebes, and has never been in any way dependent upon Siam. In 1783, the Sēlângor people joined those of Rhio, and went by land to Malacca, which they blockaded. A fleet from Holland arrived opportunely in 1784. It is reported by Mr. LIGHT who writes to the Governor-General, that, "the Dutch then proceeded to Sēlângor, which they found empty, the King with his followers having fled to Pahang. The Dutch at the beginning of this war wrote to the Râjas of Trēnggānu and Kēdah

“ for assistance ; the former joined, but the latter declined, excusing
 “ himself on account of a war in Pētani. This will account for the
 “ King of Trěnggānu’s reception of your letter, and for the King of
 “ Kēdah’s anxious desire to have the Honourable Company for his
 “ protector. In July last, the King of Sēlāngor, having collected
 “ about two thousand Pahangs, crossed over to Sēlāngor, and in
 “ the night sent a few desperadoes to massacre the Dutch. They
 “ got into the fort, and wounded one of the sentinels and the chief,
 “ but the garrison taking alarm, killed eight of the Bugis, dis-
 “ persed the rest, and in the morning, the Dutch, being afraid of
 “ another attack, embarked in their vessels, and fled to Malacca,
 “ leaving all their stores, provisions, and ammunition undestroyed ;
 “ the King took possession, and still keeps it. The King of Sēlān-
 “ gor cannot remain long in his present situation, his people are
 “ kept together by hopes of assistance from the English, which he
 “ expects from the indulgence and preference our merchants always
 “ received from him and his father, above any other nation.” “ I
 “ had scarcely arrived when I received intelligence that the Dutch
 “ fleet consisting of three large ships and fourteen sail of praus
 “ and sloops, were before Sēlāngor. The King, unable to procure
 “ provisions, or to support himself longer without assistance, entered
 “ into a treaty with the Dutch, the particulars of which I have not
 “ learned. It is said, they obliged him to swear on the Korān he
 “ would send all the tin to Malacca, and be a friend to the Dutch.
 “ They took away the guns which they had lost there, and have
 “ now sent for him to Malacca.” In the early part of the year
 1786, the Rāja of Sēlāngor, Sultan IBRAHIM, who is still alive,
 sent a letter to the Governor-General of India saying, that the
 Dutch Company’s people had gone (having been expelled by
 force) and requested the British Government to form a Settlement.
 It does not appear, that this State has ever had any intercourse,
 direct or indirect, with the Siamese, either commercially or poli-
 tically.

KLANG.

This was formerly a dependency of Malacca, and afterwards
 fell under Sēlāngor. In the reign of Sultan MUDHAFER SHAH, the
 third Mahomedan King of Malacca, Klang was one of the most
 flourishing Settlements under Malacca, and formed originally by
 emigrants from Singapore and that place. In the year 1340, the
 chief of this place Tuan Pêrak, son of the deceased Bēndahāra,
Srieva Rāja was principally instrumental in repul-
 sing the Siamese in one of their attempts upon Malacca. The
 circumstances are thus related in the annals: “ About the year
 “ 1340, it is reported that the King of Siam, who in ancient times

“ was named Salien Nani, hearing that Malacca was a great coun-
 “ try and did not own his allegiance, sent to demand a letter of
 “ submission, but the King of Malacca refused. The Siamese pre-
 “ pared to attack Malacca, and had reached Pahang, when all the
 “ inhabitants from Muar assembled at Malacca, and Tuan Pêrak
 “ brought up the people of Klang with all the women and chil-
 “ dren.” The people of Klang complained of their chief’s conduct,
 in bringing up their wives and children, as only the males from
 other places had arrived. His Majesty demanded why he had
 done so; Tuan Pêrak replied: “ The reason I have brought their
 “ wives and children is, that they may contend with a true heart
 “ against the foe, and even if the Râja were disposed to shrink from
 “ the combat, they would only be the more eager to prevent the
 “ slavery of their wives and children. For this cause, they will
 “ contend strenuously against the enemy.” The King of Malacca
 was highly pleased with Tuan Pêrak and said: “ Tuan Pêrak,
 “ you must not live longer at Klang, you must come and live
 “ here.” The men of Siam however arrived, and engaged in fight
 with the men of Malacca. The war continued for a long time,
 and great numbers of Siamese perished, but Malacca was not
 subdued. At last the whole Siamese army retreated. Tuan
 Pêrak was appointed Bëndahâra, or General. Some time after,
 the Siamese made another attempt. “ They advanced as far as
 “ Batu Pahat, a place a few miles to the southward of Malacca, but
 “ were vigorously opposed by the Malays; the Siamese champion
 “ said: ‘ The preparations of the Malays are immense. If they
 “ advance, what a fine situation we shall be in, especially as we
 “ found ourselves to-day, unable to contend against a simple prau
 “ of theirs.’ Then all the Siamese returned. In their retreat, they
 “ were pursued by the Bëndahâra, Paduka Râja, as far as Sing-
 “ apore.”

JOHOR

Was founded by Sultan MUHAMED, ex-King of Malacca, in 1512.
 The place was destroyed by the Portuguese in 1608, and a new
 town built higher up the river. In 1613, when the Dutch had a
 small factory there, it was conquered by the Acheenese. In 1703,
 says MILBURN: “ Captain HAMILTON visited the place, and was
 “ kindly received. The King made him a present of the Island of
 “ Singapore, situated near the entrance of the river, but he declined
 “ taking possession of it, notwithstanding its convenient situation for
 “ trade, and the surrounding country being well supplied with
 “ excellent timber and trees fit for masts.” In more recent times,
 it has been little heard of, and from being a large and populous
 city, dwindled down to a small fishing village. Johor has long
 been a dependency of Rhio.

PAHANG.

In the reign of Sultan MANSUR SHAH of Malacca, an expedition was sent against Pahang. It is thus related in the annals:—
 “The Běndahāra proceeded against it, and after a day’s journey, the Malacca forces reached Pahang, and defeated the inhabitants “with great ease.” The King of Malacca married the beautiful Princess WANANG SRI, the daughter of the Pahang Chief, Maha Rāja DEWA SENA, who fled. During the reign of Sultan MANSUR SHAH, the Siamese never returned to Malacca, nor did Malacca men interfere with the Siamese. Towards the conclusion of this King’s reign, he sent an embassy to Siam with a letter which contained neither greeting nor salutation, and ran thus:—
 “It is desirable that there should be no further wars, for there is “reason to fear the loss of life, and verily Paduka BUBANGAN is to “be dreaded in war, but there is great hope of his forgiveness and “favour.” The Emperor of Siam asked how it was Malacca had not been taken by the Siamese, and Tūan TALANI, the Envoy from Malacca “called an old man of Savor, who had the elephantiasis “in his legs, to display his skill in the spear. He tossed up spears “in the air, and received them on his back without the smallest “wound.” “This, Sire,” said he, “is the reason why Malacca was not “conquered by the Siamese, for all the men are of his description.” The Siamese also sent a mission to Malacca, and the King of Malacca was rejoiced and said: “Now my heart is at rest, for my “enemy is converted into my friend”—and as the historian expresses it: “God knows the whole, and to him be grace and glory.” The kingdom of Malacca was powerful at this time, and it is reported, that embassies were sent to and from the Emperor of China and the King of Malacca. In the reign of Sultan ALU-EDDIN, the successor of Sultan MANSUR SHAH, the Laksamāna was sent to Pahang, to call the King to account for killing a Malacca Chief.

It has been supposed by some authors, that during the reign of this Prince, Sultan ALU-EDDIN RAYAT SHAH, the country of Malacca was under the Siamese power, but this does not appear to be by any means the case, as it would seem that Malacca, during that King’s long reign of thirty years, was as powerful as it had ever been, as has been before shewn. Pahang in late years has been considered under the authority of Rhio. The King was desirous of having the English there, but it was never taken possession of.

PAKANJA.

This was also a dependency of the Rhio State.

TRÉNGGĀNU.

Before Penang was settled, the Sultan offered a Settlement at this place, and about the same time, he writes to the Supreme Government. "According to the advice communicated to us through Captain GLASS, we gave fair words and liberal presents to Siam, but Siam is not contented. He demands ourself, or our son to go and do homage at the foot of his throne, and if we do not comply with his demands, he threatens to destroy our country; there is no example or precedent from the earliest period of any prince of this country doing homage in any other manner than by letter."

KĒLANTAN.

This State was rendered tributary to Malacca in the reign of Sultan MUHAMED SHAH. The event is thus described in the Malayan annals: "After some time, the Prince ordered Sri Maha Râja to attack Kĕlantān. At that period, the country of Kĕlantān was much more powerful than Pĕtāni, and the name of the Râja was Sultan SECUNDER SHAH, who refused to do homage to Malacca; Kĕlantān was taken by the Malacca men. The Sultan of Malacca married the eldest daughter of the Râja of Kĕlantān, whose death sometime afterwards, distressed the King much." The chiefs of Kĕlantān have often complained of the vexatious demands of Siam; but have never acknowledged more than its inferiority to Siam, and maintained its independence under a regular succession of Malayan Kings, extremely friendly and disposed to conciliate the English. The Râjas of Kĕlantān have separately solicited the protection of the British Government and requested the establishment there of an English factory, offering very considerable advantages.

PĒTĀNI.

The origin of the Pĕtāni State is thus described: "It is related that there is a country named Kota Maligei, the Râja of which was a Moslem, and named Râja SLĒMAN. This country came to be mentioned in Siam as a very fine country, but not subject to Siam. A son of the King of Siam, named CHAW SRI BANGSA, proposed to go and reduce it, and proceeded against it accordingly with an innumerable host, like the leaves of the trees, and when he reached Kota Maligei, Râja SLĒMAN came out and engaged CHAW SRI BANGSA, man to man, and each of them mounted on an elephant. CHAW SRI BANGSA declared, that if he was victorious over Râja SLĒMAN, he would assume the doctrine of Islam. The place was taken, and the Siamese chief became a Mahomedan, and desired

“ his Astrologers to search for a good place to found a city. There “ was a fisherman who had a son named TANI, whence he was called “ Pa’ Tani (Tani’s father) the city was built where he resided, and “ hence it was called Pētāni.”* The King of Pētāni sent Ambassadors to the King of Malacca, requesting the *nobats* to be granted to him, and Pētāni became a dependency of Malacca. The English established a small factory in 1610, which was abandoned in 1623. The Siamese, about the time Penang was taken possession of, plundered the place and murdered and carried off the inhabitants, and in subsequent years, the State became separated and disunited under different leaders, or petty independent Rājas.

In the history of the first Malayan settlement at Singapore, we find that the emigrants from Sumatra found no inhabitants, and met with no opposition, and on their subsequent expulsion from thence, their establishment at Malacca, and again at Johor and other places, were effected under similar happy circumstances; nor do we read in the whole annals of Malayan history of their colonies on the peninsula, of one single instance in which a country was wrested by force, from aboriginal inhabitants. It has been admitted by the greatest philosophers and politicians, that “ all “ mankind have a right to things that have not yet fallen into the “ possession of any one, and those things belong to the persons who “ first take possession of them. Where, therefore, a nation finds a “ country uninhabited, and without an owner, it may lawfully take “ possession of it, and after it has efficiently made known its will in “ this respect, it cannot be deprived of it by another nation.” It follows from this argument, that the emigrants who founded the Malayan colonies, had an undoubted right to possess themselves of the desert countries which they found on the peninsula, and that having possession, and never having relinquished it, during a period of 660 years, they are, and must be considered, the rightful possessors of these countries at the present day.

Having fully established the rights of the Malays to colonize the peninsula, and having previously shewn that Kēdah was the only State which ever acknowledged any degree of dependence upon Siam, after the dismemberment of the Malacca kingdom, of which it was a part, I shall now consider what constitutes a Sovereign State, and the several degrees of submission or dependence known to us, as existing among different nations and States, which will enable us to draw a satisfactory conclusion respecting the relative situation of Siam and Kēdah, which it is more particularly the object of the present paper to discuss. The celebrated Vattel says, in speaking of States bound by unequal alliance: “ We “ ought to account as Sovereign States, those which have united

* The name of this State is pronounced Petāni; the above derivation is probably fanciful.—F. A. S.

“ themselves to another more powerful, by an unequal alliance, in
 “ which, as ARISTOTLE says, to the more powerful is given more honour,
 “ and to the weaker more assistance. The conditions of these unequal
 “ alliances, may be infinitely varied. But whatever they are, pro-
 “ vided the inferior ally secure to itself sovereignty, or the right of
 “ governing its own body, it ought to be considered as an indepen-
 “ dent State that keeps up an intercourse with others under the law
 “ of nations.” Of States allied by treaties of protection, he remarks :
 “ Consequently a weak State, which, in order to provide for its
 “ safety, places itself under the protection of a more powerful one,
 “ and engages, in return, to perform several offices equivalent to
 “ that protection, without however divesting itself of the rights of
 “ Government and sovereignty, that State, I say, does not, on this
 “ account, cease to rank among the sovereigns who acknowledge no
 “ other law than that of nations.” In regard to tributary States, he
 observes: “ There occurs no greater difference with tributary States,
 “ for though the payment of tribute to a foreign power, does in some
 “ degree diminish the dignity of those States, from its being a con-
 “ fession of their weakness, yet it suffers their sovereignty to subsist
 “ entire. The custom of paying tribute was formerly very common,
 “ the weaker by that means purchasing of their more powerful
 “ neighbour, an exemption from oppression, or, at that price, secur-
 “ ing his protection without ceasing to be sovereign.” And of
 feudatory States, it is stated by the same author: “ The Germanic
 “ nations introduced another custom, that of requiring homage from
 “ a State either vanquished, or too weak to make resistance. Some-
 “ times even a Prince has given sovereignties in fee, and sovereigns
 “ have voluntarily rendered themselves feudatory to others. When
 “ the homage leaves independence and sovereign authority in the
 “ administration of the State, and only means certain duties to the
 “ Lord of the Fee, as some honorary acknowledgement, it does not
 “ prevent the State or the feudatory Prince being strictly sovereign.
 “ The King of Naples pays homage for his kingdom to the Pope,
 “ and is nevertheless reckoned among the principal sovereigns in
 “ Europe.”

The original object no doubt of the Kédah State sending a
Bunga Mas, or token of homage, to Siam, after the custom once
 had been established, was to secure the protection of its more
 powerful neighbour, and we shall now see the obligations of the
 protector as well as protected. “ When a nation is not capable
 “ of preserving herself,” says VATTTEL, “ from insult or oppression,
 “ she may procure the protection of a more powerful State. If she
 “ obtain this by only engaging to perform certain articles, as to pay
 “ tribute in return for the safety obtained, to furnish her protector
 “ with troops, and to embark in all his wars as a joint concern, but
 “ still reserving to herself the right of administering her own govern-

“ment, at pleasure, it is a simple treaty of protection that does not
 “at all derogate from Sovereignty, and differs not from ordinary
 “treaties of alliance, otherwise than as it creates a difference in
 “the dignity of the contracting parties.” And again: “If the
 “more powerful nation should assume a greater authority over the
 “weaker one, than the treaty or submission allows, the latter may
 “consider the treaty as broken, and provide for its safety according
 “to its discretion. If it were otherwise, the inferior nation would
 “lose by a convention which it had only formed with a view to its
 “safety, and if it were still bound by its engagements when its
 “protector abuses them, and openly violates his own, the treaty
 “would, to the weaker party, prove a downright deception.” If
 then such privileges may be retained by a State voluntarily sub-
 mitting to another, the mere tacit acknowledgement of homage
 implied by the transmission of a golden flower (for history does
 not record the admission on the part of Kēdah of the right
 of the Siamese to any further concession), we cannot fail to regard
 the subjugation of Kēdah as an unjustifiable usurpation.

In support of the opinion which I have here advanced, regard-
 ing the dependence of Kēdah upon Siam, as implied from the
 transmission of a golden flower, it may be satisfactory to refer to the
 sentiments of Captain LIGHT, and as he obtained the grant, he was
 the best qualified to form a judgment upon this question. In
 reply to the directions of the Supreme Government that he would
 ascertain “whether the King of Kēdah was the rightful
 “Sovereign thereof,” he thus writes: “It does not appear, either
 “by writing or tradition, that Kēdah was ever governed by the
 “Siamese laws, or customs. There would have been some remains
 “had there been any affinity between them. The people of
 “Kēdah are Mahomedans, their letters Arabic, and their language
 “Javanese. The King originally from Menangkabau, in Sumatra; but
 “as Kēdah was very near Ligor, a Kingdom of Siam, they sent
 “every year a gold and silver tree, as a token of homage to Ligor.
 “This was done to preserve a good correspondence, for, at this
 “period, the Siamese were very rich and numerous, but no warriors,
 “and a considerable trade was carried on between Ligor and
 “Kēdah. After the destruction of Siam, the King of Ava
 “demanded the gold and silver tree, and received the token of
 “homage from Kēdah. PIA TAK drove away the Burmans, and
 “built a new city at Siam; the King of Kēdah sent the tree to
 “Siam, and kept peace with both, paying homage sometimes to one
 “and sometimes to the other, and often to both.”

Between the years 1780 and 1785, we find the Bengal Gov-
 ernment had turned its attention to endeavouring to secure an
 eligible post, in or near the Straits of Malacca, for the purpose of
 establishing a small settlement, for the promotion of the commerce

of Western India, and the security of our traders passing to and from China and other quarters ; and we are indebted to the troubles in which the Râja of Kédah was involved, by the oppressions of Siam, for the Settlement of Prince of Wales Island. Under the expectation of securing a powerful ally, and encouraged, no doubt, by promises of protection and support from the British Government, which Mr. LIGHT evidently pledged, the King of Kédah ceded the island of Pulau Penang, by which he incurred the certainty of the almost entire abstraction of the foreign trade from his dominions, and an actual loss in revenue of 20,000 dollars annually. Being afterwards disappointed in the hopes of succour from the British Government, on which he had confidently relied, and oppressed by the numerous demands of Siam for vessels, men, and arms, which he assures the Superintendent were without precedent or example, and confident in his own strength, he determined to make an attempt to free himself from such thralldom and oppression, and while the Siamese were engaged in a distant war, made a sudden incursion into, and possessed himself of, the provinces contiguous to his own State. He was, however, dissuaded from such an enterprize by the British resident, who advised him to reply to the Emperor of Siam's demand, that the distressed state of the Kédah country could not afford such supplies, the wars between the Dutch and Malays having for several years prevented any foreign trade with Kédah, and that this year was attended with a scarcity ; in the meantime, he was advised not to neglect providing for his own security. Mr. LIGHT also told him, that were he determined to put his projects into execution, of making an attack upon the Siamese provinces, "being the aggressor, he would put it out of the power of the Honourable Company "having any excuse for making war against Siam." Having now brought down the history of the several States to the period when the British Government formed a Settlement at Penang, it may be useful to refer to the opinions of some persons, whose experience enabled them to describe the political relations of the several States at that time.

The most authentic accounts which are to be found of the political connection which has subsisted between Ava and Siam and the other States in their vicinity are contained in the correspondence of some of the earlier Settlers at Penang. Captain JAMES SCOTT, a gentleman well known in this quarter, many years ago, as an eastern trader, and afterwards a merchant and planter at Penang, resided some time at the Island of Junk Ceylon, at Kédah, and at Sclângor, and from his long acquaintance and intercourse with the Malays, was well qualified to describe the countries which had so long been the scene of his mercantile operations. He submitted to the Supreme Government a paper

professing to convey “some idea of the political situation of the countries East of the Bay of Bengal,” of which I shall here transcribe an extract, as necessary to a proper understanding of the political relations at the period:—

“Arracan, Pegue and Siam formerly possessed the shores from Chittagong to Kédah. Some twenty years ago, the oppressions of government drove the merchants from frequenting the ports of Arracan, since which they have been little heard of. Pegue has lately been conquered, and is become a province of Ava. Siam formerly possessed from Martaban to Kédah, which last was tributary to them. Ava was little known to Europeans, previous to their, some twenty-five years ago, over-running Siam; they then extirpated the Royal Family, the Capital of Juthia, carried off immense numbers of the inhabitants, leaving that country, once so rich, a mere wild. The Siamese under a bold Usurper, called PIA TACK, drove home the Burmans, and recovered all they had over-run, except Martaban, Tavoy and Mergui, which they retain at this time. They have dwindled under Ava, to mere villages, from losing the exports of the western provinces of Siam, which have in some measure come to Salang. In 1778-9, PIA TACK conquered Camboja, Chia and Ligor, and overwhelmed the whole Peninsula; but in 1783 Camboja revolted. He sent an army against them under PIAS CHECK and SUSSIN, two brothers, who having reduced Camboja, returned to Bangkok, killed PIA TACK, and possessed themselves of the Government, where they now jointly reign. In 1783, Ava made war on Arracan; the event is yet unsettled. Tonquin and Cochin China, during the last ten years, have been depopulated by civil wars and the eruptions of some barbarous mountaineers, which attacked either party and plundered both. In 1783-4, the one competitor drove the other out, who retired to Siam for assistance. The successful one sent a French Missionary Bishop to Pondicherry to solicit the assistance of the French against Siam and the mountaineers. The Dutch had likewise an Agent there, who offered the assistance of Batavia. His negotiation failed, and we heard he lost his life. In 1784-5, the Siamese sent an army of 15,000 men, and 150 praus and junks. The fleet by accident or treachery were surprised and taken, and only 5,000 men with their Generals reached Siam again. Ava has joined Cochin China and the French, and everything is being prepared, on the opening of the dry season, to conquer Siam; and, from all accounts, the internal state of Siam is weak beyond conception; that bond of union which seems to cement large empires, is feeble under the two jarring usurpers, and in a few years will probably fall to pieces of itself, without a foreign concussion.”

After Penang had been occupied a short time, Captain GLASS, the Commanding Officer of the troops, gives the following descrip-

tion of the several States of the peninsula, and their more powerful neighbours, which, though embracing other points foreign to the present subject of discussion, had better be preserved entire, as a satisfactory elucidation of the sentiments of those most conversant with the subject in those days, of the connexion subsisting between the Malayan States, and the powerful Empires of Siam and Ava, as well as the policy which appeared proper to be pursued by the British Government, in regulating their new establishment and connexions to the eastward.

“1st. The Empire of Ava, with whose southern provinces there will be a considerable communication. The haughty ferocity of this people and pretensions of their sovereigns, who treat all men as their slaves, prevent treaties of commerce being formed with them, or, if formed, having any reliance thereon, because a compact supposes an equality, which cannot exist in the relation of master and slaves, it is immaterial whether the relation exists in fact, or in idea, the consequence is the same. From a small tribe called Purmaa, they have conquered Cossac to the northward, Pegue and Arracan to the southward, three independent States; they have likewise wrested the provinces of Martaban, Tavoy, and Mergue from Siam; but while the Siamese can keep them employed, there is little to fear from them here; but should they be successful in the present contest with Siam, they may again adopt their wish, the reduction of the Malayan Peninsula. This is the only native power whose force we have to fear in open war.

“2nd. Is Jan Salang. This island is a distant and neglected province of the Empire of Siam, which in itself has no effective force to be dreaded.

“3rd. Is Kēdah, which comprehends a sea coast of forty to fifty leagues, and the best cultivated part of the Malayan Peninsula. Its population exceeds 40,000. From its vicinity to this place, the plenty of provisions of all kinds which it produces, it deserves your Lordship's most pointed attention, being contiguous to the two potent Empires of Siam and Ava; to the former of which it is tributary, or more properly, pays homage, by sending yearly a flower of gold and another of silver, which, with presents, and an inoffensiveness in the people, has hitherto preserved them from the attempts of either. But the trifling conduct of the present King and his Council, is likely to give occasion of offence to both; he will then fall a sacrifice to the successful. In giving this Island (Penang) to the Company, the King of Kēdah and his Nobles could not have foreseen, what they now feel, a loss of trade and consequent revenue, and no reasoning will convince them, that an increased demand, and consequent increased price for the produce of their country, will in time prove an equivalent.

“The revenues of all the Malay Princes arise from the profits

“ on a restrictive commerce in general, managed by a Malabar,
“ who acquires influence in consequence of the command of cash,
“ and generally expends a large part of the profits in support of this
“ influence; free from these depredations, the revenues of Kēdah
“ amount to 100,000 rupees annually. This small sum, with the
“ feudal obligations of his people, generally ill-complied with and
“ ineffective when collected, cannot cope with either Siam or Ava
“ in force or resources, but to allow this country to become a pro-
“ vince to either, would render our supply at this place dependent
“ on the nod of a despot. By securing the independence of this
“ country, the Honourable Company would acquire a dependent and
“ useful Ally, secure the supplies at this Settlement, until the island
“ can supply itself, and virtually in the end, as our influence increases,
“ an accession of about 40,000 subjects.

“ 4th. Is Pêrak, which borders on Kēdah, and extends about
“ fifty leagues inland; near Pêrak river is well cultivated, and it
“ contains about 30,000 people, exports annually 5,000 piculs of
“ tin, which is delivered to the Dutch at 32 Spanish dollars per
“ Bhara of 428 lbs. The Dutch have a small stockade fort, with
“ about fifty people there to prevent the natives from carrying the
“ tin to other markets; but with all their precautions, the quantity
“ they used to receive, is greatly lessened since the Settlement of this
“ Island. The people of Pêrak are, in general, very ignorant, their
“ revenues so small, and their residence so far inland, that little is
“ to be feared from their animosity, and less to be hoped from their
“ friendship while connected with the Dutch.

“ 5th. Sēlāngor. This country runs to Cape Rachado, but is so
“ much reduced by the late war with the Dutch, that the population
“ of forty leagues of a very fine country, does not, I am credibly
“ informed, exceed 1,000 or 1,500 people. The King, I understand,
“ wishes to give the English Company the sovereignty of his country.

“ 6th. Rambau, an inland country, and while the Dutch possess
“ Rhio, they claim the dominion of Johor, which takes in the
“ whole of that side of the peninsula.

“ On the eastern side are Pahang and Trēnggānu, the population
“ of which is not great. Pētāni has lately been reduced to a province
“ of Siam.

“ From this view of the East side of the Bay of Bengal and
“ Malay Peninsula, it appears, there are only three powers, whose
“ effective force requires attention; all the others will soon consider
“ our nod as law. The three are Ava, Siam, and the Dutch. As
“ the plans of the two first are the result of ignorance and caprice,
“ in the whimsical despot, it is hard to conclude anything by
“ indication, &c.”

A month after taking possession of Penang, viz., 12th September, 1786, Captain LIGHT, the Superintendent, gives the following

information to the Supreme Government of India : “The Bur-
 “mans divided their army into several parties, and ravaged at the
 “same time the countries of upper and lower Siam, Ligor, Chia,
 “Chompow, Mandelong, and Bancy, burning and destroying and
 “massacring without compassion or exception. On a sudden, their
 “army disappeared, but whether by the Siamese, or occasioned by
 “a dissention among the Generals, is uncertain, as both are alleged.
 “The Siamese recovered the places they had lost, and the King’s
 “brother, SOORAM, who came to Ligor with a small army, had no
 “sooner put to death the 2,000 Burmans left there as a guard, than
 “they resolved to call to account all the neighbouring States who
 “had not given the Siamese aid against the Burmans. He sent
 “for the chiefs of Pētāni, the King of Kēdah and Trēnggānu, none
 “of whom choosing to enter the Court of so desperate a tyrant, sent
 “their several excuses, with presents, which he returned, and began
 “immediately upon Porgit. This place was deemed impregnable.
 “It was surrounded by seven thick rows of bamboos ; within the
 “bamboos, was an exceeding wide and deep canal, and within the
 “canal, a strong rampart of earth, on which was mounted a number
 “of large cannon. The area within these walls contained all the
 “inhabitants, cattle and grain ; their strength amounted to near
 “4,000 fighting men. The chief had rendered himself obnoxious
 “to his people from tyrannising. This, and their confidence of
 “situation, gave the Siamese an easy conquest. The reduction of
 “this place has made every one tremble for his safety, and though
 “the King of Kēdah has avoided the storm for the present by
 “submission, yet there is no dependence upon the word of a man,
 “who has no moral restraint whatever, but as policy will prevent
 “his entering Kēdah while he can procure supplies from it, until
 “the season for cutting paddy, it is possible some accident may
 “arise to destroy his schemes.”

We may gather from the foregoing details, that for some time
 prior to, and about the period the British Government took pos-
 session of Prince of Wales’ Island, there had been and was, an
 almost incessant warfare between the States of Ava and Siam, and a
 contest for preponderating influence over the minor States in their
 neighbourhood, which involved these inferior powers in continual
 distress, and imposed upon them the necessity, either of affording
 supplies to the utmost extent of their limited means, or of being en-
 tirely subdued by their more powerful and overbearing neighbours.
 Mr. Scoot admits that “Siam formerly possessed from Martaban
 “to Kēdah, which last was tributary to them.” Captain GLASS
 states, that Kēdah pays homage to Siam by sending yearly a
 flower of gold and another of silver, “which with presents and an
 “inoffensiveness in the people, has hitherto preserved them ;” and
 Captain LIGHT says, the King had “avoided the storm for the

“ present by submission,” yet there is no mention that Kědah was immediately under the control of Siam, or that it did more than merely send a token of homage, or acknowledgement of inferiority to a superior power. The King of Kědah, as an independent sovereign, being requested to permit a British Settlement to be formed at Penang, thus submits his proposals to the Governor-General of Bengal, as the conditions of such cession :—

“ Whereas Captain LIGHT, Dewa Râja, came here and informed me that the Râja of Bengal ordered him to request Pulau Penang from me, to make an English Settlement, where the Agents of the Company might reside, for the purpose of trading and building ships of war to protect the island and to cruize at sea, so that if any enemies of ours from the East or the West should come to attack us, the Company would regard them as enemies also and fight them, and all the expenses of such wars shall be borne by the Company. All ships, junks, or praus, large and small, which come from the East or the West and wish to enter the Kědah river to trade, shall not be molested or obstructed, in any way, by the Company, but all persons desirous of coming to trade with us shall be allowed to do as they please; and at Pulau Penang the same.

“ The articles of opium, tin and rattans are monopolies of our own, and the rivers Muda, Prye, and Krian are the places from whence tin, rattans, canes, besides other articles, are obtained. When the Company’s people, therefore, shall reside at Pulau Penang, I shall lose the benefit of this monopoly, and I request the Captain will explain this to the Governor-General and beg, as a compensation for my losses, 30,000 dollars a year to be paid annually to me as long as the Company reside at Pulau Penang. I shall permit the free export of all sorts of provisions and timber for ship-building.

“ Moreover, if any of the Agents of the Company make loans or advances to any of the Nobles, Chiefs or Râjas of the Kědah country, the Company shall not hold me responsible for any such advances. Should any one in this country become my enemy, even my own children, all such shall be considered as enemies also of the Company; the Company shall not alter their engagements of alliance, so long as the heavenly bodies continue to perform their revolutions; and when any enemies attack us from the interior, they also shall be considered as enemies of the Company. I request from the Company, men and powder, shot, arms large and small, also money for the purposes of carrying on the war, and when the business is settled, I will repay the advances; should these propositions be considered proper and acceptable to the Governor-General, he may send a Confidential Agent to Pulau Penang to reside; but if the Governor-General does not approve

“ of the terms and conditions of this engagement, let him not be
“ offended with me. Such are my wishes to be made known to the
“ Company, and this treaty must be faithfully adhered to, till the
“ most remote times.—Written on Tuesday, 24th Shawal, 1199.”

Here no mention is made of the Râja of Kēdah being tributary to any other State, and the offer is accepted from him as an independent King. If we considered him a tributary Prince, why accept such a grant from him?

We now come to the most delicate branch of the discussion, but I shall have no difficulty in shewing, that the policy of the British Government to give protection to the Kēdah State is no less manifest, than its moral obligation to do so. It would appear that prior to Captain LIGHT's negotiations with the Râja of Kēdah, and his obtaining a grant to the island of Penang, an ineffectual application had been made, for the same purpose, under the orders of the Supreme Government; a proof that the acquisition of a Settlement in this quarter, was considered important and useful. Mr. LIGHT thus writes: “As I understand this Government
“ had made application to the King of Kēdah for the island of
“ Penang without success, with the consent of the Governor-General,
“ I made use of the influence and interest I had with the King and
“ Ministry, to procure a grant of the island of Penang to the Honour-
“ able Company. The King of Kēdah who now solicits your
“ friendship and alliance, has sent by me a grant of the island of
“ Penang and has annexed to the grant some requests.”

The propositions made by the King of Kēdah as the conditions of the cession, were separately remarked upon by Mr. LIGHT, and he makes the following observations upon the first article, which stipulated for assistance and protection in arms and men: “This
“ article comprehends the principal and almost only reason why the
“ King wishes an alliance with the Honourable Company, and in the
“ treaty must be worded with caution, so as to distinguish between
“ an enemy endeavouring or aiming at his destruction or the king-
“ dom, and one who may simply fall into displeasure with either
“ the King or his Ministers.”

The interpretation of this is not difficult, and it appears to be very certain, that Mr. LIGHT gave assurances, that such a close and intimate alliance would be formed between the King of Kēdah and the British Government, by the cession of Pulau Penang, as would ensure his safety, and the independence of his kingdom. The Supreme Government, in accepting the grant, acquaints Mr. LIGHT that “It has been resolved to accept the King of Kēdah's
“ offer to the Company of the harbour and island of Penang. This
“ Government will always keep an armed vessel stationed to guard
“ the island of Penang, and the coast adjacent belonging to the King
“ of Kēdah. The Governor-General and Council on the part of

“ the English India Company, will take care that the King of Kēdah shall not be a sufferer by an English Settlement being formed on the island of Penang.”

That he has been a sufferer, there is no question ; and if, as it is alleged by many, the Emperor of Siam was displeased because he gave Penang to the English, and had he possessed the means, would have visited him with severe punishment at the time (though, by-the-bye, the records shew that Siam was, at the period coeval with the formation of the Settlement of Penang, in a state fully capable of subduing the Kēdah country, her arms having been victorious over some of the Malay States on the other side of the peninsula, and there is little doubt the consideration of the alliance of the King of Kēdah with the British Government, and the probability of their aiding him, prevented such an attempt) we are the more bound, on these considerations, to defend the Kēdah country from invasion. But if there were any feelings of irritation at that time on the part of the Siamese, the long interval which has elapsed, might be supposed sufficient to have done away with them. We engaged, it seems, to have an armed vessel to “ defend the coast of Kēdah at all times.” It must be recollected, however, that Kēdah was taken by an attack from seaward, the fleet which captured it having been equipped at Trang, on this side the peninsula. Sir JOHN MACPHERSON, then Governor-General, in accepting the island, replies to the King’s letter, and makes no objection to the proposed conditions, which he submits to England for approval, the King of course naturally expecting, from the promises of Captain LIGHT, and the tacit assent of the Governor-General, that they would all be approved of by the Honourable Company. “ Your friendly letter containing a grant of Pulau Penang to the Honourable Company, was delivered to me by Captain FRANCIS LIGHT, the 16th February, 1786. Captain LIGHT also made known to me the requests of my Friend and Brother, which I, having the interest and friendship of my noble friend at heart, have already transmitted to England for the approbation of the King of England, and the Honourable English Company. I have likewise ordered a ship-of-war for the defence of the island, and protection of the coast of Kēdah.” This last paragraph implies clearly, that it was intended to secure Kēdah against an invasion or attack from seaward. Not more than a month after Penang was occupied, Mr LIGHT writes, as I have before noticed : “ The King of Kēdah has reason to be afraid of such a tyrant (the King of Siam) and hopes to secure himself by an alliance with the Honourable Company.”

This was a very natural expectation, and we are, no doubt, indebted to the troubles which the King of Kēdah experienced from the Burmans and Siamese, for our Settlement of Penang. He

hoped to secure the protection of the English. It is acknowledged by Mr. LIGHT, that the King of Kēdah sent a token of homage to Ava, as well as to Siam, or, in other words, that he was oppressed by two contending powers, and to get rid of his difficulties, he formed an alliance with the English, by giving as he thought a *quid pro quo* in the cession of an island eligibly situated, and which had been solicited by the Supreme Government. This was accepted from him as a sovereign Prince, and we are constrained, therefore, to view him and his heirs as the sovereigns of the Kēdah country, otherwise we contend against our own right to hold the island, except by the sufferance of the Siamese. We know (at least Mr. LIGHT appears to have been aware of) the motives which induced the King to give Penang to the English. We accepted it with such a knowledge and should be guilty of great inconsistency to deny it. It must be always borne in recollection, also, in weighing the merits of this important question, that there was no stipulated payment, at the time of the Grant, for the loss the King would sustain, by the abstraction of the trade from his dominions. His compliance with Captain LIGHT's request originated, not in pecuniary considerations, but in the expectation of gaining a powerful ally. But, if more proof were wanting, that Mr. LIGHT gave the King assurances of protection, the following paragraph of his letter to the Governor-General, dated 5th October, 1786, will put the matter beyond dispute: "I returned for "answer" (to a letter the King addressed to him concerning an expected invasion from Siam) "that his best policy is to have as "little communication as possible" (alluding to the Burmans and Siamese) "but to put his country in a state of defence, and that "while the English are here they will assist him if distressed."

Who that reads this will say, that Mr. LIGHT considered Kēdah dependent on Siam? He regards it certainly as a dangerous and powerful neighbour; but would he have leagued with Kēdah and told the King, "the English while here, will assist you if "distressed," if he had viewed it as a tributary State? No arguments can be of any avail as to what were our original intentions, and what was the King's conviction, after such an unequivocal admission as this. Mr. LIGHT appears to have been fully aware of the value of the acquisition. In this letter of 15th September, 1786, he says: "The excellency of this situation for commercial "exchange, is evident from the united opinions of every person who "has been here, Europeans and Indians, from the heart-burning "of the Dutch, and from the jealousy of the people of Kēdah, "who already foresee they must be dependent upon this place for "any foreign trade, &c." We take away from Kēdah its valuable trade; we withhold the only return stipulated by the King, in the first instance, namely, protection and assistance, (for even at

this time, there appears to have been no pecuniary compensation granted), and we wonder that the people of Kēdah should be jealous of us. I have omitted to notice the opinion of J. PRINCE, as to whom the island belonged, which is contained in a letter to the Governor-General, dated 23rd February, 1786: "I prefer it (Penang) to the Negrais, as it is an island sufficiently detached from the continent to prevent surprise or even attack from the natives, and being a free gift from the acknowledged and rightful owner, can never give cause for war."

It may appear superfluous to multiply proofs that Kēdah was an independent kingdom at the period of our forming the Settlement of Penang, but if further evidence were wanting, the opinion of the highest authority in India at the time, may be produced in evidence. The Governor-General records his sentiments in a minute, as follows: "The Grant of Penang seems, in fact, to have been procured by the influence of the principal officer of the King of Kēdah, with a view to secure himself a place of retreat against his numerous enemies, and the ostensible object of the King himself in making the grant, originated in the idea of supporting his own independence by the protection of the English, and his attachment to us will either be strengthened or changed into animosity, as that protection is granted or withheld. This protection, however, cannot be effectually given, without involving us in disputes with the Burmans or Siamese, the latter of whom are the most powerful."

Throughout his proceedings, we trace the anxiety of Mr. LIGHT to obtain the sanction of the Supreme Government, for effectual aid to the King of Kēdah, which he had no doubt promised, and of which we find him still holding out expectations. He thus notices (in his Diary) an interview with the King: "The King received me without any state, and seemed much troubled; he told me there was a passage in the letter (from the Governor-General) he did not understand. It seemed to threaten him if he did not comply with the Governor-General's request; he asked me if I had a copy. I told him it must be a mistake in the translation, and what the translator had taken for a menace to him, was meant to his enemies; he said this was probable, and ordered three people each to make a separate translation. Yesterday the King of Kēdah sent the Laksamāna to enquire if I would consent to the people of Pētāni settling opposite to Penang, and assist him, if attacked by the Siamese," and again "this day, the King of Kēdah sent his brother, the Laksamāna, with a letter; the purport as follows: we have received intelligence that Ava has mustered its army to attack Siam, and arrived at the borders. We have also received a letter from the King of Siam, commanding us to defend the island of Juuk Ceylon against the Burmans, who are

“ expected with a fleet of praus and ships. We have sent our
 “ brother, the Laksamâna, to accompany our friend to us, that
 “ we may profit by his counsel, and consider what is best to be done
 “ for the safety of our country.” The King of Kēdah would not
 willingly obey the orders of the King of Siam, and applied to us for
 aid, to which he considered himself entitled. The more I con-
 sider Captain LIGHT’s proceedings, the more am I convinced
 of the unkindness of the conduct towards the King of
 Kēdah. It has been seen, that Captain LIGHT acknowledged
 he had assured the King he would support him, if in distress ;
 that he told him the Governor-General menaced his enemies ;
 and that he received the island on condition of protection ; and we
 find him writing to the Supreme Government on the 17th May,
 1787, nearly a year after we had possession of the island : “ The
 “ Honourable Board were pleased to mention in their instructions,
 “ that they were willing to give a pecuniary consideration to the
 “ King of Kēdah. Soon after the *Rarensworth* sailed, the King
 “ became very pressing, and we found, for a considerable time, a
 “ difficulty in procuring provisions. I wrote to the King it was the
 “ intention of Government to make him a compensation for the
 “ island, and to keep him in good humour I trusted him with 20
 “ chests of opium, at 250 dollars per chest, since which we have
 “ been plentifully supplied with provisions. There is a necessity
 “ for coming to some terms with the King of Kēdah while the
 “ fears of the Siamese and Burmans are upon him ; and I have
 “ reason to believe nothing will be acceptable without Government
 “ promising the King protection. This place will be subject to
 “ many inconveniences without such an alliance as will oblige the
 “ King to furnish the Settlement at all times with provisions ; and
 “ preventing other European nations from settling in any other part
 “ of his country. Should the Siamese be permitted to take posses-
 “ sion of his country, we shall not only find an insolent and trouble-
 “ some neighbour, but be under the necessity of assisting them in
 “ their wars, or to go to war with them ourselves. I humbly
 “ conceive that it will be easier, and attended with less expense to
 “ the Honourable Company, to declare at once the King of Kēdah
 “ under our protection ; little else than the name of the Company
 “ will be wanted ; the longer it is delayed, the greater will appear
 “ the consequence of the island, and the more difficulty there will
 “ be in fixing a Settlement. The Danes, the Dutch, and the
 “ French have solicited permission to have only a house in Kēdah ;
 “ either of them will promise much, and should the King consider
 “ himself aggrieved or disappointed by the English, he may in
 “ despair seek for other alliance.”

The bias upon Mr. LIGHT’s mind is too obvious to be mistaken,
 and it is equally clear he held out expectations of assistance from

the English ere the British Standard was hoisted at Penang; otherwise, as he remarks, the King would have sought an alliance with some other European power, who would have made unconditional promises. Why, also, if the island was a voluntary Grant of the King, as it is termed (though this appears strange, when we consider that the King of Kēdah had given a decided refusal to a former application on behalf of the Supreme Government) should Mr. LIGHT state: "the King was pressing for a settlement," and why should he support his claims? It does appear, however, that the Supreme Government objected to interfere, but why was Mr. LIGHT permitted to take possession, without coming to a clear explanation of our intentions in the first instance? The same paper which contained the Grant contained also the condition, namely, protection; and the Governor-General writes: "I have ordered a man-of-war to guard Pulau Penang and the coast of Kēdah," inferring ostensibly at least, that the protection sought for would be granted.

Captain GLASS, the Commanding Officer of the troops at the time, and a discreet, sensible man by all accounts, gives his sentiments as to the propriety of effectual aid being afforded to the Râja of Kēdah, and insinuates, as plainly as his respect and deference for his superiors would admit of, in an official communication, that there had been some evasion. He remarks: "This feeling," (alluding to the abstraction of the trade from Kēdah, and discontent of the Kēdah people) "and the evasive answers Mr. LIGHT has been obliged to give them to many requisitions, has impressed them with the idea, that they have been deceived, and as no idea tends more to estrange their affections, &c." They find themselves deceived after a year's trial. It may be argued perhaps, why did the King, in making a treaty afterwards, not insist upon our protection? The fact was, he saw we were in possession, and he knew it was in vain for him to attempt to expel the English. He, therefore, prudently made the best bargain he could, by accepting money; but still this is no justification of the want of good faith, evinced on the occasion. It was impossible that they could be so blind as to avoid foreseeing a great loss in their trade by the Settlement of Penang, but, as I have already observed, they were content to sacrifice that advantage for the greater security against the encroachments of the Siamese which they hoped to obtain by and alliance with the English.

In Captain LIGHT's account of Junk Ceylon, he says: "The King of Kēdah claims the dominion of these seas" (that is between Salang and Mergui) "and grants a license for collecting the birds' nests and sea slug to some of his officers, for which he receives about 1,200 or 1,500 dollars per annum. After the loss of Siam" (alluding to the conquest of that country by the Burmans) "the

“Malays got possession of the Island (Junk Ceylon) and the Laksa-
“mâna of Kēdah maintained an absolute authority, treating the
“Siamese as slaves, until an accident inspired the Islanders with the
“idea of liberating themselves, which they performed in one night.
“The Laksamâna constantly regretted the loss of this island, and
“offered me 8,000 men, when it was proposed by Mr. HASTINGS to
“establish a Settlement there.” It is far from probable, that the
King of Kēdah would have been allowed to reap the advantages of
so lucrative a trade, or to have laid claim to such extensive autho-
rity, if he had, in these days, been absolutely dependent on Siam.

But let us now turn our attention to the extremely difficult
and unpleasant situation in which Captain LIGHT found himself,
who, there can be no doubt, promised more than he was permitted
by the superior and controlling authorities to perform. In his let-
ter, dated 18th June, 1717, he says: “I have supplied the King of
“Kēdah with twenty chests of opium, at the price of 250 Spanish
“dollars per chest, which I do not expect he will pay until the Com-
“pany have come to some settlement with him.” In truth, Mr. LIGHT
felt his own honour at stake; he had engaged for more than he could
fulfil, and he was glad to pacify the King in any way he could.
This is a humiliating confession he is obliged to make: “I do
“not expect he will pay for it until the Company have come to some
“settlement with him.” What settlement? If, as we are told, the
island was a free grant, why should Mr. LIGHT insist upon our
obligation to come to a settlement, unless he felt that he had given
a solemn pledge?

The island was taken possession of on the 12th August, 1786,
and we do not find the positive decision of the Governor-General
against affording protection, till January, 1787, when the sentiments
of the Supreme Government on that head are communicated to Mr.
LIGHT: “With respect to protecting the King of Kēdah against
“the Siamese, the Governor-General in Council has already decided
“against any measures that may involve the Company in military
“operations against any of the Eastern Princes. It follows of course
“that any acts or promises which may be construed into an
“obligation to defend the King of Kēdah are to be avoided. If,
“however, Mr. LIGHT can employ the countenance or influence of
“the Company for the security of the King of Kēdah, consistently
“with these rules, the Governor-General in Council has no objection
“to his adopting the measure, strictly guarding against any acts or
“declarations, that may involve the honour, credit, or troops of the
“Company.”

We shall now see that the communication of such sentiments
and determination, was productive of the greatest embarrassment
to the Superintendent, and what a hazardous game Mr. LIGHT had
to play, in consequence of his inability to support the King of

Kēdah; that the latter finding he had been deceived, begins to devise measures for his own security, and retaliating upon those by whom he conceived himself unfairly dealt with; this is styled by Mr. LIGHT “duplicity and cunning.” He acquaints the Supreme Government, that “Captain WRIGHT in the *Grampus* who arrived here on the 21st instant from Siam, reports, at Siam they questioned him particularly about the strength of the place. The French Padre begged of him, not to mention Penang, for the King was exceedingly disturbed at the English being there; they told him at his departure, the King had sent a letter desiring the Honourable Company to take Mergui. Two messengers from Kēdah were at Siam, and report spread, that the Rāja of Kēdah had sent to Siam complaints against the English; the same report came from Junk Ceylon, with this addition, that the Rāja had written for assistance to drive the English from Penang.” And again: “I should be extremely sorry, from any ill-grounded apprehension, to put Government to any unnecessary charge or trouble; but it is impossible to say what may be the intentions of the Siamese. If they destroy the country of Kēdah, they deprive us of our great supplies of provisions and the English name will suffer disgrace in tamely suffering the King of Kēdah to be cut off. We shall then be obliged to war in self-defence against the Siamese and Malays; should your Lordship resolve upon protecting Kēdah, two Companies of Sepoys, with four six-pounder field pieces, a supply of small arms and ammunition, will effectually defend this country against the Siamese, who though they are a very destructive enemy, are by no means formidable in battle; and it will be much less expense to give the King of Kēdah timely assistance, than be obliged to drive out the Siamese, after they have possessed themselves of the country.”

Captain GLASS also writes to the Governor-General about the same time: “The King of Kēdah still continues to profess friendship towards us, but from his own want of resolution and the intriguing disposition of his Council, I do not think his professions are much to be relied upon. But I am still of opinion (for reasons already enumerated to your Lordship), that if his friendship and independence could be secured, it would greatly add to the future peace and welfare of this Settlement.”

The following extracts from Mr. LIGHT’s communication to the Supreme Government shew clearly, that the King was still buoyed up with hopes of our protection, and though even at this period Mr. LIGHT had reason to suspect his friendship, yet the Rajah consented to follow the advice of the Superintendent and refrained from availing himself of the means, then apparently at his disposal, not only of subduing the Siamese in his immediate vicinity, but of obtaining a large accession of territory and subjects; an attempt

he would not have thought of making, unless he had been pretty confident that it would be attended with a favourable result. Instead, therefore, of returning aggression by aggression, it seems he followed the advice of Mr. LIGHT, and kept merely upon the defensive. This entitles him to some consideration on our part. About this time, namely, in June, 1788, Mr. LIGHT endeavoured to negotiate for a final settlement of the King of Kēdah's claims; he says: "I have made an offer to the King of 10,000 dollars per annum, for eight years, or 4,000 dollars per annum, for so long a period as the Honourable Company should continue in possession of this island; to these offers, I have received no answer. I have endeavoured to sooth his Majesty into compliance with the offers of your Lordship, and have hinted, that although the Company did not wish to make alliances which might occasion disputes with powers they were at peace with, they had not positively forbade my assisting him, if really distressed."

About three years after taking possession of Penang, viz., in July, 1789, we find Mr. LIGHT is under considerable apprehension that the King of Kēdah would form other alliances, and being disappointed in the expectation of succour from the British Government, his attachment was daily subsiding. The negative which the King gives to the offer of money in the first instance, demonstrates that a pecuniary recompense was not his object, and the ungenerous acception of the offer, proves too clearly that he considered himself deceived. Mr. LIGHT says: "I make no doubt, but the King of Siam will take the first opportunity to send his troops into Kēdah and Trēnggānu," and afterwards: "I have entered on the character of the Rāja of Kēdah to prepare your Lordship for a scene of duplicity which he is endeavouring to effect, and which principally prevents my embracing the present opportunity of waiting on your Lordship. After acquainting the King of Kēdah of the intention of Government to allow him 10,000 dollars for seven or eight years, he remained silent a considerable time; at last he acquainted me, that he did not like the offer, without stipulating for any particular sum of money, or mentioning what performance on the part of the Company would content him. Being informed, that he did not relish the idea of selling the island, I asked him if he chose to accept 4,000 dollars per annum, for as long a time as the Honourable Company should continue in possession of the island. To this, after waiting a considerable time, he answered in the negative, at the same time by his letters and messengers he endeavoured to draw a full promise, that the Honourable Company would assist him with arms and men, in case an attack from the Siamese should render it necessary. This I evaded, by telling him no treaty, which was likely to occasion a dispute between the Honour-

“ able Company and the Siamese, could be made without approba-
 “ tion of the King of Great Britain; at present, as there was no
 “ reason for his entering into war with the Siamese, he had nothing
 “ to fear; the Siamese and all other country powers would consider
 “ the English as his friends, and for that reason would not disturb
 “ him, unless provoked thereto by his bad policy. From the
 “ information I have received, I am pretty well satisfied of the King
 “ having written to Malacca and Batavia to try if the Dutch would
 “ give him better terms, and last year I hear he wrote to Pondi-
 “ cherry, to try if the French would undertake to defend his
 “ country.”

Neither Mr. LIGHT, nor any of the succeeding Superintendents or Governors had it in their power to assist the King of Kēdah, although his appeals were frequent, and his oppression intolerable. Availing himself of the arrival of the Governor-General of India, Lord MINTO, at Penang, when his Lordship was proceeding to Java, he addressed him a long letter dated 24th December, 1810, detailing the whole history of his connection with the English and the oppressions from Siam, and earnestly entreating the effectual aid and protection of the Supreme Government. The letter is as follows: “In the year 1199 of the Hegira, in the time
 “ of my late father, Mr. LIGHT bearing on the head of submission the
 “ commands of the King of England, and the orders of the Governor-
 “ General, with various splendid presents, appeared in the presence of
 “ my late father, the Râja, and requested, in the name of the King of
 “ England and of the Governor-General, the island of Penang, for
 “ the purpose of repairing their ships-of-war, highly extolling the
 “ greatness, splendour, power, wisdom, beneficence, of His Majesty,
 “ the prosperity of the Honourable Company and all those connected
 “ in the ties of friendship with them; promising that the King and
 “ the Governor-General would assist my father in whatever might
 “ be required, and would prevent the enemies of Kēdah engaging in
 “ proceedings detrimental to the country. Moreover, that they should
 “ pay rent for the island 30,000 dollars per annum, and entered into
 “ sundry other engagements. My father, consulting with the Minis-
 “ ters, considering that the neighbouring Burman and Siamese nations
 “ were more powerful than Kēdah and having reflected that the
 “ King of Europe (*i. e.*, England) was greater and more powerful than
 “ either of those nations, and that by means of the friendship of the
 “ English Company, these powers would be prevented from violence
 “ or molestation, perceived that it would be very desirable to enter
 “ into alliance with the Company, because the Europeans were just
 “ and regular in conducting all their affairs, and should the Burman
 “ or Siamese powers unjustly attempt violence, the powerful aid and
 “ protection of the Company would enable my father to repel the
 “ aggression. My father was, therefore, extremely desirous of obtain-

“ ing the friendship of the Company, under whose powerful shelter
“ and protection, the country might be transmitted to his descendants
“ increased in strength. For this country, being small and deficient
“ in strength, would depend on the power of the Company to repel
“ the attacks of the Siamese and Burmans. My father accordingly,
“ impressed with a sincere desire to obtain the friendship of the
“ Company, granted the island of Penang according to the request of
“ Mr. LIGHT, the Agent for the Governor-General, and a written
“ engagement, containing my father's demands from the Company,
“ was given to Mr. LIGHT, for the purpose of being forwarded to the
“ Governor-General. Aftersome time, Mr. LIGHT returned to settle on
“ the island, bringing some Sepoys, and he informed my father that
“ the Governor-General consented to his requests, and had sent people
“ to settle on the island ; that the writing from my father had been
“ transmitted by the Governor-General to Europe, for the purpose
“ of receiving the royal seal and sanction, and that it would be returned
“ in six months. My father accordingly granted permission to proceed
“ to settle on the island of Penang, and sent his people to assist
“ in the work, and his officers to protect them from the pirates in
“ the commencement. My father having waited some time, at the
“ expiration of the year, requested the writing from Mr. LIGHT, who
“ desired him to wait a little ; at the end of six years no authentic
“ writing could be obtained ; he received 10,000 dollars per annum,
“ but Mr. LIGHT refused to fulfil the remainder of his engagements,
“ and in consequence of my father insisting upon having a writing,
“ agreeably to his former stipulation, a misunderstanding arose
“ between Kēdah and Penang, after which a new treaty of alliance
“ was concluded. Since that time, many Governors have been
“ placed over Penang, but my father was unable to obtain a writing
“ either from Europe, or from the Governor-General. In the year
“ 1215, my father left the government to my uncle, at which time
“ the Governor of Penang, Sir GEORGE LEITH, requested the cession
“ of a tract of land on the opposite shore, alleging that the island
“ being small, the Company's people were distressed for procuring
“ timber, and the raising of cattle. My uncle being desirous of
“ removing the uneasiness, granted a tract (of which the boundaries
“ were defined) accordingly, placing entire dependence on the
“ power of the Company to protect and defend him against his
“ enemies, and Sir GEORGE LEITH made a new treaty, consisting of
“ fourteen articles, and constituting the two as one country. This,
“ and the former treaty, are inscribed on the Company's records.
“ During the whole government of my father and uncle, no injury
“ or molestation of any consequence had been sustained, nor has
“ any one ever offered to send my letter of supplication to the King
“ or to the Governor-General. I consequently desisted, and only
“ communicated with the several Governors of the islands in matters

“ relating to the two countries, but no certain arrangement from
“ Europe could be heard of, nor could I obtain any assurances on
“ which I could depend.

“ Moreover, so long as I have administered the Government of
“ Kēdah, during the time of the late King of Siam, his proceed-
“ ings were just and consistent with former established custom and
“ usage. Since the decease of the King, and the accession of his
“ son to the throne, in the year 1215, violence and severity have
“ been exercised by the Siamese against Kēdah, in demands and
“ requisitions exceeding all former custom and usage, and which I can-
“ not support for a length of time. The Rājas of Kēdah have been
“ accustomed to submit to the Siamese authority in matters clearly pro-
“ per and consistent with the established customs of the governments,
“ for the sake of the preservation of the country, being unable to
“ contend with Siam, from the superior number of their people.
“ During my administration, their demands have been beyond
“ measure increased, and heavy services have been required of me,
“ inconsistent with the custom of the country. These, however, I
“ submitted to as far as I have been able, for the sake of the people,
“ and to prevent the danger of a rupture with them; how many
“ services, unprecedented in former years, have I not performed,
“ and what expenses have I not incurred in carrying into effect
“ their requisitions! Nevertheless, I cannot obtain any good
“ understanding with them, nor any peace, nor any termination to
“ their injuries and oppressions. They no longer confide in me, and
“ seek to attach blame, alleging that I have joined with the Burmans,
“ with whom this year they have made war, and their intention is
“ to attack Kēdah for the purpose of reducing the country under
“ their government. I have in vain endeavoured to avert the
“ enmity of Siam, but without any appearance of success. I have
“ made known to the Governor of Penang, every circumstance with
“ relation to this country and Siam, and have requested his advice
“ and the assistance of the Company, on which my father relied,
“ because the countries of Kēdah and Penang are as one country
“ and as one interest. When, therefore, Kēdah is distressed, it
“ cannot be otherwise with Penang. The Governor advised me by
“ all means to avoid coming to a rupture with Siam, alleging that it
“ was not in his power to afford me assistance, for that the Supreme
“ Government in Europe had forbidden all interference in the wars
“ of the neighbouring powers. Perhaps this would be improper
“ with respect to other countries, but Kēdah and Penang are much
“ distressed by the labours necessarily imposed to avert the resent-
“ ment of Siam, and every exertion on my part has been made to
“ prevent coming to a rupture with that power, but I was unable to
“ submit to demands exceeding all former precedent, which induced
“ me to apply to the Governor of Penang for the Company's aid

“ to enable me to repel their demands, for my father having trans-
 “ mitted to me his friendship and alliance with the Company, it
 “ would be otherwise a reflection upon the power of the King of
 “ England, who is accounted a Prince greater and more powerful
 “ than any other. I conceive that the countries of Kédah and
 “ Penang have but one interest, and perhaps the King and my friend
 “ may not have been well informed, and in consequence the Govern-
 “ or of Penang has not been authorised to afford assistance, and that
 “ should they be acquainted therewith, they would consider it im-
 “ possible to separate the two countries. In consequence, I request
 “ my friend to issue directions, and to forward a representation to
 “ the King and to the Honourable Company, of the matters contain-
 “ ed in this letter. I request that the engagements contracted by
 “ Mr. LIGHT with my late father, may be ratified, as my country and
 “ I are deficient in strength ; the favour of His Majesty the King of
 “ England extended to me, will render his name illustrious for
 “ justice and beneficence, and the grace of his Majesty will fill me
 “ with gratitude ; under the power and Majesty of the King, I desire
 “ to repose in safety from the attempts of all my enemies, and that
 “ the King may be disposed to kindness and favour towards me, as if
 “ I were his own subject, that he will be pleased to issue his com-
 “ mands to the Governor of Penang to afford me aid and assistance
 “ in my distresses and dangers, and cause a regulation to be made
 “ by which the two countries may have but one interest ; in like
 “ manner I shall not refuse any aid to Penang, consistent with my
 “ ability. I further request a writing from the King, and from my
 “ friend, that it may remain as an assurance of the protection of the
 “ King, and descend to my successors in the government. I place
 “ a perfect reliance in the favour and aid of my friend in all these
 “ matters.”

The whole of Mr. LIGHT's correspondence is corroborative of this candid exposition, and it was quite inconsistent with reason to suppose, that Penang was ceded without some very powerful inducements, in the way of promises by Mr. LIGHT, which, no doubt, in his eagerness to obtain the grant, were liberal and almost unlimited and that his inability to perform them was the occasion of much mental suffering to him.

Thus abruptly ends Mr. ANDERSON's paper. His statements are supported by documentary evidence, his position as Secretary to Government gave him every opportunity of learning the facts, he was a Malay scholar, and his previous post of Government Interpreter had brought him, more than any other officer, in contact with the Malays, while the whole of the native correspondence had probably passed through his hands.

Lastly, the account was written at the instance of the then Governor, and we are told that, after hearing the other side, the views expressed in Mr. ANDERSON's paper were in accordance with the opinions "of the great majority of the Europeans of Penang not connected with the Government."

This paper was, however, recalled and suppressed, and it is hardly surprising.

At this distance of time, close upon a century from the date of the events, it seems clear that the Sultan of the Malay State of Kédah called himself, and believed himself to be, independent; free to govern his country as he liked, free to make Treaties, and free, with the consent of his people, to alienate a portion of his territory. That position was accepted by Captain LIGHT, on behalf of the Supreme Government at Calcutta, was confirmed by the Governor-Général, and a Treaty concluded with the Sultan of Kédah (in 1791) for the cession of the Island of Penang, without any question ever arising of the need to consult Siam in the matter.

A second Treaty was concluded in 1800, with the Sultan of Kédah, confirming the cession of Penang and ceding to the British a strip of territory on the mainland (now called Province Wellesley), whilst it provided for an annual payment of \$10,000 to be made to the Sultan of Kédah and his successors in office as long as these places should be occupied by the British.

Thus, between 1786 and 1800, two Treaties were concluded direct with the Sultan of Kédah for cessions of territory, and no question of even the implied right of Siam to interfere was ever made, nor did the Siamese themselves ever mention such claim.

The Siamese were repeatedly mentioned in the negotiations between the Sultan and Captain LIGHT, and also in the correspondence between the latter and the Supreme Government in India, and always in the same strain, viz., that the Sultan of Kédah was ready to give up a valuable position to obtain an offensive and defensive alliance with an ally powerful

enough to keep in awe the Kings of Siam and Ava, dangerous neighbours whom he had so far only kept out of his territory by fair words and valuable presents.

When the matter was first mooted by Captain LIGHT in 1785, the Sultan of Kēdah framed his demands in the letter quoted in ANDERSON'S Considerations. Those demands were sufficiently plain; first, a promise of real assistance—"if any enemies of ours from the East or West should come to attack us, the Company would regard them as enemies also, and fight them, and all the expenses of such wars shall be borne by the Company."

Secondly, that as Kēdah would lose trade by the settlement of the British at Penang, "as compensation for my losses, \$30,000 a year to be paid annually, so long as the Company reside at Pulau Pinang."

And lastly, the first request repeated, "when any enemies attack us from the interior, they also shall be considered as enemies of the Company."

Those were the terms, and short of these the Sultan was not prepared to accept, and asks that the Governor-General will therefore "not be offended with him."

In the face of this letter, and in the face of the subsequent correspondence which passed between Captain LIGHT and the Supreme Government, it is impossible to throw any doubt on the nature of the demands, or indeed on the nature of the promises.

The island was wanted by the Honourable Company, one negotiation had failed, this one succeeded. Captain LIGHT gave a promise, and the Supreme Government accepted the terms and confirmed the promise. The actual words of Captain LIGHT to the Governor-General, in forwarding the result of his negotiations, were, referring to the first article above-mentioned: "This article comprehends the principal and almost only reason why the King wishes an alliance with the Honourable Company," and the reply of the Supreme Government was: "It has been resolved to accept the King of

“ Kēdah’s offer to the Company of the harbour and island of
“ Penang. This Government will always keep an armed
“ vessel stationed to guard the island of Penang, and the coast
“ adjacent belonging to the King of Kēdah. The Governor-
“ General in Council on the part of the English India Com-
“ pany will take care that the King of Kēdah shall not be a
“ sufferer by an English settlement being formed on the island
“ of Penang.”

Again, in October, 1786, Mr. LIGHT tells the Sultan of Kēdah, and reports what he had done to the Supreme Government, that “ while the English are here, they will assist him if
“ distressed ;” and that is in reply to the Sultan’s expressed fears of the Siamese and Burmans.

And so the island was occupied, and the Supreme Government raised no objection whatever to the demands of the Sultan, they “ resolved to accept the King of Kēdah’s offer. ”

Mr. LIGHT drew the special attention of the Government of India to the principal condition of the Sultan, but the request for \$30,000 seems to have been little regarded. It was, no doubt, estimated at its proper value, the King of Kēdah, being asked to frame his terms, put in this sum, being prepared to reduce the amount when the really important demand was accepted.

Later, the Supreme Government began to waver, and Mr. LIGHT informed them that the Sultan refused a money payment without the promise of assistance.

Later still, when a firm hold had been established on the island, in 1793, the Home Government sent out the ultimatum that “ *no offensive and defensive alliance should be made*
“ *with the Rāja of Kēdah,*” and, adds the writer from whom I quote,* himself Mr. ANDERSON’s chiefest opponent in this question, “ Captain LIGHT died about the latter part of this
“ year.”

* Journal of the Indian Archipelago, vol. iii., page 614—“ An Account of the Origin and Progress of the British Colonies in the Straits of Malacca,” by Colonel Low.

The political relations between the Indian Government and the Courts of Burmah and Siam at this time persuaded the Supreme Government that it would be inexpedient to support Kēdah against both her enemies, and thus perhaps induce them, hitherto always at feud, to combine against the British Indian Company.

The position had been secured; seven years of occupation had proved its value, and shewn that it could be held without difficulty by a small garrison against Asiatics; Mr. LIGHT, the original negotiator, was dead; a Treaty which said nothing about offensive or defensive alliances had been concluded; the promises of 1785 and 1786 were forgotten or ignored, and the Râja of Kēdah was left to settle accounts with his Northern foes as soon as the conclusion of their mutual quarrels should give them time to turn their attention to him.

As Mr. LIGHT had pointed out, Kēdah was safe as long as Siam and Ava thought that an attack on Kēdah might involve a trial of conclusions with the British, but when it was publicly given out that the assistance for which Penang had been ceded could not be relied upon, would not in fact be given, then the fate of Kēdah became a mere question of time, the prospective conqueror, whether Siamese or Burman, a matter of chance.

It is, perhaps, not necessary to touch further on these negotiations, except as regards one point, the conclusion of the *preliminary* (I quote that word from Colonel Low) Treaty in 1791. There is no mention of an offensive and defensive alliance in that Treaty any more than in the subsequent engagement of 1800, and it might be argued that the Râja of Kēdah should have taken care to see that the Treaty contained the stipulation which he most desired.

I do not think that this serious omission would at all surprise any one well acquainted with Malays.

If a British Officer, accredited by the British Government, makes, during the progress of negotiations with a Malay Râja, any promise on behalf of his Government, it would not occur

to the Malay to doubt but that such promise would be accepted by those who sent the officer, and honourably fulfilled. Were any such promise made, and on the strength of it territory ceded to the British Government, the acceptance of the cession would be deemed by the Malay the acceptance of the promise, if nothing were said or written to him to point out that his demand could not be complied with.

If, after five years' occupation of such ceded territory, a preliminary Treaty were concluded, though that Treaty did not contain the fulfilment of the promise, the Malay would not consider that the British Government was thereby released from performing an engagement, on the faith of which the occupation had taken place.

If such a Treaty were called preliminary, and it were necessary to obtain sanction for important matters from a distant Government, the probabilities are that the Malay would be told that this particular request of his was still under consideration, and that, when instructions were received from that high and distant authority, a further and permanent Treaty could be concluded with him.

Under such circumstances a Malay Râja dealing with British Officers would accept their advice.

Lastly, if the British, having been in occupation of a strong position for five years as the friends of a Malay Râja, proposed to conclude with him a Treaty which was not all or anything that he could have hoped for, it is difficult to see what the Malay would gain by refusal.

How all these matters appeared to the King of Kēdah (the son and successor of him who ceded Penang to the British), will be seen from the letter * addressed by His Highness on the 24th December, 1810, to Lord Minto, Governor-General of India, when proceeding to Java.

We are not told what reply was sent to the Râja, but that letter, addressed to the highest authority then known to the

* See page 41.

Malay, would appear to him to exhaust his means of seeking redress. An adverse reply would be conclusive of the futility of further representations on the matter.

It was not till 1821 that the Siamese found leisure to attend to Kědah, but then the attack was sudden, the war short but sanguinary, and the submission that has resulted very complete.

The Malays of Kědah more than once, at short intervals after their conquest, made an effort to regain their independence, and though on one occasion they drove out the invaders and carried the war into Sěnggôra, they were not long able to prevail against their too powerful enemy.

As I said in the opening, the supremacy of the Siamese in Kědah to-day is absolute and uncontested. Whether the influence of the Court of Bangkok has tended to ameliorate the condition of the Malays of Kědah, to raise them in the social scale, to render the country prosperous and the people happy, is another question on which I shall say a few words later.

While Mr. ANDERSON considered, and was trying to prove that Kědah had been deceived by the Indian Government, and had fallen a prey to a relentless enemy, who, unprovoked, had sought a means of reducing the country under its sway, another officer took an opposite view of the case, and, regarding Kědah as a rebel and traitor to its lawful sovereign, justified the proceedings of Siam and blamed the Indian Government for any countenance, support, or protection given to the Râja of Kědah or his family.

This officer was Captain Low (afterwards Colonel Low), Superintendent of Province Wellesley, and I could have wished to have here added his views on the subject, if only to shew both sides. But Colonel Low has not written any connected article on this question, what he says appearing, with many other matters, in a series of papers, to which I have already referred, entitled "The Origin and Progress of the British Colonies in the Straits of Malacca."* Moreover, Colonel

* Journal of the Indian Archipelago, vol. iii., page 599, and vol. iv., pages 25, 119, and 360.

Low's statements are, as a rule, his own, not supported by documents or the opinions of others, as in the case of Mr. ANDERSON's paper. Colonel Low, too, being then Superintendent of Province Wellesley, himself states that, from his action, he had incurred the dislike of the Kědah people, and it is possible that this fact may, to some extent, have biassed his mind.

When Colonel Low's paper appeared in the *Journal of the Indian Archipelago*, Mr. J. R. LOGAN, the Editor, a man universally respected in this Colony, and whose long residence, deep study, ability and independent position entitled him to speak on such a question as this, felt it necessary to attach to the paper the following note :—

" We have not deemed it proper to express our dissent from
" some of the Author's views with respect to the rights and claims
" of the Malay Kings of Kědah ; but distant readers ought to know
" that public opinion in Penang has always been strongly in favour
" of them. In 1824 an elaborate work was compiled from official
" records by Mr. ANDERSON, the Secretary to the Penang Govern-
" ment, in proof of the right of the King to cede Penang and his
" claim upon us for assistance against the Siamese. The Governor
" in Council concurred in Mr. ANDERSON's conclusions, and the
" work was printed by their order." *

And again, in Vol. iv. of the *Journal of the Indian Archipelago*, page 25, appears the following :—

" Colonel Low has sent us the following memorandum with
" reference to our note at the foot of the first part of this paper,
" Vol. III. p. 617.

" Memorandum.—Mr. ANDERSON, the gentleman alluded to in
" the note, was Secretary to the Penang Government. He advo-
" cated the independence of Kědah of the Siamese—which was a
" political view of the case quite at variance with the views of the
" Supreme Government of India—and although the Local Govern-
" ment of Penang did not prevent his publishing the pamphlet,
" supposing that he would not uphold the Râja of Kědah against
" his Liege Lord as it was admitted by the Supreme Government
" that the Emperor of Siam was, yet when the Local Government
" became aware of the side taken by Mr. ANDERSON, it instantly
" directed him to suppress the pamphlet. That all the native
" public of Penang were in favour of Kědah can excite no surprise,

* *Journal of the Indian Archipelago*, vol. iii., page 617.

“ as the bulk of the people was composed of Malays and Chinese
“ whose feelings and interests were closely connected with Kēdah.
“ Many of the Europeans, from motives of humanity, were doubt-
“ less also in favour of Kēdah, but none of these cases can be
“ deemed as any evidence or proof of the political question in
“ either way, as to the Rāja's claims or rights.

“ *Penang, 9th December, 1849.*

J. Low.

“ We shall not enter into any controversy with our esteemed
“ contributor. In saying that public opinion in Penang has
“ always been strongly in favour of the rights and claims of the
“ Malay Kings of Kēdah, we meant the opinion of the great
“ majority of the Europeans of Penang not connected with Govern-
“ ment. Much has been said and written on both sides of the
“ question, and we saw with some apprehension the revival of the
“ discussion in the pages of this Journal. We say nothing as to
“ the relative value of Colonel Low's opinion and that of Mr.
“ ANDERSON and the large number of European residents, past and
“ present, who, like ourselves, agree in Mr. ANDERSON's views.
“ Whether or not the Local Government of 1824 concurred in
“ these views, may be gathered from the following extracts from
“ the report of the trial of Tunku MAHOMED SAAD in the Court of
“ Judicature at Penang in 1840.

“ *From the evidence of the Hon'ble J. W. SALMOND, Esq., Resi-
“ dent Councillor at Penang.*

“ Have you read this book in which the translation of the treaty
“ is printed, and which bears on its title page to be ‘by JOHN
“ ANDERSON, of the Honourable East India Company's Civil Ser-
“ vice, Penang,’ and to be printed at Prince of Wales' Island
“ under the authority of Government by WILLIAM COX in the
“ year 1824, and are the Government records therein correctly
“ cited?

“ I have read Mr. ANDERSON's work, but have not compared it
“ with the Government records, but I believe they are cited
“ correctly.

“ Do you know the book to have been printed under the autho-
“ rity of Government?

“ I know that 100 copies were printed by order of Government
“ and sent to the Court of Directors.

“ Is the printed copy produced a true copy?

“ I cannot say.

“ Mr. BALHETCHET.—Then we must prove it.

“ EDWARD D'OLIVEIRO called (*previously sworn on the 26th
“ October.*)

“ I was a printer employed in the Printing Office of the late
“ WILLIAM COX; the copy of Mr. ANDERSON's book produced was
“ printed by Mr. Cox by order of the Government.

“ Mr. BALHETCHET.—I have already mentioned to your Lordship that the Government * recalled all copies of this book that could be discovered; that Mr. ANDERSON was obliged to give his word of honour that he did not retain a copy, and that this copy now produced and proved is from the library of Mr. JAMES FAIRLIE CARNEGIE of this island, a brother-in-law of Mr. ANDERSON.

“ *From the Charge to the Jury by the Honourable Sir WILLIAM NORRIS, Recorder.*

“ Again, the prisoner’s agents had dwelt at some length, and with much feeling and eloquence, on the cruelties and oppressions which had followed the Siamese invasion of Kēdah in 1821; and that they had not exaggerated matters was pretty evident from the details in Mr. ANDERSON’s book, which could scarcely have been published, as it both purports and was proved to have been, under the authority of the Local Government of Penang, within three years from that period, had not the appalling facts which it records been substantially true.—ED.”

I have, however, made a few extracts from Colonel Low’s paper, not so much with a view of throwing light on the Kēdah question, for that seems sufficiently clear, but because of occasional references to other States—Pêrak, Trěnggānu, Pētāni and Kēlantān. Colonel Low, writing in July, 1848, makes the following remarks on the occupation of Penang by Captain LIGHT in 1786:—

“ It is much to be regretted that the cession of this island had not been obtained directly from the Siamese Court, which appears to have been not indisposed to the measure at the time. Siam was then waging war with Ava, and it had become an object of great importance for it to have ready means of procuring European arms and ammunition on its western coasts. But its Emperor could not brook that the British had acquired the island from the Lord of his vassal State of Kēdah, and accordingly resented the unauthorised alienation, which had been concealed from him, by threatening the Rāja with a full measure of his vengeance.

“ It was not long, however, before the consideration just noticed began to have its full and due weight, and as the island was in itself of no value to the Siamese King, he was apparently easily pacified, the intention was dropped of punishing the Rāja then, and the Kēdahyans and Siamese were soon allowed to enter into

“ * By order of the higher authorities. The Governor, Mr. FULLERTON, held the same opinion as Mr. ANDERSON and urged that the British Government should not hesitate to endeavour to obtain the restoration of our ally to the throne of his ancestors.—ED.”

“ a friendly intercourse with the settlers on that island, one which
 “ has not been seriously interrupted up to the present day.

“ The then tenure, therefore, of Penang by the British rested upon
 “ the very flimsy foundation of recent occupation and it may now
 “ be considered as based on long occupancy alone—one, however,
 “ which, subsequently to the waived protest of the Siamese, has
 “ never been questioned or disturbed by them, but on the contrary
 “ has been formally recognized in the treaties betwixt the Court
 “ of Bangkok and the British.

“ The treaties with the Kĕdah Râja were indeed null and void
 “ from the very first, since the Kĕdah Râja, as a delegated ruler,
 “ had no power to make them; or at any rate to give away any
 “ portion of the territory of Kĕdah. Even had he been a ruler
 “ both *de facto* and *de jure*, his expulsion from that country after-
 “ wards by the Siamese would have had a similar effect, for he
 “ could not have performed then those acts to which he was by
 “ treaty bound. A sort of tacit right, however, to hold possession
 “ may have arisen from the Siamese having originally neglected
 “ to strongly and sufficiently protest against it, and from their not
 “ having enforced the not very regular one, which they did make.
 “ This, however, would be a dangerous precedent on which to base
 “ occupations of territory.

“ The treaty of Bangkok treats Kĕdah as one of the Siamese
 “ Provinces. Hence there can be no independent Râja there, and
 “ consequently no one who is entitled to the sum formerly payable
 “ to the self-styled independent Kĕdah Râjas, by virtue of the
 “ treaty made by Sir GEORGE LEITH before noticed. The Siamese
 “ Emperor could not claim it on the plea that he is the ruler *de*
 “ *jure* of Kĕdah, without directly admitting that the Râja who
 “ ceded Penang was a ruler in his own right, and so nullifying
 “ such a claim. If this sum is now, therefore, to be paid, it can
 “ only be as a gift. But it is one which cannot benefit the reci-
 “ pient, unless by helping to conciliate the Emperor, for it must,
 “ as it now does, find its way into his coffers. But although osten-
 “ sibly paid under this aspect of the case, and quite irrespective
 “ of political views, and merely in consideration of the fact that
 “ the possession of Penang was obtained from a Râja of Kĕdah,—
 “ still from its being paid to a Siamese Officer or *Governor* of
 “ Kĕdah, and immediately afterwards from its being paid over by
 “ him to Siam, it has too much the appearance of being a rent or
 “ tribute. All this seems to be anomalous in politics, and had
 “ better, perhaps, be at once got rid of by a commutation, but
 “ securing at the same time the office of Governor as at present,
 “ on his duly preserving his allegiance to Siam, to the legitimate
 “ nearest descendant of the Râja who ceded Penang, or to Siam
 “ itself. We may, however, be pretty sure that, unless this be

“ done, the payment will be perpetuated, since for its sake the
 “ Siamese Government will, for so long as any of the descendants
 “ of the Râja just noticed remain, place one of them as Governor
 “ over Kĕdah, or at least, as now has been done, the central por-
 “ tion of it. There is, it may be added, no scarcity of scions of the
 “ stock of the Râja of Kĕdah.

“ The original intention in securing Penang was purely of a
 “ general commercial nature, and for the purpose of erecting docks
 “ and building ships, and to be a naval depôt—and to this agricul-
 “ tural and other objects were mere adjuncts. It became one in
 “ the chain of trading colonies with which the British have since
 “ girded the world.”

I extract the following to shew that, in 1848, though a
 strong partizan of Siam, Colonel Low writes Trĕnggĕnu and
 Kĕlantan as “ Independent,” though I believe that at that
 time both these States sent the “ Bunga Mas ” to Siam, while
 Pĕtĕni is called “ Dependent on Siam ”:—

“ The population of the Peninsula, excluding the British posses-
 “ sions, may probably stand thus at the utmost :—

“ Independent.			
“ Johor and its dependencies)	...	...	40,000
“ and Pahang, }	...	...	...
“ Trĕnggĕnu, ...	...	...	30,000
“ Kĕlantan, ...	...	...	40,000
“ Pĕrak, ...	...	...	25,000
“ Sĕlĕngor, ...	...	...	3,000
“ Dependent on Siam :—			
“ Pĕtĕni, ...	...	...	50,000
“ Kĕdah, ...	...	...	25,000
			213,000 ”

Immediately afterwards, he tells how Pĕtĕni became depend-
 ent :—

“ About this time (July, 1786) the Siamese over-ran the
 “ Pĕtĕni country which had refused to pay the usual homage. The
 “ population of this country amounted then to about 115,000, but
 “ it was easily reduced to its former state of submission. Hajis
 “ abounded in it, as they now do, and it is well known that this
 “ class of Malays, both from bigotry and religious pride, are ever
 “ ready to foment rebellions. They gain little indeed by the Haji
 “ beyond these two qualifications.”

I quote the following paragraph on the terms of the occupa-
 tion of Penang to shew that Colonel Low calls the question
 of affording assistance to Kĕdah a “ new subject ” (in Decem-

ber, 1789), and this, I think, either shews bias or an insufficient acquaintance with the real facts :—

“The Râja of Kēdah insisted [December, 1789] that Captain LIGHT had, several years before and previous to the cession, promised to assist him if distressed in his expected troubles with both the Burmese and Siamese. It appears that although such promise had not been actually made by that officer in positive terms, still that, by evading in general terms any direct reply, he had left the Râja to entertain hopes that he would perhaps gain his object. But it seems also clear that this new subject was then mooted by the Râja, as he had hopes otherwise of obtaining the aid of some less scrupulous power than the British, for enabling him to set the Siamese at defiance. In this frame of mind he had made secret overtures to the French at Pondicherry and to the Dutch. It does not appear that the former shewed any great alacrity in meeting the Râja's views, but the Dutch entertained them with avidity, received the Râja's letters with great pomp, and doubtless hoped, by a grand stroke of policy, to exclude the British forever from the Straits, and this at the very time too when the hoisting of a signal of aid, if not of approbation merely, by the latter would have raised every Malayan arm throughout the Archipelago against Dutch rule and influence. A Dutch frigate was despatched to Kēdah, and two other cruizers were anchored off Penang harbour and interfered with the traders to that port. The Râja of Kēdah now laid an embargo on rice and other supplies usually carried to Penang.”

Here follows an extract to shew the nature of the relations between the Siamese and the British Authorities in Penang:—

“In 1792 the Râja, notwithstanding all past experience, gave umbrage to Siam by aiding or at least countenancing an attack made on the Siamese provinces of Dalung and Sēnggōra by 400 Hajis and 3,000 Pētāni men, who, however, were cut up by the Siamese troops. The Râja saved himself by timely concessions. The Siamese Court, in order to try the temper of the British Chief at Penang, sent an embassy to him requiring, if not demanding, the aid of two vessels loaded with rice to be used in their war with the Burmese. The request was met with a present of some iron and nails!”

I have already referred to the following passage :—

“25th February, 1793.—The Home Government at last sent out the ultimatum that *no offensive and defensive alliance should be made with the Râja of Kēdah*. Captain LIGHT died about the latter part of this year.

“Although the rather implicit credence which he gave at first to the Râja's assertion of his independence of Siam, might have led to more serious consequences than it did, still it would

“ appear that he was a man of sound sense, probity and judgment—active, practical, and moderate—that certainly reprehensible credence, however, secured to the British merchant and to the world the port of Penang, the most eligible one at this extremity of the straits.”

I give two extracts regarding the acquisition of Province Wellesley :—

“ 15th July, 1800. At this period, Sir GEORGE LEITH, without any lengthened negotiations, purchased from the new Râja of Kêdah for the sum of two thousand Spanish dollars, that tract of land on the Peninsula opposite to and outflanking Penang, which has since been called Province Wellesley.”

“ The new treaty which was entered into with the Râja embraced the same articles as those which were contained in the preceding treaties, and the Râja was to receive ten thousand dollars per annum so long as he was *de facto* the ruler of Kêdah. This treaty was superseded by the treaty of Bangkok and by the Râja's losing his government. But his son now receives it, although he is a mere Governor appointed by the Court of Bangkok over a fourth part of the Kêdah country.”

Colonel Low thus recounts one attack on Pêrak :—

“ 1813. The Siamese obliged the Râja of Kêdah in this year to attack the State of Pêrak, which then, as it now does, bounded Province Wellesley on the South. This was an unprincipled and unprovoked aggression. The Kêdah forces evacuated the country soon after, but not before they had inflicted on it the miseries of demibarbarian warfare.

“ 25th February, 1814. The Governor-General deprecated the undesirable consequences likely to result from the extension of Siamese power to the vicinity of Malacca, but as the invading force had retreated, no mediation as contemplated became necessary. Yet the Kêdah Râja, before his invasion of Pêrak, had received from the Penang Government one hundred muskets and twenty barrels of gunpowder, and probably on some false plea, for the independence of Pêrak had all along been desiderated. The Pêrak Râja, quite unaware of the aid thus untowardly given to his enemy, addressed a letter to the chief authority at Penang, which exhibited the profound ignorance which has ever characterised the rulers of that petty State. He only asked for two ships of war and two thousand troops, one half of these last to be Europeans (one hundred being perhaps the utmost strength of the latter at the time in the island). ‘I am,’ wrote this potentate over twenty thousand subjects, ‘he who holds the royal sword and the dragon betel stand and the shell which came out of the sea which flowed from the hill of S'Gantang.’

“ He offered at the same time the Dinding islands to the British
 “ for nothing, and the *monopoly of all the tin and rattans in Pérak*
 “ *for the yearly sum of two thousand dollars*, also elephants in
 “ exchange for gunpowder, at the rate of sixty dollars for each of
 “ the height of six feet, and six hundred to nine hundred dollars
 “ for those of the largest size. These requests and offers were not
 “ attended to, although some of them were very advantageous.
 “ But the Supreme Government afterwards sanctioned the occupa-
 “ tion of the Dinding islands. This, however, never took place.”

Again, another instance of the style in which the Siamese carried on their correspondence with British Officers :—

“ 12th November, 1821. The warning before noticed was true,
 “ for, in the November following it, the Râja of Ligor burst into
 “ Kědah at the head of a force of seven thousand men. The small
 “ brick fort at the entrance of Kědah river fell after a feeble
 “ defence on the 18th, and the Râja, without trying to defend it,
 “ fled precipitately on an elephant to the coast opposite to Penang.
 “ The Governor deputed Mr. CRACROFT to offer him an asylum in
 “ Penang, but under the express stipulation, that neither he nor
 “ any of his followers should intrigue or commit any political act
 “ without the approval of the British Government. The Râja
 “ established himself under these conditions in Penang, and for
 “ upwards of twenty years afterwards strenuously and systemati-
 “ cally acted in direct opposition to them.

“ The Râja, it is said, escaped the hot pursuit of the Siamese by
 “ scattering rupees from his elephant in his route, which helped to
 “ delay the soldiers.

“ The Râja of Ligor now addressed a letter to Mr. PHILLIPS
 “ describing the refractory conduct of the ex-Kědah Râja,* and
 “ stating that the Emperor would appoint a Siamese officer to be
 “ its Governor, and then, in somewhat of the Celestial fashion, he
 “ set forth that a large force would be sent to attack any country
 “ which should protect the ex-Governor and carry him off. ‘ Let
 “ ‘ my friend the Governor of Penang if he goes there secure him
 “ ‘ and deliver him, so that his head may be brought up. Should
 “ ‘ this be refused, be it known that I am at Kědah with a large
 “ ‘ force, and near to Penang, and that friendly relations will be
 “ ‘ broken and commercial intercourse will cease.’ He at the
 “ same time invites the Governor of Penang to visit him at Kědah
 “ to enter into amicable relations. This vaunting letter, which

“ * He was never styled Râja by the Court of Bangkok, but
 “ Chow Pangiran, or Lord, the title which the Emperor conferred
 “ upon him when he went to the capital to solicit the Government
 “ of Kědah. The Malays, following their own custom, called him
 “ Râja.” [This note is by Colonel Low.]

“supreme ignorance alone could have dictated, and which looked like a close approach to a declaration of war, only that it was not official and was the exhibition of anger in a mere provincial chief unauthorised by his Emperor, was calmly replied to. The Râja of Ligor was told that the British Government was not accustomed to deny the rights of hospitality to an ally or friend, and that confident in its own strength and power, it was not in the habit of receiving, or of using in its correspondence with neighbouring States, any unavailing threats and expressions.

“January, 1822. The uncle of the ex-Râja, who was a tool in the hands of the Ligorian, wrote to the Governor to have paid to him the rent as he called it, which the English had to pay for Penang. To back this demand, the Ligorian recognised this Chief as Governor of Kédah, although he had just before declared that a Siamese should be placed over Kédah. As the Siamese Emperor had never openly protested against the British occupancy of Penang, he committed a palpable political blunder in not maintaining the annual payment to the ruler *de facto* of that country. It is of small consequence how this money is paid, for any how, if demanded, it finds its way into the Siamese treasury. But it would have been extremely beneficial had the negotiators at Bangkok induced the Siamese at once to accept a sum of money in lieu of all further demands. At present the payment looks too much like rent or tribute.”

The following extract is not in accord with one already quoted, but Colonel Low gives no authorities for his conclusions. As a matter of fact, Kélantan is an important State, probably the most populous, as regards Malays, of any in the Peninsula, and denies the authority of Siam to interfere in the Government :—

“July, 1822. The Râja of Kélantan, a small State on the East Coast of the Peninsula, wrote to the Governor of Penang offering to give up that country to the British upon his being allowed one-half of the revenues. He would have made a good bargain, and the British a bad one, had the proposal been entertained—for being then under Siam, it would have relieved him from vassalage, and placed more revenue at his disposal than perhaps he could else have had the power to retain.”

The following refers to the British-Siamese Treaty of 1826, to which I shall have occasion to refer later :—

“1826. Captain BURNES, Envoy of the Governor-General, concluded with the Siamese Court the Treaty of Bangkok, on the 20th June, 1826. This was chiefly of a commercial nature, but the

“ Court would not listen to any overtures for the return of the
“ ex-Râja of Kĕdah to that country. The right, however, of the
“ British to possess Penang, founded on occupation, was unequi-
“ vocally and fully recognised in this treaty.*

“ It does not appear that the commercial compacts contained
“ in this treaty have been all adhered to by the Siamese—so at
“ least we might infer from the frequent complaints of British
“ merchants at Bangkok—and it is believed that the Americans
“ have, without difficulty, obtained a much better treaty, owing to
“ their being unshackled in the East by any political or other
“ considerations, beyond mercantile ones.”

Colonel Low thus alludes to the last attempt of the Siamese
in Pĕrak :—

“ About September, 1826, it was found that the Siamese had
“ introduced troops into the State of Pĕrak, on the plea that the
“ Râja desired them, which, if true, would have been sufficient,
“ but the Râja, after much difficulty, got a letter conveyed to the
“ Governor at Penang acquainting him that the Siamese had
“ arrived without his consent, and at the instigation of some fac-
“ tious chiefs, and that he had been deprived of all power. As this
“ conduct of the Ligor Râja contravened the 14th article of the
“ Treaty of Bangkok, the Governor despatched an officer,† in charge
“ of a party of Sepoys and with a Bombay H. C. Cruizer at his
“ command, to free Pĕrak from Siamese interference. This officer
“ had also the powers of an envoy.

“ The objects proposed were fully attained. The Siamese force
“ forthwith evacuated their position on the bank of the river, and
“ the Râja dismissed those who had intrigued with the Siamese,
“ and formed a steady Government. He was then told by the
“ Envoy, acting on his instructions, that he might rely in future
“ on the aid of the British in expelling any Siamese who might,
“ without his permission, proceed to Pĕrak, and for resisting any
“ interference not sought for by him with his Government. These
“ measures secured the independence of Pĕrak.

“ The Râja wanted to see the English flag hoisted in Pĕrak, and
“ he proffered a written deed ceding to them the island of Pangkor
“ off the mouth of the river, but neither of these offers was
“ accepted by the British Government.”

“ * Art. 10th. But as the Siamese right to possess Kĕdah is also
“ clearly admitted in that document by the British Government,
“ it follows that all Treaties made by the latter with the Râja of
“ Kĕdah are null and void, if they were not virtually so long
“ before.” [This note is by Colonel Low.]

† Colonel Low himself.

Here follow two references to Colonel Low's own action in the struggle between Siamese and Malays in the Peninsula:—

“ He likewise spread a report that he would make a descent on Province Wellesley and ‘retaliate for the *obstacles which the Superintendent there had thrown in the way of the Malays, joining the standard of the Prophet's servants.*’ ”

“ About seven thousand arms of different kinds were at this time seized in the Province by its Superintendent, and cast into the sea, but as its salient population of Malays was about fifteen thousand, and such arms were easily manufactured, this measure had scarcely any perceptible effect in checking the preparations for war.

“ Six years of peace in Kēdah and of apparent return to their allegiance in the Malays of that country who had *sworn fidelity to the Siamese on the Koran*, had seduced the Siamese Governor into a fatal confidence. He had thought that his three hundred Siamese soldiers and these Malays could easily have repelled any attack.”

I here give an extract recounting the re-capture and subsequent loss of Kēdah by the Malays in 1838:—

“ It had, however, the intended effect, for the Malays abandoned the fort to the Siamese part of the garrison which, thus weakened, retreated towards the North. These Malays then joined the invaders, who took quiet possession. Ten days after the fall of the fort the Malays got hold of Perlis and Trang, provinces further to the North. The Malayan force, when first concentrated, consisted of 7,000 men, 2,000 at least having been drawn from Province Wellesley. Of these, 800 were employed carrying stores. This body was then split up into detachments and dispersed to guard all outlets to the country. Some Pētāni soldiers and others joined this force for a short while, swelling it to 10,000 men. The Malayan chiefs believed that their army must have intimidated the Siamese, and that the Emperor would be induced, by a new promise of tribute by them, to restore the ex-Rāja, and yet, at the same time, they adopted the very course which was most likely to thwart any negotiation with that view, the exciting of Pētāni to rebellion. They now tried to negotiate through the Rāja of Sēnggōra, who pretended a wish to serve the Malays, in order that he might gain time to prepare against a meditated attack by them on himself, should he not further their policy. The negotiation of course failed, and the outer districts of Sēnggōra were attacked some time subsequently by the Malayan troops, and after a very short and partial occupation were evacuated, but not before they had sustained much mischief. They also attacked the Siamese district on the same East coast of Peninsula, called Channa; sacking and plundering

“ villages, and Buddhist temples. The images which they found
“ in these were chiefly made of tin, the priests having secured
“ the more valuable ones before they fled. A party of the insur-
“ gents then arrived at Kôta Bharu, and finally at the embouchure
“ of the Pētâni river, where they had hoped to procure boats to
“ carry them to the assault of the town of Sënggôra, the popula-
“ tion of which consisted principally of Chinese. In this hope
“ they were disappointed. The second Malayan column under
“ MAHOMED TAIB reached the above town and invested it a good
“ way off on the land side, but had not the means of doing so on
“ the sea face. They had here passed nearly three months in a
“ state of inaction, when the Sënggôreans marched against them
“ with a force of five hundred Chinese and two thousand Siamese
“ and Malays. The invaders were worsted with considerable loss,
“ and compelled, under Tunku MAHOMED SAAD, T. ABDULLAH, T.
“ MAHOMED SUNNAWI and T. MAHOMED TAIB PUTIH, to retreat to
“ Këdah.”

The paper concludes with this note by Mr. J. R. LOGAN :—

“ To prevent distant readers being misled by Colonel Low’s
“ present strong opinions on the subject of the Siamese and Malay
“ claims to Këdah, we beg to refer to our note at the bottom of
“ p. 25, and to repeat that ‘the opinion of the great majority of
“ ‘Europeans of Penang not connected with Government’ has
“ always been as strongly in favour of the Malays as that of
“ Colonel Low has latterly been hostile to them and favourable to
“ the Siamese. We may add, that we have taken some pains to
“ make ourselves acquainted with the facts, and that we regret
“ our esteemed contributor should have abandoned the more
“ unprejudiced views which he formerly entertained.”

Briefly, we may gather from the foregoing, that the weight of evidence shews that, a century ago, Këdah was independent of Siam (though Colonel Low denied the independence), and that, a century ago, the Indian Government received the island of Penang and the territory of Province Wellesley from the Sultan or Râja of Këdah. In 1821, Siam attacked and conquered Këdah, and in 1826 contracted with the British Government a treaty, known as the Treaty of Bangkok, confirming to the British Government its rights over Penang and Province Wellesley.

A subsequent treaty (1869), which will be found in the appendix, rectified the boundaries of this territory, and it is stated that this treaty took the place of one concluded in 1868 between the Governor of the Straits Settlements (Sir H. ORD) and the Râja of Kědah, on the ground that the Râja of Kědah had no power to negotiate in a matter of this kind.

It has always, so far, been the custom for the Governors of the Straits Settlements and the Lieutenant-Governors of Penang to conduct their relations direct with the Râja of Kědah, but within recent years the Siamese Consul at Penang has gradually come to be used as a medium of communication between the Penang Authorities and the Kědah Authorities. A new appointment, at least one which has but lately come under the knowledge of Government, is that of a Siamese Commissioner of the Western Provinces, *i. e.*, Rendang, Junk Ceylon, Perlis, Kědah, &c. Until within the last ten years this Siamese Official interfered not at all, or but very occasionally, in the affairs of Kědah.

Since the death of Yam Tuan* AHMED BIN SULTAN ZEIN ALRASHID, Sultan of Kědah, the administration of Kědah affairs has been in the hands of the officials at Bangkok. It was only after a long period of delay that the late Sultan's son was chosen to succeed his father, with two uncles, Tunku DIA UDIN and Tunku YAKUB, as joint-Regents until the youth should have come to years of discretion, or had gained sufficient experience to enable him to rule without their aid.

The young Sultan of Kědah died, however, last September, and the brothers, his uncles, have ever since spent nearly all their time at Bangkok, each endeavouring to procure his election to the Chief Authority in Kědah.

Meanwhile, the people live in a state of constant uncertainty and intrigue, the simplest matters are referred to Bangkok for decision, and the threat of making complaint to the Siamese

* Contracted from "Yang di Pertuan" an expression used to designate the highest authority in a Malay State when that authority is a Sultan.

carries far more weight than a just cause.

It is said the last Sultan's younger brother will be elected Yang di Pertuan, and that seems likely enough, but the choice matters little, for he, too, will be under the control of his uncles, who, each jealous of the other's power and popularity, will seek to procure the favour of the Bangkok Court by the one powerful persuasive—bribery.

This is the means by which lucrative posts are secured, causes gained, revenge accomplished in all the dominions of Siam, and, as in China, to procure the means to bribe, the working population must be squeezed.

The Governor of a Siamese Province obtains his Government by bribery: he is bribed to bestow the principal offices in his patronage: the holders of these again sell the subordinate posts, and so on down to the most insignificant servant in the Government employ:—each obtaining from those below him the means with which he bribes his superior, and thus the non-official population pays, besides the taxes and imposts demanded for the general purposes of Government, the whole series of "squeezes" which go to fill the pockets of the officials.

Though Mr. ANDERSON and Col. Low differed about Kédah, they agreed that Trěnggānu and Kělantān were independent of Siam, and Col. Low states that about 1786 the Siamese overran Pětāni, so, if that is correct, we may suppose that, up to that time (and I think later) Pětāni was also independent.

Pêrak, we find, was over-run by the Siamese on the same pretext as that given for the conquest of Pětāni, viz., that the chief had neglected to forward to Bangkok the "golden flower." But the British interfered, and the Siamese withdrew from Pêrak, and a treaty was concluded by which they were altogether excluded from Pêrak,* the Sultan's independence being guaranteed; and yet, strange to say, in the Bangkok Treaty,* concluded four months before, it was provided that the Sultan or Râja of Pêrak could, if he wished, send the

* See Appendix.

This is an error owing to a mis-print at page 709, Vol. viii., of HERTSLET'S Treaties, where, in Article X. of the Treaty of Bangkok, 1826, "Patam" appears instead of "Pétani."

Bunga Mas (golden flower) to the Râja of Ligor—the Siamese Officer who specially interested himself in the Malay States.

The Chiefs of Pêrak allege that the Siamese (or Pêtâni Malays over whom the Siamese claim sovereignty) have, in the course of the last 40 or 50 years, crossed the northern borders of Pêrak, and occupied a very large area of Pêrak territory, and in 1874 the Sultan of Pêrak asked the British Government to assist him in obtaining the restoration of this tract of country.

I will now turn to the Eastern States—Pêtâni, Kêlantan and Trěnggânu—over the first of which, I believe, the Siamese now claim right of administration, and over the two last a sort of undefined suzerainty, born of the practice, which still obtains in Kêlantan and Trěnggânu, of sending the *Bunga Mas* to Siam.

In the Treaty of Bangkok, dated June, 1826, are three clauses concerning the Malay States,* those are articles X., XII. and XIII., a reference to these clauses will show (Art. X) an enumeration of the English and Siamese countries respectively. In the list of Siamese countries neither Pêtâni, Kêlantan, nor Trěnggânu is mentioned, though the sentence closes with the words “and other Siamese provinces.” But Art. XII. specially exempts the States of Kêlantan and Trěnggânu, and it is difficult to understand why, when Sěnggôra, Junk Ceylon and Kêdah were named, Pêtâni, if then an undoubtedly Siamese State, should have been omitted.

After the conclusion of this treaty of 1826, matters appear to have remained quiet for a number of years, Siamese and British being engaged in the administration of their undisputed possessions, without raising, or giving cause to raise, questions of national rights over independent countries; and during this time the clauses of the treaty regarding Kêlantan and Trěnggânu appear to have been outwardly observed, though, from what occurred in 1862 it may be supposed that Siam had, while seeking and obtaining (as for some time was the case with Pêrak) the transmission to Bangkok of the *Bunga Mas*, sought to impress upon the minds of the

* See Appendix.

Rulers of Kēlantān and Trěnggānu that this present constituted an admission of dependence on Siam.

Whatever may have passed between the Chiefs of these States and Siamese officials, to British Officers, the Rāja of Kēlantān and the Sultan of Trěnggānu have always maintained their independence of Siam.

In 1856 another treaty* was concluded with Siam, confirming Article XII. above-mentioned, but in some measure abrogating Article X. Between 1826 and 1860, no question touching the independence of the Sultan of Trěnggānu, the Rāja of Kēlantān and the Rāja of Pētāni was, as far as I can ascertain, ever raised by the Siamese. During that time, the British Authorities in the Straits had frequent correspondence with these States, at least with Trěnggānu and Kēlantān, and in 1850 the Sultan of the former State sent an Embassy to Java without any reference to the Court of Bangkok.

In 1857, the Běndahāra of Pahang, a State lying to the northward of Johor and between Johor and Trěnggānu, died, and a dispute arose as to his successor. One of the claimants, named Inche WAN AHMED (the present Běndahāra of Pahang) worsted at the outset, left Pahang for a district named Kēmāman in the State of Trěnggānu.

From this place he fitted out expeditions against his successful rival, and the then Governor of the Straits Settlements (Mr. BLUNDELL), in the interests of British Subjects, and to preserve the peace of the Peninsula, repeatedly desired Inche WAN AHMED to desist from his attacks on Pahang, and also strongly remonstrated with the Sultan of Trěnggānu, who was supposed to be giving sympathy and assistance to Inche WAN AHMED. This went on till 1861 when the ex-Sultan of Lingga, a Dutch dependency, joined Inche WAN AHMED in Trěnggānu Territory and was stated to be giving his support to Inche WAN AHMED to enable him to fit out another expedition against Pahang.

* See Appendix.

In this year, 1861, the Sultan of Trěnggānu visited Singapore, and complained to the Governor that it was reported the Siamese intended to depose him by force. On the receipt of further information to the same tenor, the Governor of the Straits protested, through H. M.'s Consul at Bangkok, against any Siamese interference in Trěnggānu, pointing out that such action would constitute an infraction of the treaty.

On receipt of the Governor's remonstrance the King of Siam denied the rumour and matters remained quiet for some months.

The first King of Siam meanwhile married the sister of the ex-Sultan of Lingga, and in 1862 sent word to the Sultan of Trěnggānu to prepare to receive the ex-Sultan, then living in Bangkok. At the same time the ex-Sultan was sent to Trěnggānu, and to the same place went Inche WAN AHMED, who had been for some time living in Kělantān.

The Governor of the Straits Settlements (Colonel, now General, Sir ORFEUR CAVENAGH), seeing in this meeting the prospect of further troubles in Pahang, sent letters to the Sultan of Trěnggānu desiring his Highness to send the ex-Sultan of Lingga back to Bangkok.

The Sultan did not, however, do as he was desired, and after a good deal of correspondence, two vessels-of-war visited Trěnggānu, with a Civil Officer bearing the ultimatum from the Governor to the Sultan. As the Governor's request was not complied with the Sultan of Trěnggānu's fort was shelled by the British vessels.

The Siamese Government, which, in reply to the representation of General CAVENAGH, had promised to remove the ex-Sultan from Trěnggānu, did not carry out its engagement till March, 1863, and that only after the strong action described.

The measures taken by Governor CAVENAGH were justified in the following papers which were printed in October, 1863. The first is a narrative of events, while the two letters to H. M.'s Consul at Bangkok maintain the treaty independence of the States of Trěnggānu and Kělantān.

The Court of Bangkok does not appear to have made any effort, through the British Consul or otherwise, to disprove or deny Governor CAVENAGH's statements or conclusions, and it would, therefore, appear that the complete independence of Trěnggânu and Kělantān must be accepted both by the Court of Bangkok and by the British Government.

I know no proofs to shew that Pětâni is on any different footing, but I am aware that, in the case of this State, the Siamese have assumed a control of details of administration not attempted in Trěnggânu or Kělantān.

NARRATIVE OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE STRAITS GOVERNMENT,
WITH REGARD TO THE RECENT OPERATIONS ON THE EAST COAST
OF THE MALAY PENINSULA, BY GOVERNOR CAVENAGH.

TRĒNGGĀNU is an independent Principality, situated on the East

Despatch from Governor, Straits Settlements, No. 205, dated 16th November, 1861.

Coast of the Malay Peninsula, the Ruler of which, as is often customary with weak Oriental States, despatches

a periodical Embassy with presents to his powerful neighbour, the King of Siam, but he has never acknowledged obedience to the latter, and has always refused to do him personal homage.

2. When the treaty of 1826 was concluded between Great Britain and Siam, the independence of TrĒnggĀnu and the adjoining State of Kĕlantān was mutually guaranteed by Article 12. This Article is still in force, having been confirmed by the treaty of 1856, whilst Article 10, which specially referred to the Countries and Provinces under the authority of Siam, was, by the same engagement, in a great measure abrogated.

3. Even as far back as 1785, the Sultan of TrĒnggĀnu has been in direct communication with the

Vide Correspondence with the Governor of Penang, 1785, 1787, and 1792.

Despatch from Governor, Straits Settlements, No. 174, dated 31st December, 1847.

Do. do., No. 11, dated 11th January, 1848.

Do. do., No. 18, dated 9th July, 1850.

Do. do., No. 32, dated 13th October, 1851.

Do. do., No. 53, dated 11th December, 1851.

Despatch from Resident Councillor, Singapore, No. 124, dated 4th October, 1851.

Do. from Supreme Government, No. 1945, dated 11th June, 1852.

British Authorities in the Straits, and has, on one or two occasions, actually solicited their aid to enable him to resist the Siamese when threatened with attack; he has, at all times, been recognised as an independent Chief and neither in 1850, when he despatched an Embassy to Java, with the view of cultivating friendly relations with the Dutch, nor in 1851, when his treatment of some British subjects became the matter of investigation, were any pretensions to exercise the slightest control over his proceedings, or to interfere in his behalf, advanced by the Siamese Court.

4. The country of Pahang, the boundary of which is continuous with that of TrĒnggĀnu, was originally a Province of Johor, governed by one of the great hereditary Chiefs; on the disruption of the ancient Empire, the several Chiefs in charge of Provinces asserted their independence, and Pahang has continued to be ruled by the descendants of the last Governor, styled the BĕndahĀra; as Great Britain, from her power in the Straits, gradually assumed

the position of the old Sultans, the neighbouring Chiefs naturally looked upon the British Government as the paramount authority, and, although not bound by any treaty obligations, the Bëndahâra of Pahang has always courted the friendship, and solicited the countenance and advice, of the Governor of the Straits Settlements.

5. In October, 1857, the Bëndahâra of Pahang died, leaving two sons, of whom the elder succeeded to the Sovereignty, the younger, Inche WAN AHMED,* having, it is said, previously fled the country, to escape the punishment due to the crime of having had connection with one of his father's wives, of which he had been accused. Subsequently, Inche WAN AHMED laid claim to the Districts of Kuantan and Ēndau, and his claim having been denied, organised a force within the territories of the Sultan of Trěnggānu, by whom he was generally supposed to be supported, and proceeded to attack his brother's Government.

Despatch from Governor, Straits Settlements, No. 13, dated 25th January, 1858.

Do. from Supreme Government, No. 887, dated 2nd March, 1858.

6. Hostilities were carried on for a long period with varied success on both sides. Inche WAN AHMED, when repulsed, invariably taking refuge in Kěmāman, a Province of Trěnggānu, adjoining Pahang, where he re-collected his followers, and after obtaining supplies of arms and ammunition, made arrangements for fresh incursions. Eventually, owing to the disturbed state of Pahang, consequent on these continued aggressions, our trade with the Eastern coast of the Peninsula became seriously interrupted, and the prevailing tranquility amongst the other Malay States became endangered, hence, in May, 1858 (a previous attempt made in March having proved unsuccessful, owing to the violence of the monsoon), the then Governor of the Straits Settlements, Mr. BLUNDELL, visited Pahang and Trěnggānu in the Government Steamer *Hooghly*, accompanied by H. M. Ship *Niger*; as Inche WAN AHMED had, however, in the meanwhile experienced a complete defeat, all necessity for any action on Mr. BLUNDELL's part had ceased, and he merely warned the Sultan of Trěnggānu against the evil consequences likely to ensue in the event of his failing to attend to the remonstrances of the British Government, and attempting to interfere in the affairs of the neighbouring country.

Despatch from Governor, Straits Settlements, No. 32, dated 2nd March, 1858.

Do. do., No. 50, dated 10th May, 1858.

Do. do., No. 56, dated 26th May, 1858.

7. In September, 1858, information having been received that Inche WAN AHMED, notwithstanding the warning so lately given, had again been allowed to commence collecting

Despatch from Governor, Straits Settlements, No. 116, dated 13th September, 1858.

* The present Bëndahâra of Pahang.—F. A. S.

a force at Kēmāman, for the purpose of invading Pahang, upon a representation from the Chamber of Commerce at Singapore, the Steamer *Hooghly* was despatched to the scene of operations, with orders to compel Inche WAN AHMED, by force, if necessary, to abandon his intention, and take up his residence either at Trēnggānu or Singapore, the Sultan of Trēnggānu was also reminded of the responsibility he would incur by permitting a continuance of unprovoked attacks upon a friendly country.

8. After this admonition, for some time the Sultan refrained

Despatch from Governor, Straits Settlements, No. 85, dated 23rd May, 1861.

Do. do., No. 86, dated 3rd June, 1861.

Do. from Supreme Government, No. 3941, dated 18th July, 1861.

Do. from Governor, Straits Settlements, No. 123 dated 19th July, 1861.

Do. from Supreme Government, No. 4535, dated 14th August, 1861.

Do. from Governor, Straits Settlements, No. 146, dated 23rd August, 1861.

Do. from Supreme Government, No. 5298, dated 13th September, 1861.

Do. from Governor, Straits Settlements, No. 164, dated 17th September, 1861.

from granting any support to Inche WAN AHMED, and the country of Pahang, which had suffered greatly from the previous dissensions, was, for a while, allowed repose. In the early part of 1861, however, Inche WAN AHMED left Trēnggānu with a considerable force, and recommenced his attacks, the whole of the seaboard consequently soon became disturbed, and both parties having appealed to the head of the Straits Settlements, with the view of protecting our commerce, upon

which the unsatisfactory state of affairs had again entailed serious injury, as well as that of preserving the general peace of the Peninsula, which there was reason to believe, had been threatened by the neighbouring Chiefs becoming interested in the strife, it was deemed advisable to adopt measures for ensuring a speedy settlement of the question at issue, and the present Governor accordingly personally visited Pahang, and offered his mediation; this was accepted by the Bēndahāra, and his assent having been signified to the terms proposed, they were communicated to Inche WAN AHMED, who, however, declined to agree to them; he was, therefore, informed that his pretensions to authority over the Districts claimed could not be recognised, and that any interference with the interests of British trade would be promptly resented. For a short period, Inche WAN AHMED, who had, in the first instance, again retreated to Kēmāman, with the alleged support of the ex-Sultan of Lingga (an intriguing Chief, the representative of the junior branch of the Johor family, who had left the protection of the Dutch Government, and, in accordance with the wishes of Mr. BLUNDELL, had been required to quit Pahang, in which country he had originally taken up his residence) as well as of the Sultan of Trēnggānu, succeeded in prolonging the contest along the frontier: notwithstanding the renewed representations of the Chamber of Commerce at Singapore, as to the evil effects thereby produced

upon our trade, it was not, however, deemed advisable to adopt any active measures towards the maintenance of the Běndahāra's authority, and, in reply to his calls for assistance, that Chief was, therefore, informed that he must himself take means for expelling the intruder from his territories, and that the action of the Straits Government would be restricted to preventing any foreign interference: at the same time the Sultan of Trěnggānu, equally with other Chiefs, was warned as to the necessity for pursuing a course of the strictest neutrality, and refraining from rendering Inche WAN AHMED any countenance or assistance; this warning had the desired result; unsupported, Inche WAN AHMED, as had been expected, was unable to successfully oppose his nephew, who had succeeded to the Běndahāraship, owing to his father's voluntary abdication, and speedily retired from the position he had occupied on the Kuantan River, ultimately seeking refuge in Kělantān, a State to the North of Trěnggānu.

9. In the meanwhile, the Sultan of Trěnggānu, who, in an interview with the Governor, held at

Despatch from Governor, Straits Settlements, No. 121, dated 19th July, 1861.

Do. do., No. 135, dated 7th August, 1861.

Do. do., No. 166, dated 17th September, 1861.

Do. from Supreme Government, No. 4298, dated 13th September, 1861.

Do. from Governor, Straits Settlements, No. 6, dated 10th January, 1863.

Singapore, on the occasion of his visiting that Station, with the view of proceeding on a pilgrimage to Mecca, had distinctly denied all subordination to Siam, and fully explained the nature of the Embassy periodically sent to the Court at Bangkok, became seriously

disquieted by a report that it was the intention of that Court to depose him by force, and place upon his throne the ex-Sultan of Lingga, his nephew, who had been summoned from Trěnggānu (where he had latterly been staying) to Bangkok by the Siamese Authorities; so alarmed was the Sultan, that, on the Siamese Squadron, with one of the Royal Princes and the Prime Minister on board, visiting Trěnggānu, he failed to wait upon the former, and a British Steamer, despatched for the purpose of watching the proceedings of the Siamese, being anchored off the Port, the Squadron continued its route to Singapore. The report of the Sultan's intended deposition having been confirmed by information from other reliable sources, the Governor addressed Her Majesty's Consul at Bangkok upon the subject, pointing out that any interference with the Government of Trěnggānu could not but be considered a breach of the treaty, as proving a serious obstruction to trade; this brought forth a denial on the part of the King of Siam of the truth of the rumour, and the Siamese schemes of aggression being thus thwarted, and all pretext for any quarrel between the Chiefs of Trěnggānu and Pahang having been, through the mediation of the British Authorities, removed by the return of the mother of

the ex-Sultan of Lingga* to the former State, the Malay Peninsula, for several months, remained undisturbed, and order and quiet having been restored to Pahang, British capital again began to be employed in working the valuable tin mines, and thus developing the resources of the country, of which the prosperity would have rapidly increased.

10. On the 17th June, 1862, under the sanction of the Supreme Government, a treaty of mutual

Despatch from the Governor, Straits Settlements, No. 213, dated 16th December, 1861.

Do. from Supreme Government, No. 37, dated 18th June, 1862.

Do. from Governor, Straits Settlements, No. 76, dated 20th June, 1862.

Do. from Supreme Government, No. 61, dated 17th January, 1863.

defence and assistance was concluded between the Běndahāra, and his relative by marriage, the Tě-menggong of Johor, and as thus supported, the Běndahāra would be fully able to resist any unaided efforts on the part of Inche WAN

ANMED or his adherents to again obtain a footing within his territories, there appeared every reason to hope that the prevailing tranquillity would long remain unbroken; this hope, however, failed to be realised.

11. Although well aware, from the correspondence already referred to, of the character of the ex-Sultan of Lingga, and the consequences likely to ensue, in the event of his being placed in a position to interfere in the affairs of the Malay States, the Court at Siam, with which he had, in the meanwhile, become connected by the marriage of his sister to the first King, notwithstanding the protestations of the Sultan of Trěnggānu,† directed the latter to make due arrangements for his reception, and forwarded him to

* A Steamer was placed at the lady's disposal by the Straits Government; on her arrival at Trěnggānu, her brother the Sultan preferred, on her behalf, a claim to a portion of the District of Kuantan; he was informed that he would be held responsible for any evil that might ensue in the event of any attempt being made to enforce the claim, without the sanction of the Běndahāra.

† About this time Trěnggānu and Kělantān were, for the first time, visited by one of the Interpreters of the Consulate, a gentleman who had been previously in the service of the second King of Siam; as he openly avowed his opinion in favour of the claim on the part of Siam to supremacy over those States, and was furnished with letters from the Court at Bangkok instead of from the Governor of the Straits, it is not unnatural to suppose that the Chiefs may have been led to believe that Great Britain recognised the right of Siam to subject them to its sway, and consequently, that the Sultan may have felt himself constrained to attend to orders from Bangkok, rather than to the admonitions of the British Authorities.

his destination in a Government Steamer, which, en route, touched at Kēlantān, where Inche WAN AHMED was still residing. Upon the ex-Sultan's arrival at Trēnggānu, he was at once joined by Inche WAN AHMED, accompanied by several armed boats. After a short stay at Trēnggānu for the purpose of maturing his plans, of which no secret was made, the ex-Sultan of Lingga having himself communicated them to the Commander of a Gunboat belonging to his Highness the Tēmēnggong of Johor, Inche WAN AHMED with his followers continued his voyage along the coast, as far as the mouth of the Dungun River, up which river he proceeded, and being still within the territories of Trēnggānu, commenced, in perfect safety, to organize a fresh attack upon Pahang.

12. On the 26th of June, information reached the Straits Government, that the King of Siam

Despatch from Governor, Straits Settlements, No. 100, dated 24th July, 1862.
Do. do., No. 103, dated 26th July, 1862.
Do. from Supreme Government, No. 809, dated 30th August, 1862.

had intimated his intention of causing the return of the ex-Sultan to the Peninsula, and vesting him with authority over the Malay States. On

the following day a protest against the proposed measure was forwarded through Her Majesty's Consul at Bangkok, the Sultan of Trēnggānu being, at the same time, again seriously warned against allowing his territories to become the base from which hostile operations might be projected against a neighbouring friendly State, under British protection, it being clearly pointed out that, for such violation of his duty as a Ruler, he would be held strictly responsible.

13. On the 23rd of August, 1862, it was signified to Her Majesty's Consul, that instructions

Despatch from Governor, Straits Settlements, No. 124, dated 18th September, 1862.
Do. do., No. 136, dated 8th Oct., 1862.

had been despatched to Trēnggānu for the return of the ex-Sultan to Bangkok, should his presence in that quarter prove objectionable,

and, after repeated urgent remonstrances both from the Consul and the Straits Government, the Court of Siam, on the 30th September, distinctly promised to at once withdraw the ex-Sultan, and thus to remove the impression existing in the minds of the Bēndahāra and other Malay Chiefs, that the attack upon Pahang, which in the meanwhile had been renewed, had been made with its sanction, if not at its instigation.

14. On the 8th of October, 1862, in a letter, to Her Majesty's Consul at Bangkok,* the Governor again urged the necessity for the withdrawal of the ex-Sultan, at the same time pointing out that, under the instructions received from the Supreme Government, it had become his duty to adopt such measures as might seem suit-

* See p. 78.

able for the restoration of the peace and tranquillity to the Peninsula, and that this result might possibly best be obtained by preventing any assistance reaching Inche WAN AHMED from Trěnggānu. No reply having been received to this communication, on the 29th, another remonstrance, couched in still more explicit terms, was transmitted from Singapore, the date of the receipt of which at Bangkok fully admitted of the despatch of a Steamer in time to reach Trěnggānu by the 10th of the following month.

15. All doubts as to the objects of the ex-Sultan of Lingga's stay at Trěnggānu having been re-

Despatch from Governor, Straits Settlements, No. 138, dated 13th Oct., 1862.

Do. No. 150, dated 11th Nov. 1862.

Do. from Supreme Government, No. 978, dated 23rd October, 1862.

Do. from Governor, Straits Settlements, No. 167, dated 24th Nov. 1862.

Do., No. 163, dated 4th Dec. 1862.

Do., No. 6, dated 10th Jan., 1863.

Do., No. 36, dated 19th Feb., 1863.

moved by the receipt of a communication, dated 30th September, 1862, in which he claimed sovereignty over Pahang and Johor, whilst, apparently, there was little prospect of the promise made by the Siamese Court being fulfilled, on the

contrary there being every reason to suppose that its fulfilment would be purposely evaded, as the Northerly Monsoon was rapidly approaching, when communication with the Malay coast would be, in a great measure, cut off; in compliance with the continued appeals from the Běndahāra, as well as for the protection of our own trade, which, as represented in a communication, dated 31st October, 1862, from the Secretary to the Chamber of Commerce, had again become seriously endangered, from the unsettled state of affairs in Pahang; British property at Kuantan, the frontier district, having been actually menaced by armed boats from Kěmāman,—it became incumbent upon the Straits Government to take measures for depriving the Běndahāra's assailants of the means of obtaining further reinforcements and supplies. On the 6th of November, the Resident Councillor at Singapore, with Her Majesty's Ships *Scout* and *Coquette* and the Straits Government Steamer *Tonze*, was accordingly deputed to Trěnggānu, with instructions to call upon the Sultan to desist from affording any further countenance and support to Inche WAN AHMED and his force, and to compel the ex-Sultan of Lingga, to whom a passage in the *Coquette* was offered to Bangkok, to quit his territories. On the afternoon of the 11th of November, notwithstanding Lieutenant-Colonel MACPHERSON's urgent entreaties, the Sultan having declined to accede to their demands, in accordance with the orders furnished to the Senior Naval Officer to destroy, as far as practicable, the Sultan's fort and to seize his boats, so as to effectually cripple his military resources, and prevent his rendering further aid to the party whose cause he had espoused, due precautions having been taken to preserve from danger the inhabitants of the place, of whom not a single person was either killed or wounded from the effects of the cannonade,

a fire was opened upon the fort, which stands apart from the town, and of which the works were partly destroyed. After inflicting sufficient damage to convince the Sultan of the necessity for attending to the warnings he had received, the Steamers returned to Singapore.

16. On the 8th November, 1862, the promise to withdraw the Sultan having been given more than

Despatch from Governor, Straits Settlements, No. 178, dated 26th Dec., 1862.
Do., No. 5, dated 7th Jan., 1863.
Do., No. 78, dated 25th April, 1863.

a month previously, the Siamese Minister for Foreign Affairs informed Her Majesty's Consul, that his Government were about to

despatch a Steamer to Trěnggānu, but that some time would elapse ere she could leave Bangkok, and, as the North-east Monsoon had set in with violence, it was doubtful whether she could reach her destination and anchor off the coast. The advancement of this plea, which had been duly anticipated by the Straits Government,* afforded a sufficient proof of the duplicity of the Court at Bangkok, and the motive of the delay in the fulfilment of its engagement; eventually on the 20th of November, when, owing to the strength of the monsoon, all hopes of being able to effect the removal of the ex-Sultan had ceased, a Steamer was duly despatched to Trěnggānu; as had been doubtless expected and intended, her mission proved unsuccessful, and it was not until the change of the monsoon, in March, 1863, that he was at last withdrawn from the Peninsula, where, as described in the Governor's letter, No. 480, dated 4th December, 1862, † his presence had been the cause of so much trouble.

* *Extract from Despatch, Governor, Straits Settlements, No. 150, dated 11th November, 1862.*

“ And being moreover convinced that the Court at Bangkok had
“ no intention of fulfilling the promise made to Her Majesty's Consul
“ with respect to the withdrawal of the ex-Sultan, and that the ob-
“ ject in giving that promise was merely to gain time, so that the
“ setting in of the monsoon might hereafter be pleaded as an excuse
“ for not causing his removal, whilst from the same cause all endea-
“ vours on our part to restore tranquillity to the Peninsula would,
“ for some time to come, be completely frustrated, and we must
“ have remained inactive until next Spring.”

† See p. 80.

17. In the interim, the struggle in Pahang, now cut off from communication with Singapore,

Despatch from Governor, Straits Settlements, No. 93, dated 18th May, 1863.
Do., No. 104, dated 9th June, 1863.
Do., No. 117, dated 1st July, 1863.

continued; the warehouses at Kuantan, belonging to British merchants, which had been previously threatened, and for the protection

of which, owing to the surf generally running on the coast through the Northerly Monsoon, no arrangement could be made, were seized by Inche WAN AHMED's followers, and although the Bëndahâra for a long while succeeded in holding his assailants in check, yet eventually his adherents, under the impression that their opponent was supported by the powerful State of Siam, an impression that, whether true or false, as already stated, equally existed in the minds of the neighbouring Chiefs, and partly owing to the lack of energy displayed by their leader, who was enervated by sickness, and to the want of food, Inche WAN AHMED's force having, in the first instance, on leaving the Trënggânu territories, seized the upper rice lands, gradually became disheartened and retired towards the coast, taking up a position to command the entrance of the Pahang River; here, in June, 1863, the Bëndahâra died, and his eldest son being a minor, his party have ceased to possess a head. The Bëndahâra's family have sought shelter in Johor, and the country has, for a time fallen under the usurper's sway.* Whether he will be allowed to rule undisturbed is doubtful; it is not improbable that one of the late Bëndahâra's brothers may rise up against him, and the civil war, from which the unfortunate inhabitants have now suffered for the last five years, and which may be mainly attributed to foreign interference, be prolonged for an indefinite period.†

ORFEUR CAVENAGH, *Colonel,*
Governor, Straits Settlements.

SINGAPORE, 20th October, 1863.

* His principal adviser is a brother of the ex-Sultan of Lingga, who is said to exercise unlimited authority.—O. C.

† These anticipations were not verified in the result—Inche WAN AHMED became Bëndahâra and *was* allowed to rule undisturbed. Since his accession there has been no disturbance whatever in Pahang, and though he refused, for a long time, to recognise the treaty made by his predecessor with the Tëmënggong of Johor, or the boundary fixed by the Governor of the Straits Settlements under that treaty as between Pahang and Johor, he has now accepted the boundary, made friends with the Maharâja of Johor, and is now on the best possible terms with the Straits Settlements Government.—F. A. S.

To

HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S CONSUL,
BANGKOK.

Dated Singapore, 8th October, 1862.

SIR,—IN acknowledging the receipt of your despatch, dated 1st instant, and with reference to the remarks made by His Excellency the Kalahome, relative to the proceedings of this Government, I deem it right to place on record a brief statement of facts connected with the present state of affairs in Pahang, the accuracy of which, the Court at Bangkok will not, I believe, venture to impugn.

2. In July, 1861, consequent on a communication from the Resident of Rhio, as to the intention of their Majesties the Kings of Siam to depute the ex-Sultan of Lingga to Trěnggānu (a Malay State in the Peninsula forming no integral portion of the Siamese dominions, and of which the independence is mutually guaranteed by the 12th Article of the Treaty, dated 20th June, 1826), I considered it my duty to point out to you, the prejudicial effect that such a measure must necessarily have upon British interests, and in reply to the remonstrance made upon the receipt of my letter, you were informed that the report that had reached me was incorrect.

3. In May last, notwithstanding the intimation thus given that the presence of the ex-Sultan in the Peninsula would be distasteful to the British Government, and the apprehensions of the King himself, as expressed in the extract from the letter to the Sultan of Trěnggānu marginally * noted, apprehensions for

* " Sultan MAHOMED (the ex-Sultan of Lingga) came and resided for several months; from his manners and speech he appeared to be a thoughtless person, and fond of amusements, at which His Majesty was rather apprehensive saying that now Sultan MAHOMED had gone to Trěnggānu, he will probably, considering himself as having been a Chief, not pay due respect to Phya Trěnggānu as his family, and will thereby be the cause of quarrels, and also he may think that as Pahang once belonged to Lingga, and its Chief and Officers have been accustomed to respect him, to be able to induce the inhabitants to create a disturbance, and should this be the case, Phya Trěnggānu as well as the Siamese will be scandalized, they may say that Sultan MAHOMED resided in Bangkok, where he was advised and received encouragement to create a disturbance. Foreign traders also go to Pahang, and not understanding the circumstances, will be apt to think like this, also boundaries of Trěnggānu and Pahang join, the inhabitants intermix and trade with each other, should any disturbances take place, it may be the cause of their disliking each other, and thereby lessen the prosperity of both places."

which there must have been good foundation, the above Chief was despatched to Trěnggānu in a Steamer belonging to the Siamese Government, and an order issued for his being provided with suitable accommodation on his arrival at his destination. En route, the Steamer proceeded to Kělantān, from which place she was joined by Inche WAN AHMED with eight war praus.

4. For some days, both Steamer and praus remained at anchor off Trěnggānu, and whilst still on board the former, the ex-Sultan openly avowed the intention of attacking Pahang, stating that the attack would be made from the Dungong River as soon as a favourable opportunity offered, this intention has been duly carried out in the

manner proposed, and consequently, there can be but little doubt as to the influence through which Inche WAN AHMED has been permitted to take advantage of the security afforded him by the supineness or connivance of the Trěnggānu Authorities, to organize, within the territories of the Sultan, the force with which he has recently entered the neighbouring State, and thus disturbed that peace and tranquillity, which it has ever been the desire of the British Government to maintain throughout the Peninsula.

5. Upon being apprised as to the intention of the Siamese Government, I lost no time in communicating with you on the subject, clearly specifying the dangers likely to arise from the continued residence in any of the Malayan States, of a restless, intriguing character, such as the ex-Sultan is described to be, and at the same time remarking upon the responsibility that must necessarily attach to that Government, through whose countenance and support he had been placed in a position to mature designs prejudicial to British commerce.

6. Although from the correspondence between the Court of Siam and the Sultan of Trěnggānu, of which I have been favoured with a copy, it appears that his Majesty the King of Siam was equally acquainted as myself with the probable consequences of the ex-Sultan's protracted stay at Trěnggānu, no active measures have hitherto been taken by the Siamese Government to avert them, my predictions have been duly fulfilled, Pahang has been attacked from the side of Trěnggānu, the only quarter indeed from which the attack could have been made with any hope of success, and the working of the Tin mines, for which considerable advances had been made from Singapore, prevented, and the general prosperity of the country, which was rapidly recovering from the effects of former similar inroads, materially checked.

7. The foregoing statement requires no comment, and in conclusion I would merely observe that, considering the commercial relations between the Straits Settlements and Pahang, it is incumbent on the British Government to endeavour to restore to the latter country that rest, and quietness so essential to the development of its resources; this, in all probability, can be best effected by preventing any assistance, either covert or open from reaching Inche WAN AHMED from Trěnggānu, and should the present disturbances continue, I shall deem it my duty, acting upon instructions received from His Excellency the Governor-General in Council, to adopt such measures as may appear most expedient for the protection of British interests and the maintenance of the general peace of the Peninsula.

I have, &c.,

ORFEUR CAVENAGH, *Colonel,*
Governor.

No. 480.

GENL. No. 1169
OF 1862.

To HER MAJESTY'S CONSUL AT BANGKOK.

Dated Singapore, 4th December, 1862.

SIR,—In acknowledging the receipt of your despatch, dated 28th ultimo, with enclosure, I deem it right to submit for your consideration the following observations:—

1st. The States of Trěnggānu and Kělantān form no part of the territories of the Kingdom of Siam, all correspondence between the British Government and their Rulers has invariably been conducted direct through the Governor of the Straits Settlements, and in the present instance, a reference was made through you, as the proper channel to the Court at Bangkok, solely in consequence of the immediate necessity for remonstrating with the Chief of Trěnggānu having arisen, in a great measure, from an act of that Court, in having despatched to the above country, although well aware of the probable result, an intriguing, restless ex-Chief (with whose character they were intimately acquainted), whose arrival, consequent on the influence acquired from his having made his advent under the auspices of the Siamese Government, had led to the serious disturbance of the general peace and tranquillity which it has ever been the sincere desire of the British Government to maintain.

2nd. Although by the 11th Article of the Treaty of 1827, Great Britain is clearly precluded from making any attack, with aggressive views, upon either Trěnggānu or Kělantān, it has never been deemed a bar to our demanding redress for wrongs inflicted on our subjects, or adopting measures to compel the Chiefs to respect the rights of the neighbouring Rulers; moreover the Court of Siam is, equally with Great Britain, inhibited from any interference with the above States, but in this case, by the stoppage of the rice trade with Pahang, the whole course of commerce has been materially affected, owing to the intrigues of the ex-Sultan of Lingga, whose presence in the Peninsula, as well as the power he has hitherto exercised, is to be attributed solely to the apparent countenance and support of the Siamese Government.

3rd. The action of this Government as regards Trěnggānu has been by no means hasty; in 1858, consequent on the part taken by the Sultan of Trěnggānu with regard to the disturbances in Pahang, my predecessor was obliged to personally visit the Malay coast, and to warn the Sultan of the serious nature of the consequences likely to ensue, in the event of his interfering in the affairs of the neighbouring State, a similar course, and from the

same cause, was forced upon me in 1861, and would again have been pursued in the present year, had I not trusted in the good faith of the Siamese Government, and fully believed, that upon being made acquainted with the state of affairs in the Peninsula, no delay would be allowed in retrieving the error that had been committed, and withdrawing the ex-Sultan of Lingga from the scene of his intrigues; I need not refer you to the dates of my numerous letters* on this subject, suffice it is so that in consequence of your earnest representation, on the 30th September, a distinct promise was made for the withdrawal of the ex-Sultan, whilst it was not until the 8th of November, that you received a letter to the effect that a Steamer would be prepared for the purpose of carrying out that promise, it being, however, at the same time specially mentioned, that the Northerly Monsoon having set in, it was quite possible that communication with Trěnggānu might be barred, and her voyage therefore prove utterly fruitless.

4th. After allowing full time for the despatch of a vessel from Bangkok, and knowing equally with the Court at Bangkok that, during the Northerly Monsoon, the surf over the bars at the mouths of the Rivers in the Peninsula often, for weeks together, runs too high to admit of any communication with the shore, it became my duty, as I had previously clearly intimated, to take the necessary measures for protecting British interests, and preserving the peace of the Peninsula. The best means for effecting this purpose was evidently the removal of the known instigator of the existing disturbance. Had this been permitted by the Sultan of Trěnggānu, he would have been duly conveyed to Bangkok with all proper consideration and respect, and as this course would have been in strict accordance with the avowed wishes of the King of Siam, it must have met with his Majesty's approbation. That it was not pursued is not to be ascribed to any fault on the part of the British authorities, but to the refusal of the Sultan of Trěnggānu to accede to our just demand, it was therefore evident that he identified himself with the policy of the ex-Sultan, and in conformity with orders received, it became necessary for the Senior Naval Officer to neutralize, as far as practicable, all intentions of affording assistance to the invaders of Pahang by bombarding his fort, thus destroying any Magazines or Store-rooms therein contained, and effectually depriving him of all power of furnishing further supplies of arms and ammunition. Of this intended bombardment, due notice was given with the hope of inducing the inhabitants of the Town to leave the neighbourhood, and thus preventing their suffering from the mis-

* GOVERNOR CAVENAGH repeatedly protested against the action and interference of Siam, but I have not thought it necessary to quote more than these two letters.—F. A. S.

deeds of their Chiefs, upon whom alone it was the desire of this Government that any punishment should be inflicted.

2. In conclusion, I have the honour to enclose, for your information, copies of letters, dated respectively, 18th and 20th ultimo, from the Běndahāra of Pahang and Sultan of Trěnggānu, and of my replies thereto.

I have, &c.,

ORFEUR CAVENAGH, *Colonel,*
Governor.

As Governor CAVENAGH's action and statements with regard to Kělantān and Trěnggānu do not seem to have been met by any vigorous protest from the Siamese Government, the Governor of the Straits Settlements probably considered that an important point had been made, and for the information of his successors in office he caused the papers to be printed and placed on record in Singapore.

It may be supposed, that whilst General CAVENAGH remained in the Straits, the Court of Bangkok carefully guarded its action towards the Malay States on the Eastern Coast of the Peninsula, knowing the views held by H. M.'s Representative in the Straits. Asiatics in such cases never push matters, waiting always for one event—the change or removal of the official whose action is opposed to their wishes.

In 1867, Colonel (now General Sir H. St. G.) ORD, R.E., succeeded General CAVENAGH as Governor of the Straits Settlements.

Governor ORD had correspondence with the Sultan of Trěnggānu, and even visited him in his own State, but the Governor appears to have speedily concluded that Trěnggānu was subject to, and under the Government of, Siam, though what led him to these conclusions it is impossible to say.

In 1869, however, H. M.'s Principal Secretary of State for the Colonies (Lord GRANVILLE), in a despatch to the Governor of the Straits Settlements, informed Sir H. ORD that the Sultan of Trěnggānu had dispatched an Envoy to England bearing

letters and presents to Her Majesty and to the Prince of Wales.

LORD GRANVILLE asked whether the Governor was aware of this mission, and if so, why the bearer of the Sultan's letter (a Malay named Tunku MAHOMED ARIFFIN) was not provided with credentials from the Governor, or from Her Majesty's Consul at Bangkok, and generally the Secretary of State desired to be furnished with information regarding Trěnggānu.

A further despatch followed, informing the Governor of the manner in which the Sultan's Envoy had been received, and forwarding, for transmission to the Sultan, the gracious replies of Her Majesty and the Prince of Wales.

In reply to these despatches, Sir H. ORD wrote giving the Secretary of State an account of the circumstances which he, the Governor, believed had led to the sending of the Envoy, and he informed LORD GRANVILLE that the Sultan of Trěnggānu had no power to make independent references to other Governments, with this remark: "*I have never heard it questioned,** but that he was, like the Rāja of Kědah and "other rulers of Provinces in the Malayan Peninsula, a tributary of the King of Siam."

As this despatch is the first, and indeed the only one, forwarded to the Secretary of State since the Straits became a Crown Colony, purporting to give information regarding Trěnggānu and its relations with Siam, it will be as well to give the letter *in extenso* :—

*Governor Ord to the Right Hon'ble the Secretary
of State for the Colonies.*

"PENANG, 22nd December, 1869.

"No. 268.

"POLITICAL.

"MY LORD,—I had the honour to receive yesterday your "Lordship's two despatches, 195 and 198, of the 19th November, "1869, on the subject of an Embassy sent to Her Majesty's

* The italics are mine.—F. A. S.

“Government by the Sultan of Trěnggānu, and although the
“necessity of closing my despatches to-day leaves me but little
“time for going into the subject, and my position here deprives
“me of the opportunity of ascertaining certain particulars about
“it on which I should have liked to have satisfied myself I think
“it right to lose no time in furnishing your Lordship with such
“information respecting the matter as I am able.

“2. With regard to the position of the Sultan of Trěnggānu,
“I have never heard it questioned but that he was, like the
“Rāja of Kědah and other rulers of Provinces on the Malayan
“Peninsula, a tributary of the King of Siam, and that, as such,
“it was not competent for him to enter into any direct negotia-
“tion with a foreign Government. In the case of the exchange
“of territory with Kědah, the Siamese Government sent its Com-
“missioners to this Government to arrange the affair, and the
“Rāja of Kědah, although present, took no part in the proceed-
“ings, and was not recognised in any way by these Commis-
“sioners.

“3. I was not aware that the Sultan of Trěnggānu had sent
“an Envoy to England, and although the Maharāja of Johor
“informed me, a few weeks since, that there was a report in the
“Peninsula that he had done so, it seemed to me so unlikely that
“I did not attach any importance to the statement. When at
“Trěnggānu in August, 1868, the Sultan let fall some remarks
“indicating his wish to visit, or, if that were impossible, to send
“an Embassy to the Queen, but knowing that many of the
“Native Princes, seeing the result which had ensued on the visit
“to England of the Maharāja of Johor, were anxious to follow
“his example, and feeling that no possible benefit could accrue
“to him from such a step, which, moreover, I felt it to be very
“unlikely the Siamese Government would sanction, I endeavour-
“ed to throw cold water on the idea, and was under the impres-
“sion that he had abandoned it.

“4. It is difficult to foretell what will be the effect on the
“Siamese Government when it learns that one of its tributary
“Princes has sent an Envoy to England without its knowledge,
“but, from the suspicious character of the people, I am appre-
“hensive that it may not be easy to persuade them that our Gov-
“ernment has not been accessory to the step, and that it does
“not conceal something adverse to Siamese interests. When at
“Siam in August, 1868, I mentioned to the late King my in-
“tention of visiting Trěnggānu on my return, and the next day
“the Kalahome (then Prime Minister of the Kingdom, but now

“Regent) pressed me much as to the object of my visit, and
“seemed hardly satisfied with my assurance that it was purely
“of a complimentary nature with the object of making the Sul-
“tan’s acquaintance and establishing friendly relations with him,
“and that I should not enter into any political matter with his
“Highness. I am also under the impression that, at this time,
“either the Kalahome, or some other person, possibly an
“Officer of the Consulate, told me that the Sultan of Trěnggâ-
“nu had been talking of sending an Envoy to England and
“that it was looked upon with disfavour, being supposed to evi-
“dence a desire to obtain our assistance in emancipating him-
“self from the domination of Siam.

“5. Although having but a few minutes available before the
“departure yesterday of the English Mail for Singapore, not
“noticing that any communication had been made by the Foreign
“Office on the subject to Mr. Knox, Her Britannic Majesty’s
“Consul-General at Bangkok, I thought it right to send a
“hurried note to this gentleman stating what had taken place
“and suggesting to him that if the Siamese Government should
“appear dissatisfied with, or disquieted at, what had happened, it
“would probably be better that I should send the two letters of
“the Queen and Prince of Wales, in reply to those of the Sultan
“to Mr. Knox, to be by him handed to the Siamese Government
“for transmission to the Sultan, in place of sending them direct
“to the latter myself, as directed by your Lordship.

“6. On this point, I should, however, await the orders of Her
“Majesty’s Government and I would suggest, for your Lordship’s
“consideration, whether, in the event of its being decided that
“the letters should be sent through the Siamese Government, it
“would not be advisable that I should be informed of it by
“telegraph, as also whether such decision is to depend upon the
“opinion Mr. Knox may express to me on the matter or not.

“7. I deem it right to add, that the Envoy selected by the
“Sultan is said to be the son of a native Râja on the Sumatra
“coast, I have always understood a person of no rank or position.
“Being a clever, pushing, young man he has been usually selected
“by the Sultan to bring messages and complimentary letters to
“Singapore with presents of fruits, specimens of the Sultan’s
“skill as a carver, of which he is very proud. On these occasions,
“it is customary for the local Government to support the mes-
“sengers and crews of the large boats in which they come, during
“their stay in Singapore, and the last time but one that this
“young man has come to the Settlements, I found that he was

“ making his stay longer than was necessary, being evidently
“ more anxious to enjoy the amusements of the place than to
“ carry on his duties, and I caused him to be told that he had better
“ return to Trěnggānu. However, before he could do this, he was
“ arrested for a debt—some money he had borrowed for his own
“ personal use of a native countryman—and I was obliged to
“ repay it to obtain his liberation.

“ 8. In the course of a few months, he came back again on
“ some pretext or other, and feeling satisfied that he was making
“ a tool of the Sultan and using his name for his own purpose,
“ I refused to see him or hold any communication with him
“ and told him he must return to his country at once. He, how-
“ ever, followed me up to Penang and was with difficulty got rid
“ of.

“ 9. I am told that the Sultan of Trěnggānu has been very
“ ill, it is said he is suffering from a paralytic stroke, and I think
“ it highly improbable that, had he been in health and possession
“ of his faculties, he would have sent an Envoy to England
“ without my concurrence, still less that he would have chosen
“ this person* for such a purpose.

“ 10. The Sultan has never preferred any complaint to me of
“ our Government, though he naturally feels aggrieved and, I
“ think, not unjustly at the way he was treated in 1862. He
“ has never, to my knowledge, made any claim to the Islands
“ which have lately been apportioned between Johor and Pa-
“ hang, nor do I believe he has any, and if he feels any annoy-
“ ance about his salute, I am confident, from the friendly feelings
“ he has always shewn to me, that he would have made his views
“ known directly to me and not in the manner his Envoy has
“ adopted.

“ 11. Awaiting your Lordship's instructions.

“ I have, &c.,

“ H. ST. G. ORD.”

* It is said that owing to the non-success of his mission, or the manner in which he discharged it, Tunku MAHOMED ARIFFIN has never been able to return to Trěnggānu.

ARIFFIN does not bear a good character; he has been employed for some years by the Netherlands-Indian Consulate in Singapore to collect information on native affairs.—F. A. S.

In reply to this despatch, the Secretary of State authorised Governor ORD to forward the letters through the King of Siam as suggested by him.

I am not aware whether the letters ever reached the Sultan of Trěnggānu, but the action taken by the Governor of the Straits Settlements in 1869 must have appeared to the Court of Bangkok a pleasing contrast to that adopted by his predecessor in 1862.

I was with Sir H. ORD when he visited Kělantān and Trěnggānu in 1872, and at Kělantān, Trěnggānu, Pětāni and Sěnggōra with Governor JERVOIS, in 1875, and, I believe, on both those occasions, but certainly on the latter, the Chiefs of Kělantān and Trěnggānu, whilst admitting that they sent periodically to Bangkok the *Bunga Mas*, maintained their independence of the Siamese Government. The Rāja of Pětāni was absent from his home.

I am told that, within the last few months, the Rāja of Kělantān and the Sultan of Trěnggānu were summoned to Bangkok, but that both refused to attend.

The Sultan of Trěnggānu died not many weeks ago, and the Heir-apparent is a boy of about fifteen years old. The Malays anticipate the interference of the Siamese Government in the arrangements which must be made provisionally and prospectively for the government of Trěnggānu.

Trěnggānu, Kělantān and Pětāni march with each other, with Pahang on the South, and with Pêrak on the West, and in view of our position on the West Coast in Pêrak, Sělan-gor and Sungei Ujong, the British Government cannot regard with indifference the Eastern States and their political relations with such a neighbour as Siam.

None of these States touch that country where some believe the Peninsula may be successfully divided by a Canal, but the project, which has long remained in abeyance, is now prominently brought forward, and should the work be attempted, should it succeed, it will be well, in the negotiations which are then conducted between H. M.'s Government and Siam, not to forget

British interests in the Malay Peninsula and the Straits of Malacca, nor those circumstances which are related in the foregoing papers.

F. A. SWETTENHAM.

Singapore, 20th February, 1882.

CONCLUDING NOTE.

IN forwarding this paper, I should not like it to be supposed that I have not seen the replies of the Siamese Prime Minister to the facts of the case as put forward by Governor CAVENAGH.

I have endeavoured to cover the arguments of the Court of Bangkok by the statement at page 82 that "Governor CAVENAGH's action and statements with regard to Kélantan and Trěnggânu do not seem to have been met by any vigorous protest from the Siamese Government."

Had I attempted to give all the correspondence between the Governor, the Consul and the Siamese Minister, and entered into a discussion of the various arguments put forward by each in support of his views, this paper, already too long, would have grown beyond reasonable limits.

The originals or copies of all, or nearly all, these papers are to be found in the Secretariat here, and I may refer to what appear to be the two principal documents from the Siamese Prime Minister (given at length on pages 92-94)—one a very mild remonstrance, addressed to the Consul, when Siamese messengers arrived from Trěnggânu to report the shelling of that place by British ships; and the other, the Minister's remarks on Governor CAVENAGH's letter, No. 480, of December, 1862, printed at page 80.

In the first case, the remonstrance* (dated 25th October, 1862), if it can be properly so called, is of a doubtful and hesitating description. The Minister relies on Article XII. of the Treaty of Bangkok (the Article which appears to maintain the independence of Trěnggânu and Kélantan): he tries to enlist the personal sympathies of the Consul, by telling him Siam must deal with Britain through him, and hints that the Governor of the Straits is interfering with the Consul's prerogative: and finally the Minister tells the Consul that the action is "a cause of alarm to a nation of little power that never thought of offering resistance." Presumably the nation

* See p. 92.

is Siam, possibly Trěnggānu, the wording is not very clear. The letter concludes: "I am now, therefore, at a loss what to say further on the subject until the return of the steamer *Alligator* with Sultan MAHOMED" (i. e., the ex-Sultan of Lingga).

When Sir R. SCHOMBURGK forwarded to the Prime Minister a copy of the Governor's letter in which Colonel CAVENAGH firmly maintained the independence of Trěnggānu and Kělantān, the Minister felt it incumbent on him to dispute * the accuracy of the statement, and apparently forgetting Article XII. of the Treaty of 1826, and his own recent reliance upon it, he claimed a right, seemingly of government, over these States, supporting his claim in a very curious way. He rested his case on two grounds—first, that in 1859 the Governor of Singapore sent the complaint of a Chinese trader of Singapore "relating to some matters in connection with Kělantān" to the Consul at Bangkok, who wrote to the Siamese Government about the matter which was eventually settled by the British Consul and the Siamese Government; and secondly, that in 1861 the British Consul wrote to the Siamese Government stating that the Governor of Singapore enquired whether "the report that the Government of Siam intended to depose the Rāja of Trěnggānu, and place the ex-Sultan of Lingga in his stead was true or not."

The Prime Minister thus draws his conclusions: "these two facts, with which you are acquainted, are sufficient proofs of the error of the Governor of Singapore's statement."

It may have been sufficient for the Kalahome, but I leave it to others to judge what "these two facts" are sufficient to prove. The case, as thus stated, does not seem to me to be a strong one.

The Minister also referred to a letter purporting to have been addressed to him by the Sultan of Trěnggānu, reporting the action of the Straits Government. This last really contains little, except a report of the proceedings, giving the impression that the Sultan considered he had been very hardly used, but

* See p. 94.

whether because the ex-Sultan of Lingga refused to leave Trěnggānu, or because the English ships shelled the place, seems doubtful.

The Sultan concludes with some compliments to the Prime Minister, and his trust and confidence in Siam.

Considering how much the Trěnggānu people fear the Siamese, and how little (remembering the case of Kědah) the Malays feel they can rely upon the British for real assistance, it will be understood how easy it must be for the Court of Bangkok to obtain from the Sultan or Chiefs of Trěnggānu any sort of document which may be desired.

How far this letter expressed the Sultan's real feelings might be known: (1) from his appeal to Governor CAVENAGH to protect him from the Siamese; (2) from the fact that he despatched an Envoy to England; (3) from his constant assertion of his independence.

No doubt the Sultan's feelings towards the British, just at this time (his fort having been shelled because he feared to do something which might mortally offend his near neighbours the Siamese), were not as friendly as usual, but the old man, before his death, paid a long visit to the Governor at Singapore, and expressed himself much gratified with his reception. His Highness never visited Bangkok.

It will be observed, that there is no claim made by reason of the sending of the *Bunga Mas* to Bangkok.

Her Britannic Majesty's Consul at Bangkok (Sir R. SCHOMBURGK) contented himself, for the most part, with passing copies of letters between the Governor and the Siamese Prime Minister, but it appears that on one occasion (30th September, 1862), the Consul had an interview with the Kalahome, at which he pressed the Prime Minister to withdraw the ex-Sultan of Lingga from Trěnggānu, informing His Excellency that the proceedings of the Governor of Singapore (on whose responsibility he was then acting) had been approved by the Governor-General of India.

The Prime Minister for a long time hesitated to consent to the request, but the Consul said that "if this was not conceded he would go to Singapore by the next steamer to consult the Governor," whereupon the Kalahome "seemed much alarmed," and the matter was eventually settled by His Excellency agreeing "that if Her Britannic Majesty's Consul addressed a despatch to the Pralong desiring that, in the same manner, as under Captain BURNES's Treaty, the ex-Râja of Kédah was removed from Penang by the British Government the Siamese should remove Sultan MAHOMED from Trěnggânu, the Siamese Government would agree to do so."

Finally, I attach the despatch * of Governor CAVENAGH to the Indian Government justifying his action in bombarding Trěnggânu. This despatch Colonel CAVENAGH seems to have written to clear himself from a charge of having acted hastily in adopting the measures he at last determined would alone convince the Siamese Court and the Sultan of Trěnggânu that he was in earnest, and shew that he intended to deal with the latter as an independent Ruler.

F. A. S.

" BANGKOK, 25th October, 1862.

" To Sir ROBERT H. SCHOMBURGK.

" SIR,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 24th instant, handing the copies of the following letters for the information of the Siamese Government, viz. :—
" From the Secretary to Government, Foreign Department.
" From the Secretary of the Chamber of Commerce.
" To the Sultan of Trěnggânu.
" From the Senior Naval Officer.
" From the Commodore Commanding Indian Division.

* See p. 96

“ To the same.—

“ The contents of all these have been perused and understood.
“ Regarding the affairs of Sultan MAHOMET, the ex-Sultan of
“ Lingga, in connection with Trěnggānu, you have several times
“ written to H. E. CHOW PHYA PRAKLANG, Minister for Foreign
“ Affairs in Bangkok, and answers have been sent explaining
“ matters on each occasion.

“ The Siamese Government have not been negligent, but have
“ each time sent instructions to the Rāja of Trěnggānu, copies of
“ which have always been handed you.

“ On the 6th instant, you wrote stating that we must send a
“ vessel to bring back Sultan MAHOMET, and on the 8th instant an
“ answer was sent stating that we would send the steamer *Alliga-*
“ *tor* for Sultan MAHOMET, but that that steamer was not in readi-
“ ness to start at once, and would require some days to put her in
“ a state to proceed. All this was fully explained in that letter.

“ The *Alligator* left Bangkok on the 17th instant, and now we
“ are informed that His Honour the Governor of Singapore had
“ sent vessels of war to Trěnggānu for the person of Sultan MAHO-
“ MET, and on not securing him, bombarded that place on the 11th
“ instant before your letter with the reply of the Siamese Govern-
“ ment had time to reach Singapore; such being the case is a mat-
“ ter of grief to us, as the Siamese Government have been of
“ opinion that Her Britannic Majesty was pleased to appoint you
“ as Consul in Siam, so that in the event of any matters arising,
“ we would be enabled to consult with you, and so arrange such
“ matters throughout the Siamese territories with justice.

“ The fact that Trěnggānu has been bombarded by the authority
“ of His Honour the Governor of Singapore, and the hasty man-
“ ner in which it has been done, we consider as disregarding and
“ setting aside the authority and position of Her Britannic Majesty's
“ Consul in Siam, also a violation of the 12th Article of Captain
“ BURNEY's treaty, and thereby is a cause of alarm to a nation of
“ little power that never thought of offering resistance.

“ I am now, therefore, at a loss what to say further on the sub-
“ ject until the return of the steamer *Alligator* with Sultan MAHO-
“ MET, and I shall have enquired into the matter, and [?been] made
“ acquainted with the nature of the Rāja of Trěnggānu's letters,
“ when I shall be better enabled to communicate with you on the
“ subject, and shall request you to kindly forward further parti-
“ culars of these events to the Right Honourable the Earl RUSSELL,
“ Her Majesty's Minister for Foreign Affairs in London.

“ I have, &c.,

“ C. PHYA SRI SURYWONGS.”

“ FROM THE PRIME MINISTER OF SIAM,

“ TO SIR ROBERT H. SCHOMBURGK,

“ BANGKOK, 18th December, 1862.

“ SIR,—Your despatch of the 17th instant. and the following
“ enclosures, viz. :—

“ Copy of letter from the Governor of Singapore to Her
“ Britannic Majesty's Consul.

“ Copy of letter from the Běndahāra of Pahang to the Governor
“ of Singapore.

“ Copy of letter from the Governor of Singapore to the Běnda-
“ hāra.

“ Copy of letter from the Rāja of Trěnggānu to the Governor
“ of Singapore.

“ Copy of letter from the Governor of Singapore to the Rāja of
“ Trěnggānu.

“ In all five copies have been understood.

“ I beg to contradict the clause in the Governor of Singapore's
“ despatch which states that, ‘the States of Trěnggānu and Kělan-
“ tan form no part of the territories of the Kingdom of Siam.’
“ Those States have been tributary to Siam for years, and many
“ generations of Rulers past; this fact is universally acknowledged.

“ In 1859 the Governor of Singapore sent a complaint of CHIN
“ YONG YONG, a Singapore trader, to you, relating to some matters
“ in connection with Kělantān; you consequently wrote to the
“ Siamese Government about it.

“ The Siamese Government and Her Britannic Majesty's Con-
“ sul arranged and settled that affair.

“ In 1861, July 17th, you wrote the Siamese Government that
“ the Governor of Singapore had written enquiring if the report
“ that the Government of Siam intended to depose the Rāja of
“ Trěnggānu and place the ex-Sultan of Lingga in his stead was
“ true or not.

“ These two facts, with which you are acquainted, are sufficient
“ proofs of the error of the Governor of Singapore's statement.

“ The various other matters in the letter, it is unnecessary for me
“ to remark upon, as they have already been referred to in the cor-
“ respondence between my Government and yourself.

“ When the Right Honourable the Earl RUSSELL, Her Britannic
“ Majesty's Minister for Foreign Affairs, has minutely investigated
“ this matter, there is no doubt His Lordship will come to a just
“ decision.

“ I have, &c.,

“ C. PHYA SRI SURYWONGS.”

“ No. 203.

“ GENERAL No. 1476

“ OF 1863.

“ FROM

“ THE GOVERNOR OF PRINCE OF
“ WALES' ISLAND, SINGAPORE
“ AND MALACCA.

“ To

“ THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF
“ INDIA, WITH THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL,
“ SIMLA.

“ FOREIGN DEPT.

“ POLITICAL.

“ *Dated Singapore, 31st October, 1863.*

“ SIR,

“ IN accordance with the instructions conveyed in your Office
“ Despatch, No. 575, of the 5th ultimo, I have the honour to forward
“ herewith, for submission to His Excellency the Viceroy and Gov-
“ ernor-General, a narrative of the proceedings of this Govern-
“ ment, in connection with the late operations on the East Coast
“ of the Malay Peninsula.

“ 2. The voluminous nature of the correspondence that has
“ already taken place upon the above subject may, I trust, be
“ pleaded as an excuse for any apparent want of attention to
“ minor details in the preparation of this Report, which, at the
“ same time, I fully believe will be found to contain all the infor-
“ mation desired, no point of any real importance having been
“ allowed to be passed over unnoticed.

“ 3. Although truly sensible of the great kindness evinced by
“ the Right Hon'ble the Secretary of State for India, in the man-
“ ner in which he has been pleased to refer to my proceedings in
“ the 4th Para: of his Despatch, No. 52, dated the 25th July, 1863,
“ I cannot but feel sincere regret that those proceedings should,
“ in Sir CHARLES WOOD's estimation, have been characterised by
“ undue precipitation, and I earnestly trust that the perusal of the
“ accompanying statement of bare facts, may serve, not only to
“ remove that impression, but also to satisfy the Right Hon'ble
“ the Secretary of State, that with reference to the provocation
“ received by the wanton attack upon a country that had so re-
“ cently placed itself under British protection, my proceedings
“ were marked by the utmost moderation, and that it was only at
“ the last moment, when it was clear that the promises of the
“ Siamese Court were intended only to delude, and further delay
“ therefore became reprehensible, that I determined, acting upon

“ the general instructions I had received, to adopt the measures,
“ apparently best calculated to ensure the speedy return of peace
“ and prosperity to Pahang, measures demanded alike by the calls
“ of humanity, and by the interests of the Settlement entrusted to
“ my charge.

“ 4. For upwards of four years, the influence of Great Britain,
“ as the paramount power in this quarter, has been strenuously
“ exerted to preserve the peace of the Malay Peninsula, seriously
“ endangered by the civil war, by which the neighbouring country
“ of Pahang has been so long devastated, the line of policy adopted
“ had at last proved perfectly successful, and that unfortunate
“ State, owing to our exertions, had for some months enjoyed the
“ blessings of repose, when, consequent on the action taken by the
“ authorities at Bangkok, the effect of our labours became entirely
“ nullified, Pahang again became convulsed, and, in the case of its
“ miserable inhabitants, to the sufferings engendered by the war-
“ fare, of which their country had for the fifth time become the
“ theatre, were added those of famine, caused by the seizure by
“ their invaders of their rice lands, and the prohibition on the part
“ of the Sultan of Trěnggānu, against the exportation of grain for
“ their use.

“ 5. From the correspondence that had taken place during the
“ previous year, as well as from the representations of the Sultan
“ of Trěnggānu, there could be little doubt that the Siamese Gov-
“ ernment must have been perfectly well aware of the probable
“ result of the appearance of the ex-Sultan of Lingga in the
“ vicinity of Pahang, whilst it is extremely difficult to believe that
“ that result, if not actually planned, was not, at all events, con-
“ templated with satisfaction.

“ 6. Although no time was lost in calling upon the Court at
“ Bangkok to adopt immediate measures to prevent the anticipated
“ attack upon Pahang, and His Excellency the Viceroy and Gov-
“ ernor-General did not fail to express his displeasure at the con-
“ duct of the Siamese Authorities, the repeated remonstrances of
“ this Government were allowed to remain almost entirely un-
“ heeded; it is true that promises, in the first instance somewhat
“ vague, but latterly more definite, were given that the ex-Sultan
“ should be re-called, but no steps were taken for fulfilling the
“ engagement, whilst, from information derived from other sources,
“ there was every reason to suppose that its fulfilment would be
“ purposely evaded, until the setting in of the Northerly Monsoon
“ should afford a plausible excuse for their refusal to accede to
“ our just demands.

“ 7. An acquaintance of upwards of a quarter of a century
“ with the duplicity of the Oriental character, soon convinced me
“ of the illusory nature of the promises that had been made, still
“ I trusted that, finding the British Government determined upon

“ the point, the Court of Bangkok might at last become impressed
“ with a sense of the necessity for withdrawing its protégé from
“ the Peninsula, and thus render any action on the part of the
“ Authorities in the Straits unnecessary, hence it was only on the
“ commencement of the change in the Monsoon that, with the
“ view of protecting our commerce, as well as of putting an end
“ to the strife, by which the whole Peninsula was rapidly becoming
“ agitated, I deemed it my duty to request the Senior Naval
“ Officer to proceed to Trěnggānu, and insist upon the return of
“ the ex-Sultan to Siam, or, in the event of his demand not being
“ complied with, to deprive him, as far as practicable, of the means
“ of rendering aid to the Běndahāra's assailants.

“ 8. It may be considered that, before taking so decided a step,
“ I ought to have awaited further orders, but I would beg respect-
“ fully to represent that at the earliest, I could not have received
“ any reply to my Despatches for another month, whilst the delay,
“ even of one day, by the interruption, owing to the heavy surf, of
“ communication with the coast, might prove fatal to the success
“ of the undertaking; moreover, from the tenor of my previous
“ instructions, I was well aware, that the intention avowed in my
“ letter, No. 103, of the 26th July, of adopting, if necessary, suit-
“ able measures for ensuring Inche WAN AHMED's expulsion from
“ Pahang, had met with the approval of the Supreme Government.

“ 9. That the movement proved unsuccessful was not owing
“ to any want of tact or ability on the part of the Officer employ-
“ ed to conduct the negotiations, but to the fact that the Sultan
“ of Trěnggānu knew that the season for a blockade had passed
“ away, whilst so little disposed are we usually to exert our
“ strength, that he dreaded the wrath of the Siamese more than
“ our menaces, the great error committed was, doubtless, in not
“ making the demonstration in the first instance, without any re-
“ ference to the Court of Siam, a course that would have been
“ perfectly justifiable, and had been previously followed with suc-
“ cess, but, I could not but believe, that the expression of the
“ opinion of the Viceroy and Governor-General of India would
“ have been duly respected, and I was therefore induced to hope
“ that its receipt would have led to the adoption, by the Siamese
“ Authorities, of measures that might have tended to secure the
“ permanent peace of the Peninsula, and thus obviated all ne-
“ cessity for further intervention.

“ I have the honour to be,

“ SIR,

“ Your most obedient Servant,

“ ORFEUR CAVENAGH, *Colonel,*
“ *Governor.*

“ *Singapore, 13th October, 1863.* ”

APPENDIX.

QUEDAH. *

AGREEMENT WITH THE KING OF QUEDAH, FOR THE CESSION OF PRINCE OF WALES' ISLAND IN 1786.

Conditions required by the King of Quedah.

*Replies of the Governor-General and Council to the King of
Quedah's demands.*

ARTICLE 1.

That the Honourable Company shall be guardian of the seas ; and whatever enemy may come to attack the King, shall be an enemy to the Honourable Company, and the expense shall be borne by the Honourable Company.

This Government will always keep an armed vessel stationed to guard the Island of Penang and the coast adjacent, belonging to the King of Quedah.

ARTICLE 2.

All vessels, junks, prows, small and large, coming from either east or west, and bound to the port of Quedah, shall not be stopped or hindered by the Honourable Company's Agent, but left to their own wills, either to buy and sell with us, or with the Company at Pulo Penang, as they shall think proper.

All vessels, under every denomination, bound to the port of Quedah, shall not be interrupted by the Honourable Company's Agent, or any person acting for the Company, or under their authority, but left entirely to their own free will, either to trade with the King of Quedah, or with the agents or subjects of the Honourable Company.

ARTICLE 3.

The articles opium, tin, and rattans, being part of our revenue, are prohibited ; and Qualla Mooda, Prye, and Kream, places where these articles are produced, being so near to Penang, that when the Honourable Company's Resident remains there, this prohibition will be constantly broken through, therefore it should end, and the Governor-General allow us our profits on these articles, viz, 30,000 Spanish Dollars every year.

The Governor-General in Council, on the part of the English East India Company, will take care that the King of Quedah shall not be a sufferer by an English settlement being formed on the Island of Penang.

* Old and incorrect orthography for Kēdah.—F.A.S.

ARTICLE 4.

In case the Honourable Company's Agent gives credit to any of the King's relations, ministers, officers, or ryots, the Agent shall make no claim upon the King.

The Agent of the Honourable Company, or any person residing on the Island of Penang, under the Company's protection, shall not make claims upon the King of Quedah for debts incurred by the King's relations, ministers, officers, or ryots; but the persons having demands upon any of the King's subject, shall have power to seize the persons and property of those indebted to them, according to the custom and usages of that country.

ARTICLE 5.

Any man in this country, without exception, be it our son or brother, who shall become an enemy to us shall then become an enemy to the Honourable Company; nor shall the Honourable Company's Agent protect them, without breach of this Treaty, which is to remain while Sun and Moon endure.

All persons residing in the country belonging to the King of Quedah, who shall become his enemies, or commit capital offences against the State, shall not be protected by the English.

ARTICLE 6.

If any enemy come to attack us by land, and we require assistance from the Honourable Company, of men, arms or ammunition, the Honourable Company will supply us at our expense.

This Article will be referred for the orders of the English East India Company, together with such parts of the King of Quedah's requests as cannot be complied with previous to their consent being obtained.

QUEDAH, 1791.

TREATY WITH THE KING OF QUEDAH, 1791.

In the Hegira of our Prophet, 1205, year Dalakir, on the 16th of Moon Saban, on the day Ahat.

Whereas, on this date, this writing showeth that the Governor of Pulo Penang, vakeel of the English Company, concluded peace and friendship with His Highness, Iang de per Tuan of Quedah, and all his great officers and ryots of the two countries, to live in peace by sea and land, to continue as long as the Sun and Moon give light: the Articles of Agreement are:—

ARTICLE 1.

The English Company will give to His Highness, the Iang de per Tuan of Quedah, six thousand Spanish Dollars every year, for as long as the English shall continue in possession of Pulo Penang.

ARTICLE 2.

His Highness the Iang de per Tuan agrees that all kinds of provisions, wanted for Pulo Penang, the ships of war, and the Company's ships, may be bought at Quedah, without impediment, or being subject to any Duty.

ARTICLE 3.

All slaves running from Quedah to Pulo Penang, or from Pulo Penang to Quedah, shall be returned to their owners.

ARTICLE 4.

All persons in debt running from their creditors, from Quedah to Pulo Penang, or from Pulo Penang to Quedah, if they do not pay their debts, their persons shall be delivered over to their creditors.

ARTICLE 5.

The Iang de per Tuan will not allow Europeans of any other nation to settle in any part of his country.

ARTICLE 6.

The Company shall not receive any persons committing high treason or rebellion against the Iang de per Tuan.

ARTICLE 7.

All persons committing murder, running from Quedah to Pulo Penang, or from Pulo Penang to Quedah, shall be apprehended and returned in bonds.

ARTICLE 8.

All persons stealing chops (forgery) to be given up likewise.

ARTICLE 9.

All persons, enemies to the English Company, the Iang de per Tuan shall not supply them with provisions.

These nine Articles are settled and concluded, and peace is made between the Iang de per Tuan and the English Company; Quedah and Pulo Penang shall be as one Country.

This done and completed by Toonkoo Shariff Mahomed, and Toonkoo Allang Ibrahim, and Dattoo Pengawa Tilebone, vakeels, on the part of the Iang de per Tuan, and given to the Governor of Pulo Penang, vakeel for the English Company. In this Agreement, whoever departs from any part herein written, God will punish and destroy; to him there shall be no health.

The seals of Sheriff Mahomed and Toonkoo Allang Ibrahim, and Dattoo Pengawa Tilebone, are put to this writing, with each person's handwriting.

Transcribed by Hakim Bunder, Pulo Penang.

Signed, sealed and executed, in Fort Cornwallis, on Prince of Wales' Island, this 1st day of May, in the year of our Lord 1791.

(A true translation.)

(Signed,) F. LIGHT.

QUEDAH, 1800.

TREATY WITH THE KING OF QUEDAH, 1800.

CONFIRMED, 1802.

In the year of the Hegira of the Prophet (the peace of the Most High God be upon him) 1215, the year Hun, on the twelfth day of the Moon Mohurram, on the day Raabu (Wednesday); Whereas this day, this writing showeth that Sir George Leith, Baronet, Lieutenant-Governor of Pulo Penang, on the part of the English Company, has agreed on and concluded a Treaty of friendship and alliance with His Highness the Iang de per Tuan Rajah Moodah of Purlies and Quedah, and all his Officers of State and Chiefs of the two countries, to continue on sea and land, as long as the Sun and Moon retain their motion and splendour: the Articles of which Treaty are as follow:—

ARTICLE 1.

The English Company are to pay annually to His Highness the Iang de per Tuan of Purlies and Quedah, ten thousand Dollars, as long as the English shall continue in possession of Pulo Penang, and the country on the opposite coast hereafter mentioned.

ARTICLE 2.

His Highness the Iang de per Tuan agrees to give to the English Company, for ever, all that part of the sea-coast that is between Qualla Kream and the river side of Qualla Mooda, and measuring inland from the sea side sixty Orlongs; the whole length above-mentioned to be measured by people appointed by the Iang de per Tuan and the Company's people. The English Company are to protect this coast from all enemies, robbers, and pirates that may attack it by sea, from north to south.

ARTICLE 3.

His Highness the Iang de per Tuan agrees, that all kinds of provisions wanted for Pulo Penang, the ships of war and the Company's ships, may be bought at Purlies and Quedah, without impediment or being subject to any Duty or Custom; and all boats going from Pulo Penang to Purlies and Quedah, for the purpose of purchasing provisions, are to be furnished with proper passports for that purpose, to prevent impositions.

ARTICLE 4.

All slaves running away from Purlies and Quedah to Pulo Penang, or from Pulo Penang to Purlies and Quedah, shall be returned to their owners.

ARTICLE 5.

All debtors running from their creditors from Purlies and Quedah to Pulo Penang, or from Pulo Penang to Purlies and Quedah, if they do not pay their debts, their persons shall be delivered up to their creditors.

ARTICLE 6.

His Highness the Iang de per Tuan shall not permit Europeans of any other nation to settle in any part of his dominions.

• ARTICLE 7.

The Company are not to receive any such people as may be proved to have committed rebellion or high treason against the Iang de per Tuan.

ARTICLE 8.

All persons guilty of murder, running from Purlies and Quedah to Pulo Penang, or from Pulo Penang to Purlies and Quedah, shall be apprehended and returned in bonds.

ARTICLE 9.

All persons stealing chops (forgery) to be given up likewise.

ARTICLE 10.

All those who are, or may become, enemies to the Compan, they Iang de per Tuan shall not assist with provisions.

ARTICLE 11.

All persons belonging to the Iang de per Tuan, bringing the produce of the country down the river, are not to be molested or impeded by the Company's people.

ARTICLE 12.

Such articles as the Iang de per Tuan may stand in need of from Pulo Penang are to be procured by the Company's agents, and the amount to be deducted from the gratuity.

ARTICLE 13.

As soon as possible, after the ratification of this Treaty, the arrears of gratuity now due, agreeable to the former Treaty and Agreement, to His Highness the Iang de per Tuan of Purlies and Quedah, are to be paid off.

ARTICLE 14.

On the ratification of this Treaty, all former Treaties and Agreements between the two Governments to be null and void.

These fourteen Articles being settled and concluded between His Highness the Iang de per Tuan and the English Company, the countries of Purlies and Quedah and Pulo Penang shall be as one country; and whoever shall depart or deviate from any part of this Agreement, God will punish and destroy him: he shall not prosper.

This done and completed, and two Treaties, of the same tenor and date, interchangeably given between His Highness the Iang de per Tuan and the Governor of Pulo Penang, and sealed with the seals of the State Officers immediately officiating under His Highness the Iang de per Tuan, in order to prevent disputes hereafter.

Written by Hakim Ibrahim Ibn (son of) Sri Rajah Moodah, by order of His Highness the Yang de per Tuan, of exalted dignity.

(A true translation)

(Signed) J. SWAINE,
Malay Translator.

Revised from the original by John Anderson, Malay Translator to Government.

Approved and confirmed by the Governor-General in Council, November, 1802.

TREATY OF BANGKOK, 1826.

[The following Articles are those applying to the Malay States.—F. A. S.]

ARTICLE 10.

The English and Siamese mutually agree, that there shall be an unrestricted trade between them in the English countries of Prince of Wales' Island, Malacca and Singapore, and the Siamese countries of Ligor, Medilong, Singora, Patani, Junk-Ceylon, Quedah and other Siamese provinces. Asiatic merchants of the English countries, not being Burmese, Peguers or descendants of Europeans, shall be allowed to trade freely overland and by means of the rivers. Asiatic merchants, not being Burmese, Peguers or descendants of Europeans, desiring to enter into, and trade with, the Siamese dominions from the countries of Mergui, Tavoy, Tenasserim and Ye, which are now subject to the English, will be allowed to do so freely, overland and by water, upon the English furnishing them with proper certificates. But merchants are forbidden to bring opium, which is positively a contraband article in the territories of Siam, and should a merchant introduce any, the Governors shall seize, burn, and destroy the whole of it.

ARTICLE 12.

Siam shall not go and obstruct or interrupt commerce in the States of Triugano and Calantan. English merchants and subjects shall have trade and intercourse in future with the same

facility and freedom as they have heretofore had, and the English shall not go and molest, attack or disturb those States upon any pretence whatever.

ARTICLE 13.

The Siamese engage to the English, that the Siamese shall remain in Quedah and take proper care of that country, and of its people; the inhabitants of Prince of Wales' Island and of Quedah shall have trade and intercourse as heretofore; the Siamese shall levy no duty upon stock and provisions, such as cattle, buffaloes, poultry, fish, paddy and rice, which the inhabitants of Prince of Wales' Island or ships there may have occasion to purchase in Quedah, and the Siamese shall not farm the mouths of rivers or any streams in Quedah, but shall levy fair and proper Import and Export Duties. The Siamese further engage, that when Chow Phya of Ligor returns from Bangkok, he shall release the slaves, personal servants, families and kindred belonging to the former Governor of Quedah, and permit them to go and live wherever they please. The English engage to the Siamese, that the English do not desire to take possession of Quedah, that they will not attack or disturb it, nor permit the former Governor of Quedah, or any of his followers, to attack, disturb, or injure in any manner the territory of Quedah, or any other territory subject to Siam. The English engage that they will make arrangements for the former Governor of Quedah to go and live in some other country, and not in Prince of Wales' Island or P'rye, or in Perak, Salangore, or any Burmese country. If the English do not let the former Governor of Quedah go and live in some other country as here engaged, the Siamese may continue to levy an Export Duty upon paddy and rice in Quedah. The English will not prevent any Siamese, Chinese, or other Asiatics at Prince of Wales' Island from going to reside in Quedah if they desire it.

ARTICLE 14.

The Siamese and English mutually engage that the Rajah of Perak shall govern his country according to his own will. Should he desire to send gold and silver flowers to Siam as heretofore, the English will not prevent his doing as he may desire.* If Chao Phya of Ligor desire to send down to Perak, with friendly intentions, forty (40) or fifty (50) men, whether Siamese, Chinese or other Asiatic subjects of Siam; or if the Rajah of Perak desire to send any of his ministers or officers to seek Chow Phya of Ligor, the English shall not forbid them. The Siamese or English

* See p. 12 of Appendix, Article Second.—F. A. S.

shall not send any force to go and molest, attack or disturb Perak. The English will not allow the State of Salangore to attack or disturb Perak, and the Siamese shall not go and attack or disturb Salangore. The arrangements stipulated in these two last articles, respecting Perak and Quedah, Chow Phya of Ligor shall execute as soon as he returns home from Bangkok.

TREATY WITH PÊRAK, DATED 18TH OCTOBER, 1826.

ENGAGEMENT entered into between HIS MAJESTY PADUKA SRI SULTAN ABDULLAH MA-ALUM SHAH BIN MURHOOM JUMMAL-OOLLAH, Supreme and Rightful Ruler over all and every part of the Perak Country, and CAPTAIN JAMES LOW, Agent to the Honourable ROBERT FULLERTON, Governor of Pulo Penang, Singapore and Malacca, on behalf of the HONOURABLE THE EAST INDIA COMPANY, whereof copies have been interchanged, and which is to be everlasting as the Sun and Moon. Moreover, it is a token of lasting friendship and alliance to exist between the HONOURABLE THE EAST INDIA COMPANY and the KING OF PERAK, and between the KING and the Honourable ROBERT FULLERTON.

ARTICLE FIRST.—His Majesty the King of Perak, of his own free will and pleasure, hereby engages, that he will adhere to the stipulations respecting the boundaries of Perak and the settlement of other points which were made with the Rajah of Salangore by Mr. John Anderson, Agent to the Honourable Robert Fullerton, Governor of Pulo Penang, &c., and also to all the stipulations contained in the engagement which His Majesty made with the said Mr. John Anderson, dated the 20th day of Mohurum, Monday, in the year of the Hegira, 1241, all of which deeds are here declared to be fixed and unalterable. Moreover, His Majesty now engages that he will not hold any communication or intercourse with the Rajah of Siam, or with any of his chiefs or vassals, or with the Rajah of Salangore, or any of his chiefs or vassals; which may or can have reference to political subjects, or to the administration of his government and the management of his country of Perak. His Majesty will not countenance any of his subjects who may connect themselves with, or league, or intrigue with, the Siamese King, or with any of his chiefs or vassals, or with the Rajah of Salangore, or any of his chiefs or vassals, or with any other Siamese or Malayan people, by which the country of Perak can in any degree or manner be disturbed, and the government of his Majesty interfered with.

SECOND.—His Majesty the King of Perak will not give or present the bunga mas, or any other species of tribute whatever, to the Rajah or King of Siam, or to any of his governors or vassals, nor will he give or present such to the Rajah of Salangore, or to any other Siamese or Malayan people henceforward and for ever. Moreover, His Majesty will not receive or permit to enter into his country of Perak, from the Rajah or King of Siam, or from any of his governors or chiefs, any ambassadors or armaments arriving at Perak for the purpose of arranging political matters, or interfering in any way in the affairs and administration of the country of Perak. In like manner he will not receive into his country embassies or armaments sent by the Rajah of Salangore, or by any other Siamese or Malayan people; nor will he receive any party from any of the people, Rajahs, or countries here specified into his country, should its strength even consist of no more than thirty men, nor will he allow the least number to enter his country. But all persons of every country will, as heretofore, have free permission to trade unmolested to any port in the Perak Country, provided they do not interfere in its affairs. Should parties or armaments of the description above stated arrive in the Perak Country from any one of the countries, or Rajahs, Governors, or Chiefs, or people above specified, or should any of the said Rajahs, Governors, or Chiefs league with subjects of the King of Perak, in order to disturb his country and interfere in any way in his government, then, in any such case or cases, His Majesty will rely, as he now relies, and in all future times will rely, on the friendly aid and protection of the Honourable the East India Company, and of the Honourable the Governor in Council of Pulo Penang, &c., &c., to be manifested in such a manner and by such means as may to them seem most expedient.

THIRD.—Captain JAMES LOW, as Agent for the Honourable the Governor in Council of Prince of Wales' Island, &c., &c., engages that if His Majesty the King of Perak will faithfully adhere to and perform all and each of the stipulations contained in this Engagement as above specified, then His Majesty shall receive the assistance of the British in expelling from his country any Siamese or Malays as above stated, who, as also above specified, may, at any time, enter the Perak Country with political views, or for the purpose of interfering in any way with the government of His Majesty. But if His Majesty shall fail to perform all and every Article of this his Engagement, binding on him, then the obligation on the British to protect him and to assist him against his enemies will cease, and he will lose the confidence and friendship of the Honourable the Governor in Council of Pulo Penang, &c., &c., for ever.

This Engagement, which His Majesty has voluntarily, and with great satisfaction, entered into, has received as marks of its validity the chop or seal of His Majesty, and the seal and signature of the Agent, Captain JAMES LOW, together with the chops of the ministers of Perak, who are also parties in this Engagement with the Agent, and it is delivered to the said Agent to remain as an ever-enduring memorial of alliance and friendship between the King of Perak and the British.

This paper, written on the Eighteenth day of October 1826, of the English year, and on the Sixteenth day of Rabi-al-awal, Wednesday, in the year of the Hegira 1242.

Signature of the Agent, Captain JAMES LOW.

(A true copy)

(Signed) JAMES LOW, *Captain,
Political Agent.*

(A true copy)

(Signed) S. GARLING,
Resident Councillor.

TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND COMMERCE BETWEEN
GREAT BRITAIN AND SIAM.

*Signed at Bangkok, April 18, 1855. Ratifications exchanged at
Bangkok, April 5, 1856.*

[It is unnecessary to re-print the whole of the above Treaty, as the only point affecting the present question is that portion of Article II., which says:—“and will enforce the observance by British Subjects of all the provisions of this Treaty, and such of the former Treaty negotiated by Captain BURNEY in 1826 as shall still remain in operation.”

The Articles and parts of Articles of the Treaty of 1826 which were retained are the following * :—

Articles I., II., III., VI., VIII., XI., XII., XIII., XIV. and the following extract from Article X. :—“ Asiatic merchants, not

* Hertslet's “Treaties,” Vol. X., pp. 558, 574, 575, 576 and 577.

"being Burmese, Peguers, or descendants of Europeans desiring
"to enter into and trade with the Siamese dominions from the
"countries of Mergui, Tavoy, Tenasserim and Ye, which are now
"subject to the English, will be allowed to do so freely, overland
"and by water, upon the English furnishing them with proper
"certificates." The Articles relating to the Malay States are given
at pp. 9-11.—F. A. S.]

QUEDAH, 1869.

TREATY WITH SIAM OF 6TH MAY 1869 RELATIVE
TO THE BRITISH ENGAGEMENTS WITH QUEDAH.

Treaty entered into between Thomas George Knox, Esq., Her
Britannic Majesty's Consul General in Siam, and His Excellency
Chao Phya Sri Suriwongsa Phra Kalahome, Prime Minister of
Siam, Commissioner on the part of His Majesty the King of
Siam.

Being a Treaty in substitution for former Treaties, respectively
dated 1786, 1791, and 1802 of the Christian Era, and 1201,
1206, and 1217 of the Mahomedan Era, and also in substitution
for the Treaty with Ligor Siam of 1831,* and for the Treaty con-
cluded by Sir Harry St. George Ord on the 21st day of March of
the year 1868 of the Christian Era.

ARTICLE I.

When this Treaty shall come into operation the Treaty con-
cluded in the year 1802 of the Christian, and 1217 of the Mahome-
dan Era, between Sir George Leith Bart. Lieutenant Governor
of Pulo Penang and His Highness the Iang de per Tuan Rajah
Mooda of Purlies and Quedah, with the previous Treaties and
agreements referred to therein, and the Treaty concluded in the
year 1831 of the Christian Era, between Robert Ibbetson Esq.,
Resident of Singapore, Pulo Penang and Malacca, and the Chao
Phya of Ligor Si Tamrat, and also the Treaty concluded on the
21st day of March in the year 1868 of the Christian Era between
Sir Harry St. George Ord, Knight, Governor and Commander-in-
Chief of the Straits Settlements, and Their Excellencies Phya

* A Treaty defining the boundaries of Province Wellesley.—
F. A. S.

Debia Phrajim, and Phra Bedis Bani Siam Bejit Bhacty, Commissioners on the part of His Majesty the King of Siam, shall cease and determine, except so far as they grant to Her Majesty the territories referred to therein.

ARTICLE II.

The Governor of the British Colony of the Straits Settlements shall pay annually to His Highness the Iang de per Tuan of Quedah ten thousand dollars, as long as Her Britannic Majesty shall continue in possession of Pulo Penang and the country on the opposite coast hereafter mentioned.

ARTICLE III.

His Highness the Iang de per Tuan of Quedah agrees that the Dominions of Her Britannic Majesty on the mainland, opposite the Island of Penang, shall comprize the Territories bounded as follows: that is to say, on the West by the Sea, on the North by the right bank of the River Mudah, on the South by the right bank of the River Kurreen, (Kreecan) and on the East by a line running South from a spot on the right bank of the River Mudah, opposite the existing Frontier pillar at Sematool, in a straight line to a point on the extreme eastern end of the Maratajam range of Hills. Thence along the top ridge of the Punchore Hill to the existing Frontier pillar on the right bank of the River Kurrecan, about 400 English yards above and East of Bukit Tungal. A map showing the eastern Boundary above described, is annexed to the present Treaty, and signed by the respective Commissioners.

The British Authorities engage to respect the Royal burying grounds at Kotah Prye within the ceded Territory, and to consider them still the property of His Highness the Iang de per Tuan of Quedah, but subject nevertheless to British jurisdiction in other respects, provided always that the Mudah River shall at all times be free to the peaceful navigation of the subjects of His Majesty the King of Siam.

ARTICLE IV.

It is mutually agreed that stone pillars, not less than six feet high and at the distance of one mile apart, shall be erected at the joint expense of the Government of the Straits Settlements and His Highness Iang de per Tuan of Quedah, in order to mark the Eastern boundary line of the ceded Territory; that no grant or transfer of land shall be made, or houses other than Police Stations allowed to be erected, within one hundred yards on either side of this Boundary line, and further; that, within the distance

of two miles from the said boundary line, no shops for the sale of Opium, Toddy, Bang or Spirits shall be licensed, or Gambling houses be permitted, in their respective districts, by the Governor of the Straits Settlements or the Iang de per Tuan of Quedah.

ARTICLE V.

All persons convicted of, or awaiting trial for, or against whom warrants for their arrest may be issued for, the crimes hereafter specified, who may effect their escape from any of the Possessions of Her Britannic Majesty into the Territory of Quedah, or who may be found within the said Territory of Quedah, shall, upon a formal requisition from the Governor of the Straits Settlements, or the Lieutenant-Governor of Penang or Malacca, to the Iang de per Tuan, be delivered up to the British Authorities, and in like manner, all persons convicted of, or awaiting trial for, or charged by the Iang de per Tuan of Quedah with, any of the crimes hereinafter specified, who may effect their escape from Quedah into British Territory, shall, upon requisition from the Iang de per Tuan to the Governor of the Straits Settlements, or the Lieutenant-Governor of Penang or Malacca, be surrendered to the Authorities of Quedah. The crimes above referred to are the following, that is to say ;—Murder, Dacoity, Robbery, Arson, Rape, Burglary, Aggravated assault, Cattle-stealing, Making or uttering false-coin, Forgery, Embezzlement, Perjury, Breach of Prison, Fraudulent Bankruptcy, or Attempt to Commit Murder, Dacoity, Robbery, Arson, Rape, Burglary or Aggravated assault.

But no person shall be delivered up in virtue of this article by the Governor of the Straits Settlements, or by the Lieutenant-Governor of Penang or Malacca, unless the Governor or Lieutenant-Governor, as the case may be, shall be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing him to have been guilty of some one of the above crimes.

ARTICLE VI.

The Iang de per Tuan of Quedah engages not to levy any duty upon Cattle, grain or other provisions, exported from Quedah into the British Territory higher than according to the following Tariff viz. ;—upon Rice \$8 per Coyan of 40 piculs, upon Paddy \$4 per Coyan of 800 Gantangs, upon Cattle \$1 per head, upon Ducks and Fowls \$1 per hundred. Provided always that, in the event of failure of the Rice crop in the Territory of Quedah, it shall be lawful for the said Iang de per Tuan to prohibit the export of Rice from Quedah for the current Rice Season, at any time after three months notice of such his intention shall have

been given to the British Government at Penang, and provided that such prohibition shall be general and not applicable to particular places.

ARTICLE VII.

This Treaty shall be submitted for confirmation to the Government of Her Britannic Majesty, and to the Government of H. M. the King of Siam, but it shall come into operation as soon as possible after its signature.

In witness whereof the undersigned Thomas George Knox Esq., Her Britannic Majesty's Consul General in Siam, and Chao Phya Sri Suriwongsa Phra Kalahome, Commissioner on the part of His Majesty the King of Siam, have signed this Treaty and affixed their seals thereto.


Done at Bangkok the sixth day of May in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-nine.

(Sgd.) THOMAS GEORGE KNOX,
H. B. M. Consul General.
„ C. P. SRI SURIWONGSA.
„ THE RAJAH OF QUEDAH.

*Note by the Editor of "Treaties and Engagements
with Native States."*

The Treaty of the 21st March, 1868, above referred to as made by Sir HARRY ST. GEORGE ORD, was not approved by the Authorities at home, as being irregular in form. It purported to have been made between His Excellency Sir HARRY ST. GEORGE ORD, &c., &c., on the part of Her Britannic Majesty, and His Highness the Iang de per Tuan of Quedah, subject to the approval and ratification of His Majesty the King of Siam, whereas it was objected in England that Quedah being held to be a Province of Siam, the Treaty should have been made at Siam between the British Authority there, the Consul-General, and the King of Siam, as in fact the Treaty of 1869 was made. Except, however, as to matters of form, the two Treaties are nearly identical in the engagements entered into.

NOTE.—The spelling of Native names in the foregoing Treaties has not been corrected, but is given as in the former prints of these engagements.—F. A. S.



DO NOT CIRCULATE