Portuguese, Spanish and Dutch Plans to Construct a Fort in the Straits of Singapore, ca. 1584-1625


Résumé
Peter Borschberg
Des sources conservées dans les archives et bibliothèques portugaises et hollandaises indiquent clairement que les puissances européennes avaient compris la signification commerciale et stratégique du détroit de Singapour et de l'estuaire de la rivière de Johor dès le XVIe siècle. En fait, entre la fin du XVIe siècle et le début du XVIIe, les Portugais et les Espagnols, aussi bien que les Hollandais, établièrent des projets, en grande partie similaires, pour la construction d'un fort ou d'une citadelle dans la région. L'article analyse certains d'entre eux et les conditions de leur conception, ainsi que les échanges diplomatiques auxquels ils donnèrent lieu. Sont également évoquées les réactions portugaises au projet lancé par les Hollandais au début du XVIIe siècle.

Citer ce document / Cite this document :

http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/arch_0044-8613_2003_num_65_1_3751
HISTOIRE MARITIME

Peter BORSCHBERG

Portuguese, Spanish and Dutch Plans to Construct a Fort in the Straits of Singapore, ca. 1584-1625

The strategic location of the Island of Singapore is a matter that has aroused academic interest in recent years. This is evident not least from the book Between two Oceans and the learned reactions it has provoked since its publication in 1999. This excellent work traces the perception of Singapore’s location as a strategic island and entrepôt since the settlement’s initial foundation in the fourteenth century. The present article does not mean in any way to detract from the well-deserved accolades of this important work, but intends to make a contribution toward that historically complex and multi-faceted question of Singapore’s strategic location as seen from both unpublished and published sources of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century. This article will attempt to achieve this by identifying and discussing specific plans on the part of the Portuguese, Spanish, and Dutch to construct forts in the region surrounding the Straits of Singapore. While

1. At the time of writing this article, the author was attached to the Institut für Ostasienkunde of the Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Abteilung Sinologie, under an existing agreement with the National University of Singapore. The author wishes to thank the Bayerische Staatsbibliothek in München, the Arquivo Nacional Torre de Tombo, the Biblioteca Nacional de Lisboa, the Biblioteca Nacional and Palacio Nacional in Madrid, Stanford University Library, and the Rijksarchief in The Hague for granting access to their excellent collections of rare prints, manuscripts, and maps.

many aspects of regional security in the sixteenth and seventeenth century have already been made known to the scholarly community through the investigations of Carl Alexander Gibson-Hill, there is still a yawning gap when it comes to the maritime history of Singapore and the Straits prior to the foundation of the modern settlement by T. Stamford Raffles in 1818.

In his learned contribution, John Miksic makes reference to plans by the Dutch at the turn of the seventeenth century to construct a fort in what is now sovereign territory of the Republic of Singapore. Miksic’s source can be traced to an earlier contribution by Carl Alexander Gibson-Hill, who highlights that the Dutch were attempting to construct a fort or a citadel. Miksic reckons that the site might have been located on Sentosa (formerly known as Pulau Blakang Mati). Manuscripts retrieved in Portuguese and Dutch archives, and some sources published in these two countries as well as in Spain, reveal several plans to build a fort or citadel to protect European interests around the Straits. All of the plans discussed in the present article, moreover, were conceived and discussed during the so-called Union of the Two Crowns (1580 until 1640). This period followed the annexation of Portugal when the Habsburg monarch Philip II of Spain and later his son Philip III, ruled as Philip II and III of Portugal respectively. It was an extremely tumultuous period for the nascent colonial powers of the Iberian Peninsula, but their optimism over their future status finds expression in several, albeit highly unrealistic plans, to significantly expand their territorial possessions in East Asia. The Iberians dreamt of conquering large sections of mainland Southeast Asia, including Aceh, Johor, Patani, Siam, Pegu, Cambodia, Champâ, even China and Japan. Alas, nothing ever came out


A Fort in the Straits of Singapore, ca. 1584-1625

of these grandiose schemes, but it is nevertheless important to bear in mind that the Portuguese as well as the Spanish were “thinking big” in the sixteenth century, and their expansionist ideology did provide an impetus for further action.

One reason for failing to get as far as they might have was the arrival, at the close of the sixteenth century, of commercial and political rivals from Northern Europe, including merchants from England, the United Provinces, France and also Denmark. In addition to the strong rivalry between the Asian princes, the European powers projected their own commercial competition, and even their wars, into insular and mainland Southeast Asia. Recent publications from Germany as well as Portugal, Spain and the Netherlands have done much to shed new light on known historical problems and perspectives by focusing on questions of trade, politics, war, diplomacy as well as integration and accommodation of the Iberian powers in Southeast Asia. (7)

It has been a long-established commonplace that the arrival of Northern European traders in Southeast Asia at the close of the sixteenth century was taken with consternation by servants of the Portuguese Estado da Índia. The alliances that were forged, as well as the initial developments that took place before 1640, opened paths of development and patterns of diplomatic interaction that would largely endure until the eve of the French Revolution in Europe. The Dutch were by far the most aggressive competitors to the Iberian colonial powers in Southeast Asia, not least because their domestic “war of liberation” was directed against the Spanish monarch and they extended their hostilities to the Portuguese as well. (8) After all, the

and Maritime Asia, vol. 9, Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2000, pp. 125ff. – Several concrete proposals dating chiefly from the seventeenth century can be found in the Library of the Palacio Nacional, Madrid, Ms. 175, fols. 27ff. (Información sobre la propuesta del conde de Bailén de someter los reinos de Camboja, Sian y Champán en las Índias Orientales...) and ibid., fols. 171ff., (Relación de la conquista de Siam, por Fray Sebastián de San Pedro, 1603).


Archipel 65, Paris, 2003
Portuguese served the identical King and pursued many of the same policies of commercial exclusion as the Spanish to which the aspiring competitors in East India trade, especially the Dutch, English, French, and Danes seriously objected.

The Dutch traders, initially operating under the so-called voorcompagniëns (regional trading firms) and after 1602 under the United Dutch East India Company (commonly known by its abbreviation VOC), effectively projected the national struggle for independence from Spanish Habsburg overlordship to the extra-European region, including of course Asia. They did so via a two-pronged approach. The first was a policy of commercial and political containment. The directors of the VOC and the leading politicians of the United Provinces did indeed acknowledge that the Spaniards and Portuguese had legitimately acquired colonies in the East Indies, but denied the Iberian powers' exclusive rights of trade in the region. For this reason, agents of the Dutch company, with plenipotentiary powers bestowed upon them by the States-General, concluded a web of contracts with local rulers in Asia. Generally, these agreements sought to preserve the sovereign rights of the rulers against possible encroachment by other European powers, and especially the Spanish and the Portuguese, in return for certain privileges and exclusive trading rights. Admittedly, a good number of these treaties are believed to have been exacted under dubious circumstances, but the historically determining fact remains that the treaties were generously and loosely interpreted not only by the Dutch, but quite evidently also by the Asian princes whose autonomy these contracts were formally designed to sustain.

The second objective of the Dutch was to inflict maximum damage on the Portuguese and Spanish empires and their respective networks of trade. They sought to accomplish this by targeting Portuguese and Spanish settlements, taking over key ports and colonies, and by attacking the very source of Iberian wealth that ultimately sustained its colonial enterprise, namely its merchant fleet. Portuguese merchant ships were routinely seized in Asian and even in African waters, and these acts of aggression were sanctioned by Dutch courts that declared the acquisition of Portuguese cargos by brute force as legitimate prizes of war. It appears that such acts of violence were

---


significantly more widespread than has been hitherto admitted by historians.\(^{(11)}\) Victor Enthoven in his seminal dissertation *Zeeland and the Rise of the Republic* estimates that in the first two decades of the VOC's corporate life alone, anywhere between 150 and 200 vessels of all sizes and nationalities were attacked and taken in such acts of freebooting in the East Indies.\(^{(12)}\)

The Dutch captains were generally familiar with the principal trading routes of the long-distance Portuguese merchant vessels – many of them simply followed the well-trodden routes of their Asian counterparts\(^{(13)}\) – and were of course also cognizant of suitable locations where they could prey on ships returning from Japan, China, Makassar and the Moluccas. One of the most notorious hotspots of Dutch freebooting activity in the seventeenth century were the waters around Singapore and the Johor River estuary.

This broader region, today generically dubbed the "Straits of Singapore", enjoyed for much of the early-modern period the dubious reputation of being infested with pirates, both indigenous and foreign. The Portuguese and Spanish were generally of the impression that these were loyal to, or even subjects of, the King of Johor.\(^{(14)}\) The monarch’s relations with the Portuguese in Malacca were even in the best of times considered to be tense and strained. Already the ever-shifting relations between the Lusitanian authorities and Johor, as well as Johor’s oscillating relations with another aspiring regional power, Aceh, were a source of even more nagging concern to Portuguese skippers who worried about the security of their ships in the Straits of Singapore, Malacca, Sabam (or Sabâo) and Bangka. Barreto de Resende in his *Livro do Estado da Índia Oriental* highlights that it became the specific task of the Malacca captain to provide security for merchant shipping in the region. Escort was provided for outbound ships from Goa after May, from Eastern India after September, and to returning vessels from China and Japan after December.\(^{(15)}\) Yet it was not until the arrival of Dutch traders in the waters around Johor, and their seizure of an in-bound carrack from Macao in February 1603 that security in the Straits of Malacca and

\(^{11}\) Cf. below, note 157.


Singapore took a serious turn for the worse. The Santa Catarina was the first Portuguese merchant vessel to be captured by the Dutch in the waters off the coast of Singapore, but it would certainly not be the last. (16) Backed first by an informal alliance, and after 1606 by a treaty proper, (17) VOC servants used the Straits of Singapore and the Johor River estuary as a preferred hunting ground to corner, attack and seize vessels of the Portuguese merchant fleet. Officers of the Lusitanian crown routinely dispatched squadrons to anticipate the arrival of their fleets from China, Japan and Makassar, and lent armed protection through the Straits of Singapore and onward to Portuguese Malacca. (18) Still, even these escorts were occasionally engaged in battle, defeated or dispersed by VOC ships and their Johorean allies.

It is against the background of these broader commercial and diplomatic developments that the Portuguese, Spanish and Dutch, all devised and pursued their own respective plans to construct fortresses or citadels in the region surrounding the Straits of Singapore and also the adjacent Straits of Sabam. The motives and objectives underlying these plans, however, differed. The Portuguese together with their Spanish associates essentially sought to protect their shipping and preferably keep the Dutch “traders” as well as local sea-faring folk (in Spanish and Portuguese known as the saletés) (19) at bay; the VOC wanted to keep the Straits “safe” – safe from

---


18. Johann Theodore & Johann Israel de Bry (and text attributed to M. Gothard Artus), INDIÆ ORIENTALIS PARS OCTAVA: NAVIGATIONES QUINQUE. Primam a Iacobo Neccio ab anno 1600 usque ad Annun 1603, Secundam a Johanne Hermanno de Bree ab anno 1602 usq. ad Annun 1604; Tertiam a Cornelio Nicolai Annis quatuor; Quartam a Cornelio de Vena, duobus Annis; Quintam, sub Staphano de Hagen tribus Annis in Indiam Orientalem susceptas & peractas continens ... Frankfurt/M., 1607, p. 84; note 15 above.

retaliation on the part of the Iberian powers – and use the fort to sever Portugal’s trading links in the East Indies. This, no doubt, fit in with their plans to weaken the Portuguese Empire whenever and wherever possible. Several locations were singled out for this purpose which included, from west to east, the Karimons, Singapore Island, Sentosa, as well as several locations around the Johor River estuary as far upstream as Kota Batu or Johor Lama.

**Portuguese and Spanish Plans for fortresses in the Straits of Singapore**

Portuguese plans for fortresses or citadels around the Straits of Malacca, Singapore and Sabam were conceived in direct response to developments that adversely affected their security, and particularly the security of their merchant shipping. Initial plans were designed to cope with changes in Portuguese relations with local overlords, particularly Aceh and Johor, as well as Pahang and Jambi. Already before the Portuguese set out to destroy Johor Lama in 1587, the fragile political conditions and the instability which this brought to the conduct and flow of trade evoked an initial suggestion to build a fort in the Straits of Singapore. Diogo de Couto in his *Décadas* dating from around 1584 mentions one such proposal. At this time Johor and Aceh were on good terms and their efforts against the Portuguese led to serious difficulties for Lusitanian trade with ports in Japan, China and the Gulf of Siam. Rumors had it in Portuguese circles that the Johoreans and the Acehnese were planning to build a fort of their own in the Straits. If constructed, such a fort could have had serious repercussions on Portugal’s long-distance trade with the Far East, the Moluccas and Makassar. The Portuguese scholar Manuel Lobato claims that he has not retrieved any credible evidence to substantiate these rumors and they remained precisely that, rumors. Johor, Lobato also contends, was conceivably unwilling to consent to such a scheme, especially since this would have given the Acehnese a presence very close by, if not in Johorean territory as such.

---

20. For an extended account, cf. also Diogo de Couto, *Vida de D. Paulo de Lima Pereira*, Lisbon : Biblioteca de Clássicos Porgugueses, 1903. The account supposedly written by Dom Paulo de Lima Pereira himself is probably the most accurate and reliable. The epistolary report formulated in the Portuguese language is addressed to the King of Spain and Portugal, Philip II/I, and is preserved in the Biblioteca Nacional in Madrid, Ms. 1750/233 (incip. *Relação das cousas que successerão à Dom Paulo de Lima, Capitão-Mór e General das partes do Sul* ...). To the best of the author’s present knowledge this manuscript remains unpublished. A second, shorter account written in Castilian also remains unpublished and can be found in Madrid, Biblioteca Nacional, Ms. 1750/181 (incip. *De las victorias que don Paulo de Lima Pereyra tuvo* ...).


Aceh became bitter enemies by the turn of the century, and Lobato’s considerations thus retain their validity.

In chapter XLVI of his *Roteiro das Cousas do Achem*, Dom João Ribeiro Gaio, Bishop of Malacca, who may have very well been aware of these rumors, floats the idea of constructing a *fortaleza* or fort in the Straits of Singapore,23 but fails to mention a specific location for this enterprise. He simply states that it would be of great benefit to navigation to, and commerce with, the regions in East Asia.24 He suggests that the crown dispatch 5,000 men to the region who could then help open markets in the region. Judging from his description of then current conditions, the capital and stronghold at Johor Lama was still standing.25

About one decade later, Johor Lama was destroyed and the *fortaleza* in the Straits of Singapore was still not constructed. The project appears to have been now very much placed in the hands of the Portuguese Viceroy in Goa, Dom Francisco da Gama, who was clearly of the opinion that such a fortification would be ineffective. In a letter addressed to the King of Portugal and Spain, dating from about 1597, he expressed his clear preference for dispatching an *armada* to the region. The task of this fleet was to patrol the waters around the Straits.26 With the hindsight of history, the implementation of the Viceroy’s recommendation was certainly the more cost-effective and flexible solution pursued by the Portuguese.27

However, the Lusitanian authorities viewed Dutch and English commercial penetration and freebooting in Southeast Asia, with considerable alarm.28 Asian princes and overlords began to conclude treaties with parties hostile to the Portuguese cause, and entertained their first diplomatic relations with other European powers. For example, the Archbishop of Goa lamented in a letter to King Philip II/III, dated 6 April 1603, that Johor had dispatched an ambassador to the United Provinces and separately established contacts with Queen Elizabeth I of England.29

---

24. Ibid., p. 99: “E dizem vem sobre esta cidade de Malaca ou ao estreito de Singapura fazer uma fortaleza para toler a navegaço de China e todas aquelas partes ...”.
25. Ibid., pp. 99-100.
26. Sousa Pinto, *Portugueses e Malaios* (1997), p. 287: “… e enviar dali a armada repartida em esquadras aos Estreitos de Singapura, de Sabão e de Sunda, e aonde mais for necessário para que se assegure aqueles mares, e se alimpen dos ditos rebeldes [i.e. the Dutch] que por eles navegam, porque com ele assistir naquela cidade [i.e. Malacca] ...”.
27. Cf. note 15 above.
28. *The Voyages of Sir James Lancaster to Brazil and the East Indies, 1591-1603*, London: Hakluyt Society, 1940, pp. 105-108, where it is described that Lancaster captured with the assistance of Dutch Admiral Spilberghen a carrack in the Straits of Malacca in 1602.

The informal alliance forged between the Dutch Admiral Jakob van Heemskerk and the King of Johor in 1603 and the seizure of the Portuguese carrack Santa Catarina off the coast of Singapore, which sprang from this convenient arrangement,\(^{30}\) marked a major turning point for the merchant community in Malacca. Its captain, Fernão d’Albuquerque, was succeeded in September 1603 by André Furtado de Mendonça who used the opportunity of his new appointment for a three-year term to launch a diplomatic offensive on Johor that was also backed by a show of naval force. Furtado de Mendonça dispatched his compatriot Estêvão Teixeira de Macedo, who between 1602 and 1603 served as captain of the Portuguese fortress in Ambon,\(^{31}\) with a naval squadron to the Johor River estuary. The purpose of this mission was to impose a blockade on the Johor River to punish the Johor monarch for lending assistance to the Dutch in their capture of the Santa Catarina, and to anticipate the arrival of the China fleet with the monsoon winds of the South China Sea. The Johoreans mustered the support of Dutch Vice-Admiral Jakob Pietersz van Enkhuisen,\(^{32}\) who was passing through the Straits en route to Patani, to engage the Portuguese and drive their armada out of the Johor River estuary. Dutch reports also have it that Johor Lama had come under Portuguese occupation.\(^{33}\) Pietersz succeeded in his mission, but shortly after his departure for Tioman and the Gulf of Siam, the decimated Portuguese squadron returned and re-imposed its blockade of the River.

It is evident that the loss of a valuable cargo to the Dutch privateers in February and the serious difficulties experienced by these Lusitanian officers seasoned in combat in October 1603, may have contributed toward the revival of plans to construct a fort or citadel somewhere in the region of the Straits of Singapore. The Portuguese were soon suffering new setbacks here and in the Johor River estuary, as well as in the Moluccas and Patani.

To push for this goal from a position of strength, the Portuguese proposed, at the instigation of Manuel Godinho de Erédia, to build a Portuguese fortress in the vicinity of Tanjong Batu or somewhere in the region of the Johor River estuary.\(^{34}\) This would have enabled the Portuguese to effective-

---

ly control the flow of trade on the River and to enhance the protection of their China fleets that were periodically looted near the Straits of Singapore by Malay pirates, and increasingly since the Santa Catarina incident, also by Dutch "traders". As Gibson-Hill highlights in his important article Johor Lama and other ancient sites, (35) nothing appears to have ever become of this project. He opines that the idea was probably "abandoned when it was appreciated that the fort would be very vulnerable, unless it were of considerable strength, and heavily garrisoned." (36) It can be assumed that the actual reasons transcended simple considerations that were grounded simply in strategy and military logistics. (37)

It transpires from several letters preserved in the Livros das Monções (Letters of the Monsoon) that the dual Crown of Portugal and Spain remained seriously concerned about security in the Straits of Singapore and particularly about Dutch plans to fortify the Straits. In a letter written in Madrid and dated 27 January, 1607, King Philip II/III instructed his Viceroy at Goa, Dom Martim Alfonso de Castro, to urgently construct two forts, one in the Straits of Sabam, the other in the Straits of Singapore. This project was to "secure the navigation of my vassals." (38) These plans, however, did not materialize, not least because financial resources became seriously stretched in this period by the upgrading of forts from Hormuz and Moçambique to Macao. In fact, after the Dutch attack on Malacca in 1606, archival material reveals that a good proportion of available funds was being diverted toward building a fort or security post on the Ilha das Naos that is located off the coast of Malacca. (39)

One of the most comprehensive plans, devised after the arrival of the Dutch and the seizure of the Santa Catarina, emanated from the merchant-traveler Jacques de Coutre. (40) His autobiography and other documents of historical interest contain several concrete, and on one occasion rather detailed, proposals to construct a fort in the Straits of Singapore.

35. Cf. above, note 3.
38. Documentos Remetidos da Índia, vol. I, p. 131: "... como tembem tenho por mui necessario fazerem-se dous fortes nos estreitos de Sabão e Sincapura, para se assegurar a navegacao de meus vasallos ...". Cf. also an earlier letter, dated Lisbon, 12 January, 1607, ibid., p. 60, "... e porque a conservacao d'ella he tam necessaria para fomentar a empreza do Sul e impedir os desenhos e intentos dos ditos rebeldes de Hollanda, que, se n'ella metessem pê, importancia pouco ter eu fortaleza no Dachem e assegurados os passos de Singapura e Sabão".
40. Cf. Vida de lgaques de Covitre, Natvral de la ciudad de Brygas, 1640. According to further information provided on the title page, this work was prepared by his son, Don Esteban de Coutre, a resident of Santiago de Compostela.
A Fort in the Straits of Singapore, ca. 1584-1625

In a document entitled *Emformacion para se hazer algunos castillos o fortaleças en el estrecho de Sincapura* (Information concerning the construction of some citadels or fortresses in the Straits of Singapore) and bears no date of composition, de Coutre attempts to convince the King of Spain and Portugal that the ailing commercial fortunes of Malacca could be turned around with the construction of (a) strong fortress(es) or citadel(s) to protect the Straits of Singapore. The location for this fort is on the *Ysla de Arenas* (presently Sentosa), which lies, as he sees it “in the middle of the Straits of Singapore”. This island is rocky, and represents in its own sense a “natural” fortress, ideally suited to this project. All shipping must pass in view of this island and the waters feature a current in the *estreito velho* that is reminiscent of a river. The *Ysla de Arenas* has many large trees growing on it, and fresh water is available. The shore of the *estreito velho* or *estrecho viejo* is reported to be quite steep and rocky and therefore not suited for the landing of ships, but the opposite side, along the New Straits of Singapore, is much better suited for bantins and galleys to land and bring in supplies. All these conditions combine into an ideal place to construct a fort, and this could be accomplished, as the native of Bruges does not fail to point out, at relatively low cost.

De Coutre then proceeds to also propose the construction of a second fortification in the region of the Straits. This ideally should be built at the mouth of the Johor River toward the eastern most point of the *Ysla de la

---

41. Coutre (1991), pp. 395ff. On the authorship of this and other memorials, cf. George D. Winius and Carrie C. Chorba, “Literary Invasions invasions in La Vida de Jaques de Coutre: do they prejudice its value as an historical source”, in *A Carreira da India e as Rotas dos Estreitos*. Actas do VIII Seminário Internacional de História Indo-Portuguesa, Angra do Heroísmo 7 a 11 de Junho de 1996, edited by Artur Teodoro de Matos and Luís F. Reis Thomaz, Angra do Heroísmo, 1998, p. 712: “...[A]t least, Jacques de Coutre’s other writings, his memorials to the crown, or *arbitrios*, are surely from his own hand”. Cf. also *ibid.*, p. 714, “[De Coutre’s] *arbitrios*, his memorials to the crown about conditions in and remedies to be applied to the *Estado da India* almost certainly were known at court”.

42. Ibid., p. 396: “Y en la mitad del Estrecho de Singapura ay una isla, que será de tres leguas poco mas o menos. La dicha ysla corre de una parte del Estrecho Viejo, de la otra parte el Estrecho Nuevo. Viene esta ysla a hazer en medio del Estrecho una punta de piedra a modo de un fuerte de naturaleza. ... En esta punta avía de mandar Su Magestad hazer un castillo muy fuerte: todas las embarcaciones que passan por estos Estrechos, ansí por el Viejo como por el Nuevo, se paran y echan áncora en la dicha punta poco mas adelante o menos. Es forçado porque paçan estos estrechos en dos mares, ansí entrando por un lado como por otro”.

43. Ibid., p. 422.

44. Ibid., p. 397.

45. Ibid., p. 397: “La ysla es muy fresca de frondossos árboles y tiene muy buena agua”. A very similar statement follows in a separate *Emformacion*, *ibid.*, p. 422.

46. *Ibid.*, p. 398. Coutre recounts that this island was commonly used by sailors as a watering hole. *Ibid.*, p. 107. At the edge of the new Strait there are some settlements of the *saletes*.

47. Ibid., p. 422.
Śabandarta Vieja or present-day Singapore Island. Coutre estimates its length at more or less seven legoas, or about twenty-one kilometers, and spells out that this second fortress would be situated at a distance of about three legoas, or around nine kilometers, from the first fort located on the Ysla de Arenas. (48) This relative proximity also implies, as de Coutre does not fail to underscore, that it would be possible for the planned fortifications to lend mutual assistance, either by land or by sea, and the two separate islands upon which they would be built are only separated by the estreito velho or estrecho viejo. This body of water, Coutre testifies, resembles a river. (49) The latter can be easily closed with a chain, if need be. (50) In any case, the two fortresses should be backed up with a naval squadron of five to six well-armed “Manila galleys” that be permanently stationed around the islands and patrol the waters there. (51)

With the hindsight of history, the most intriguing and one might also say premonitory proposals advanced by de Coutre in his Emformacion concerns the use of the port, which he claims is one of the best in “India”, and the founding of a city that would, in all appearance, serve as an entrepôt. According to his recommendation, this city would evidently be situated on the Ysla de la Śabandarta Vieja and de Coutre exhorts his monarch to acquire suzerainty over the island, and the kingdom of Johor. (52)

The political conditions and events described in the Emformacion give some indications as to when this undated piece was conceived and possibly also written. For example, de Coutre explains that the King of Johor fled to the island of “Bintan” (53) and that the Acehnese had stormed the capital city Batu Sawar, some 12 legoas, or about thirty-six kilometers, upstream, and occupied it with 1,500 men. (54) Acehnese troops are also reported to have overrun and occupied Pahang (Pam), a territory whose fate stood in close connection with Johor in the early seventeenth century. (55) The above mentioned points reflect the conditions of around 1620.

48. Ibid., p. 400.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid., p. 396 : “... que se puede serrar con una cadena ...”.
51. Ibid., p. 398 : “Para efeto del dicho comercio es nesecario que Su Magestad tenga en el dicho estrecho cinco o seis galeras de Manilas bien armadas, sugetas al Castillo, para franequar el estrecho”.
52. Ibid., p. 401 : “Quedarâ senor de este puerto que es uno de los mejores que sirve la Yndia. Podrán hazer allí una ciudad y quedar señor de este reyno”.
53. This probably refers to the present-day island of Lingga rather than Bintan, as it is known and depicted by Erédia in his Declaraçam, fol. 34 verso.
Admittedly, these are not the only recommendations for the construction of forts that de Coutre makes in the context of his discourses. He further proposes the construction of strongholds in the Straits of Sabam and along the coast of Sumatra. Among de Coutre’s writings we also find another report addressed to the King of Spain, entitled: Emformación para ... remediar el Estado en la Índia Oriental (Information relating to ... the improvement of the Estado in the East Indies). This second recommendation appears to be written a bit later, probably in the early 1620s. In this, de Coutre advances a series of concrete proposals for reversing the ill fortunes of Portuguese India, and specifically the entrepôt of Malacca. One of the more striking plans Coutre offers to the Iberian monarch in this context reads as follows:

“Your Majesty should mandate that the lands of Malacca, which are very good and fertile, be populated with people that are called Chincheos [i.e. people from Zhangzhou or just Fukiienese in general], just like the Spaniards have in Manila. These people are very agile, and are workers who cultivate the lands ... They are great fishermen and work in all professions: carpenters, stone masons, smiths and all other professions one requires to run a city ...”

To the contemporary reader, these plans appear all forward-looking and rather modern, heralding events that were to unfold at the tip of the Malayan Peninsula, not under Portuguese or Spanish rule, but two centuries later in British colonial times.

Dutch Plans for a Fort in the Straits of Singapore and the Johor River Estuary

The officers of the Estado da Índia were not the only ones attempting to consolidate their hegemony in the region in the first and second decades of the seventeenth century. As has been explained above, the chief purpose of the United Dutch East India Company (VOC) at the time was to contain the spread of Iberian influence in the region and to sabotage the trading network of the Portuguese and Spanish as much as possible. There was also a plan, from an early stage onward, to wrest Malacca, that famed city of trade and spice from Portuguese control. Two formal treaties were concluded to this
effect between the Dutch party, signed by Admiral Matelieff de Jonghe, and the Johor monarch, 'Ala’udin Ri’ayat Shah III, who was acknowledged by Malay and European parties as a legitimate claimant to the throne of the fallen Malacca Sultanate. They were acknowledged by the Johor monarch, 'Ala’udin Ri’ayat Shah III, who was acknowledged by Malay and European parties as a legitimate claimant to the throne of the fallen Malacca Sultanate. Their treaty of 1606 foresaw joint attacks on the Portuguese stronghold. In the event that the Dutch should succeed, they would be legitimately ceded the city with some surrounding territory, while the Johor monarch would take possession of the lands of the former Sultanate, which at that time were held under Portuguese control. It can be assumed that the ratification of the Dutch-Johorean treaties of 1606 represent a formalization of existing arrangements that date back to 1603 when Heemskerk seized the carrack Santa Catarina with the active co-operation, and under the direct auspices of, the Johor monarch. The Heemskerk expedition then brought back to the United Provinces envoys of the Johor monarch, the chief delegate of which was one Megat Mansur. The Johorean nobleman was to bring a personal message of the monarch to Prince Maurice of Orange. Mansur passed away on the long voyage back to Europe. But other members of the Johor entourage made it to the Netherlands and back, including specifically one Encik Kamar, who returned to Johor with the fleet of Matelieff de Jonghe in 1606. Encik Kamar appears to have played a role in facilitating the negotiations between the Dutch and the Johoreans. There is evidence to suggest that a deal to jointly attack and “liberate” Malacca from Portuguese control originated with King 'Ala’udin Ri’ayat Shah, and that his ambassador, Megat Mansur, was originally sent to the Netherlands to propose this scheme.

In view of the commercial and strategic significance of the Straits of Singapore and Malacca, particularly also the prospect of expelling the Portuguese and acquiring the entrepôt of Malacca, the VOC developed and maintained for some years a commercial and special political interest in


63. Cf. the letter of the King of Johor, ‘Ala’udin Ri’ayat Shah, dated 6 February, 1609, passed on to Admiral Paul van Cærden, printed in Netscher (1870), pp. 17ff; For a text of the treaty, cf. note 17 above.
Johor. Before settling definitively in Batavia, the VOC toyed with the idea of establishing the residence of the Governor-General in Johor or establishing what they called a rendez-vous point, i.e. a place where VOC ships could assemble from different parts of insular and mainland Southeast Asia. In any case, it was maintained that Johor is “a place where commerce and trade must be maintained at all costs”. In the first decade of the seventeenth century, Johor was seen by many as a key ally in Asia, and as an important agent in Dutch efforts to contain Iberian expansion. This view was shared not only by the officers of the VOC fleets, but also by key players and stockholders back in Europe.

The Dutch-Johorean alliance proved rather difficult and fateful for both parties. While Johor’s relations with Portuguese Malacca vacillated considerably since the second half of the sixteenth century, it’s open relation with the VOC meant that Johor had formally turned its back on the Portuguese to the extent of waging war against them. In fact, Victor Sprinckel, the VOC agent at Patani, wrote to his counterpart at Bantam, Jacques l’Hermite, on December 27, 1608, lamenting that the company had “dragged” Johor into the Dutch war against the Iberian powers and that the people of Johor were now exhorting the King to conclude a peace with Portugal. The VOC, too, found itself pressured at times by its Johorean ally to declare war against its competitors and enemies. Repeated requests were made by the Johor monarch to “deal” with – i.e. destroy – Aceh and Patani, powers in other words with whom the Dutch were on relatively good footing at the time. These Johorean demands, which were attached to the granting of privileges,

---

66. Van der Chijs, I, p. 15.
67. Jonge, *Opkomst*, III, p. 80: “... ten gevolge der handelwijze van de Nederlanders, die den sultan eerst in den oorlog tegen de Portugezen hadden medegesleept; doch hem thans in den steek lieten, het rijk van Djohor tot zulk eene extreme miserie was gereduceert, dat het volk tegen den sultan in opstand was gekomen en riep om payse met de Portugezen ...”.
occasionally placed the VOC and its agents in diplomatically awkward if not compromising positions.

As long as Malacca was not wrested from the Portuguese, the Dutch view of Johor was that the kingdom was surrounded by hostile powers. Although in Europe the directors of the VOC frequently drafted plans and issued instructions to their outbound fleets, it often took several years before they had a knowledge of how these were implemented, and whether they succeeded. Thus, on October 13, 1607, the Heeren XVII of the VOC issue instructions to the outbound fleet of Admiral Pieter Willemszoon Verhoeff and his *breede raad* (naval council) that runs through a series of hypothetical scenarios. For example, the directors urge Verhoeff to conclude a treaty with the King of Johor, and if this already be accomplished, he should seek to expand and build on it. The same treaty, the directors continue, should also be offered to Aceh and other neighboring princes. This is to deprive the Portuguese of any opportunity in the future to forge alliances with their neighbors against VOC interests. In the event that Malacca should still be in the possession of the “enemy”, i.e. Portugal, opportunities for conquest should be explored and if feasible, executed. The instructions also contain a proposal to build a fort that should be constructed with the consent, advice and assistance of the King after the conclusion of an expanded treaty. The purpose of this fort, the directors continue in their instructions, is to provide security to the Kingdom of Johor and specifically also the Straits of Singapore. The directors, finally remind how important the trade in spices and Chinese silks is to the fortunes of the company, and admonish Verhoeff and his officers to wind up any outstanding business, to leave Malacca or Johor, and proceed to the Moluccas as soon as possible.

To the best of the author’s present knowledge, this is the first time the VOC directors issued concrete instructions to erect a fort in the region of the Singapore Straits. François Valentijn, however, whose voluminous *Oud en Nieuw in Oost-Indië* remains a treasure-trove for students of early-modern history and Dutch colonial politics, errs when he claims that Admiral Cornelis Matelieff de Jonghe personally supervised the early construction of

---

70. Jonge, *Opkomst III: Instructie*, p. 72: “... maeckende in sodanigen gevall des te nader en vast verbondt met den coninck van Jor, bouwende oock met dezelfs believen, advys ende hulpe een fortress ofte sterckte ... ommel also het coninckrijk van Jor ende de straet van Cincapura te verseeckeren”.
71. Ibid. : “Enne gemerckt aen den zijdehandel van China ende de speceriehandel der Molucquen dese landen ende d’Oost Indische Compagnie meest gelegen is ... [d]enselven handel insoderheyt gerecommandeert, omme die commersie met alle middelen na vermogen te vorderen ende procureren, tot dien eynde aloos het oog hebbende om spoedig van Malacca ofte Jor te scheyden, ende sich na de Moluccos de vorderen”.

Archipel 65, Paris, 2003
A fortification project in 1606. What the Admiral supervised was not the construction of a fort in the upstream capital city Batu Sawar, but merely the reinforcement of the Dutch factory and its adjacent residences in Johor’s capital city.\(^{(72)}\) The task of suggesting the construction of a Dutch fort in Johor fell in fact to Admiral Verhoeff who arrived in Johor in the first days of the year 1609 after previously ascertaining the viability of attacking Malacca. The fleet of Verhoeff also succeeded at this time in making several prizes, including two ships carrying a cargo of rice and cloves, and two vessels inbound from Macao, carrying cargos of silks, porcelain, pepper, *radix Chinae*\(^{(73)}\) and cash. One of the ships captured in the process was the carrack *Nossa Senhora del Pare*.\(^{(74)}\) One is in a rather fortunate situation that many documents and writings relating to the visit of Admiral Verhoeff in Johor have survived, including transcripts of his conversations and negotiations with the King. Not only does it transpire from these that Verhoeff followed his instructions regarding Malacca and Johor to the letter, it is also clear that the Dutch officers encountered some difficulties in selling the merits of their plan to the elite of the Johorean court, including notably their staunch allies Raja Bongsu and the King himself.

Verhoeff arrived in the Straits of Singapore on January 5, 1609, and proceeded with four sloops and several of his officers upstream to the capital Batu Sawar.\(^{(75)}\) Valentijn describes the capital city as quadrangular in its shape measuring 1,300 paces in circumference. It was fortified with palisades that were some forty feet tall. The town was densely populated with many *atap* houses within the palisades, but the houses belonging to the King and of those whom Valentijn calls “courtiers” (*hovelingen*) were constructed of wood. Most of the population, in fact, lived outside of the walls. Together with a settlement on the opposite bank of the Johor River known as Kota Sabrang, measuring some four to five hundred paces in circumference, there were an estimated three to four thousand men who were fit to defend the settlements (*weerbare mannen*).\(^{(76)}\)

---


73. A root, prepared in dried form, that was generally held to have medicinal value against skin disorders.


It was the month of *Ramadan*, the fasting month of the Muslims. The initial objective of Verhoeff was first to solicit the active support and participation of Johor in their new assault on Malacca, and for this purpose, he put forward several specific demands to the King.\(^{77}\) This was in line with the Dutch-Johor treaty signed between ‘Ala’udin Ri’ayat Shah and Matelieff in 1606.\(^{78}\) To the bewilderment of Verhoeff and the members of his *breede raad*, the King was clearly hesitant to lend any direct military support for this ambitious enterprise. Clarification of the King’s evident reluctance can be found in a letter of Cornelis Franck, the Dutch factor at Batu Sawar, written in December 1608. From this document it transpires that the King was facing a number of serious political and diplomatic challenges. Specifically, ‘Ala’udin Ri’ayat Shah’s unwillingness to dispatch military support is explained on the grounds that his people were fasting during the month of *Ramadan*, and consequently could not prepare for, or engage in, a war, at least until the fast had been broken.\(^{79}\) Deliberations and negotiations resulted in the abandonment of the plan to attack Malacca. The city, as was noted by an unnamed French defector,\(^{80}\) was well-fortified and well-manned. There were also sufficient ammunition and stockpiles of food that would have enabled the city to withstand a prolonged siege by the Dutch and any of their Malay allies. It was also contended that, even if the King of Johor eventually dispatched some soldiers after the breaking of the fast on Hari Raya Puasa, he would not be in a position to muster a sufficient number to decisively enhance the power of the attacking forces.

The Admiral’s *breede raad* remonstrated to the king.\(^{81}\) They wished to know whether the King had any intention of lending military assistance in a future attack on Portuguese Malacca. At the same time they desired from his Majesty to know whether he would consent to the construction of a fort or citadel, and they used the opportunity to highlight the security that such a fort would provide for the kingdom and its trade.\(^{82}\) The monarch’s reply must have bewildered his Dutch visitors. He stated that the Portuguese did not detest him as much as his esteemed visitors generally assumed.\(^{83}\) Were negotiations with the Portuguese for a peace in the air, as many of the rumors had it? The King thought that, in the event the Lusitanian forces should again impose a naval blockade, and cut off the riverine trade to and around

---

78. Cf. above, note 17.

Archipel 65, Paris, 2003
Batu Sawar, or indeed, launch an attack on the capital, it would still be possible for him to flee further upstream. The King also observed that the construction of a fort in his territory would inevitably mean that the Dutch would live in their midst. The monarch expressed his grave concern that, since the Dutch were people very much like the Portuguese, the Dutch men were likely to go out with local womenfolk. Quite evidently the monarch was concerned that the maidens of his lands would be deflowered by the strapping European sailors. The monarch also cautioned he would be very aggrieved if he found it necessary to commence a war against his good friends, the Dutch. (84) The king expressed his distinct preference for direct assistance in the form of cash and ammunition. (85) He had made similar requests during the visits of Admirals Sebastiaanse and Wijbrandt van Warwijk in 1605, (86) and again during Matelieff de Jonghe’s visit in 1606. (87) On the two earlier occasions, the Johor monarch received from his Dutch visitors five small cannons and ten vats of gunpowder, and in 1606 he also made a specific request for cash subsidies. Matelieff obliged and gave him one thousand Pesos de a ocho (Spanish Dollars, Ryals-of-Eight or “Pieces of Eight”), and apparently did so personally and purportedly out of his own proverbial “pocket”. (88)

Admiral Verhoeff and his breede raad thus resolved that they would comply with this request. Verhoeff thus abandoned his negotiations with the Johor monarch, which he knew would be fruitless. (89) The King was to receive a cash subsidy amounting to 3,000 Pesos de a ocho. This cash, one should immediately add, had been seized earlier from the ill-fated Nossa Senhora del Pare (90) and was formally donated to assist the Johorean monarch in the construction of his “new city” Batu Sawar. (91) The King was

84. Netscher (1870), p. 23.
86. Hervey (1885), pp. 130-132.
87. Ibid., p. 131: “Admiral Cornelis Sebastiaanse presented [the king of Johor] at the time with two brass guns, and van Warwijk gave him four small barrels of gunpowder, 40 shot-cartridges for the said cannon, 12 Japanese swords, four Portuguese muskets with shoulder belts, some pieces of prepared silk and a shot-proof armour. The two admirals presented the King at his request with two wide-mouthed guns cannon-royal, and some shot-cartridges for the same from the vessel Dordrecht and with an iron pedrero (a small field piece) and ten small barrels of gunpowder and some shot-cartridges from one of Warwijk’s vessels, in order that he [the king of Johor] should be better able to repel the assaults of the Portuguese”.
88. Ibid., pp. 293-294.
90. Ibid., Journael, I, p. 253, entry of 23 January, 1609. Cf. also above, note 74.
91. Ibid., p. 254, entry of 26 January, 1609.
also to receive twenty vats of gunpowder and tintinago or spelter for the casting of metallic cannon balls. As a precaution, and at the request of the Johor monarch, the Dutch would station two vessels, at the mouth of the Johor River. The crew was to ensure that trade be conducted "freely" immediately after the departure of Verhoeff's fleet. It goes almost without saying that the true purpose of stationing these vessels was to ensure that the Portuguese would not again impose a retaliative blockade on the Johor River as they had done after previous visits by Dutch ships. The Roode Leeuw and the cutter Griffioen were issued express instructions to hold guard in the Johor River estuary until July 1609. They should thereafter set sail for Patani and later head for Borneo and the Moluccas where they could rejoin the rest of the fleet. The remaining nine vessels of Verhoeff's fleet set sail for Bantam on February 6, 1609, where they arrived nine days later.

The two ships, the Roode Leeuw and the Griffioen temporarily lent the protection that the proposed fort was meant to provide. In the course of waiting for their mandate to elapse, the winds from Europe and Java brought news that would alter the commercial and political forces at work in the Straits. A sloop arriving from Bantam brought reports that the Dutch had entered into a temporary truce with the King of Spain and Portugal. The markets of Asia, the news continued, were now open to the VOC for trade. The Griffioen and Roode Leeuw then hoisted their sails, and headed for Japan.

News of the temporary truce pending negotiations for a standing treaty in Europe raised considerable uncertainty among the Asian communities. The full accord, as it was finally agreed upon in April 1609, did not implement the open-market concept that had been originally touted in the epistolary reports dispatched to VOC servants in Asia. In fact, the Twelve Year

92. Dutch : buskruit.
93. Ibid., Introduction, I, p. 86; ibid., Journael, I, p. 253, entry of 23 January, 1609. - Tintinago is a zinc alloy from China.
97. Jonge, Opkomst, III, p. 308, according to this document, the transitional arrangements were as follows: "... geduyrende welcken tyt van 9 jaeren de geoctroyeerde Comp. in allen plaetse van Europea, Africa ende Asia niet weesende onder tgebiet van den Coninck van Spaengien sal mogen handelen ende traffiqueeren, maer in plaetsen daer den Coninck van Spaignien ofte de seynen tgebiet hebben, daer en sal men niet mogen handelen ofte traf-fiqueeren, ten waere, met gelieve van deghenen die het ghebiet heeft, dan by noot sal men de plaetsen mogen aenvaeren ende aldaer vriendelyck gehandelt worden".
Truce was amended by secret clauses that specifically stipulated the projection and continuation of the Hispano-Dutch war effort into the colonies, including the East Indies. But this was not, and could not have been, known to the VOC servants out in Asia at the time. News of the transitional truce arrangements and the prospective open market policy conceded by the King of Spain and Portugal were accepted with a considerable dose of optimism by the Dutch agents in Asia. Enthusiasm over a new open-market strategy, led them to temporarily neglect their interests in Johor. This coincided with events that would unfold in the second half of 1609 and in 1610, and eventually push Johor to the brink of near destruction, not by its erstwhile enemy Portugal, but by one of Johor’s fiercest rivals and competitors: Aceh.

Documentary evidence suggests that the transitional truce arrangements negotiated in Europe were designed to throw a spanner into Dutch diplomatic and political interests in Johor. Cleverly, the Portuguese would exploit the relatively long intervals between Dutch visits to Batu Sawar as an opportunity to launch a diplomatic offensive on the Johor court. (98) Their efforts to draw Johor back into the orbit of Lusitanian interests on the Peninsula were backed by the now customary show of brute force.

Soon after the Roode Leeuw and Griffioen set sail for Japan, (99) the Malacca government dispatched a naval squadron with orders to impose a blockade on the Johor River. This latest blockade lasted from 1609 through 1610 and was one of the most devastating to the Johorean economy in recent memory. Food supplies were completely cut off, and trade with China as well as the surrounding regions in Malaya, Sumatra and the Riau ground to a complete halt. In previous instances, the arrival of Dutch or even English ships brought relief to Johor, as the Portuguese blockaders either lost in battle or simply fled when they spotted European vessels. This time, there were no visitors from Northern Europe. Both Raja Bongsu, Holland’s staunch supporter at the Johor court, as well as ’Ala’udin Ri’ayat Shah himself were clearly distressed that the Dutch had concluded some form of peace with the Lusitanian foe without consulting him. (100) He was also upset at the VOC’s apparent

98. Cf. also Netscher (1870), pp. 27-28.
99. Verhoeff, II, Journaal van de Griffioen, p. 337. This happened in the early days of April, 1609.
100. Jonge, Opkomst, III, p. 306, letter of Raja Bongsu to Prince Maurice of Orange (translation into Dutch by Jacques Obelar): “... Dan heeft ons voor eerst inwendich zer bedroeft te aenhooren onsen broeder met den Coninck van Portugal in eenich accoort getreed in, want oversulcx op vien mogen wy onse hope meer stellen omme der stad van Malacca weder te vercraghjen, soo ’tselvige accoort met den Coninck van Portugal voortganck heeft; derhalven soo noch eenige genegehenheteyt ende affectie t’ons waert is, dat men ons toch eerst behulpeh sy, omme Malacca weder aen ons te brengen, waerdoo den naem van onsen broeder vereert ende over the gantsche werelt verbreet mach werden, onse eenige hope en vertrouwen oversulcx op onsen broeder noch stellende”.

Archipel 65, Paris, 2003
abandonment of Johor’s political cause. According to a letter of the Dutch _opperkoopman_ (chief merchant), Jacques Obelar, of 25 November 1610, the King had repeatedly asked why the Dutch had not called on Johor for such a long time. He also wondered aloud whether the Dutch might not be trading with Johor’s commercial and political archrival Patani.\(^{101}\) Obelar did what could be expected of any good factor or diplomat. He himself probably had no answer to this truly burning question and he therefore resorted to the only course of action at his disposal: damage control. Obelar replied to the King that the Dutch traded in both places, implying that they also wished to maintain good relations with both rivaling powers, Johor as well as Patani.\(^{102}\)

As mentioned, the Portuguese matched their show of military muscle with a serious diplomatic offensive that was already in full force by the end of 1609. Portugal was exerting persistent diplomatic pressure on Johor to sign a peace accord and the King’s evident reluctance to join forces with Admiral Verhoeff in the attack on Malacca in 1609 may very well bear testimony to this. But the devastating effects of the on-going naval blockade from the second half of 1609 onwards, together with the now rapidly mounting dissatisfaction among the _orang kaya_ and Johor’s subjects at large, left King 'Ala’udin Ri’ayat Shah with no other choice but to yield to Portuguese pressure.\(^{103}\) In explaining the genesis and conclusion of the Luso-Johor agreement, one might also take into consideration a clause found in the transitional peace arrangements that imposed a ceasefire not only on the VOC, but also on its allies – both existing as well as prospective – in Asia, Africa and all regions of the East Indies, for a period of two years.\(^{104}\)


103. *Ibid.*, p. 90: “Hij had … pais gemaakt uit armoede, want hij was bijna een jaar lang naauw belegerd geweest…”; Bassett (1960) p. 16: “… the sultan of Johore felt himself to be so inadequately supported by the Dutch Company that he made peace with the Portuguese in October 1610”. According to an excerpt of Admiral Verhoeff’s _breede raad_ (naval council) published in Netscher (1870) p. 24, the Portuguese had exerted pressure on the Johor Sultan to conclude peace ever since their ships set sail from the Johor River Estuary.

104. Jonge, _Opkomst_, III, p. 309, announcement of provisional truce, dated Amsterdam, 11 April, 1608: “In stilstand van waepenen ofte treves sullen, oock weesen alle onse geallieerde vrunden in Africa, Asia ende plaetsen in Oost-Indiën, die voorals geallieeert syn ofte noch met ons zullen in alliantie, vriendschap ende contract comen, gedurende den tyt van twee jaeren nae date van desen off dat wy daeraff de weete ofte advys alhier mogen hebben op half meerte 1611 toecomende”.

*Archipel* 65, Paris, 2003
Portuguese cause at the Johor court, conducted the negotiations.\(^ {105} \) Raja Bongsu, meanwhile, retreated into the political background, clearly distancing himself from this unflattering deal with the Lusitanian crown.

On October 1, 1610, the Portuguese ambassador João Lopes de Morero, arrived in Batu Sawar where the last details of the peace were finalized.\(^ {106} \) The treaty itself was signed on October 16, 1610, by the King of Johor in Batu Sawar, and on October 22, 1609, in Malacca by the Captain Major, Dom Francisco Henriques, and countersigned by the Bishop of Malacca, Dom Frei Cristávão de Sá e Lisboa in the company of two Johorean ambassadors.\(^ {107} \) According to Manuel Teixeira in his book *The Portuguese Missions in Malacca and Singapore*,\(^ {108} \) it was the King of Johor, 'Ala'udin Ri'ayat Shah, who ventured to Malacca for the signing ceremony. But the peace was not to be. According to the same Teixeira, ratification of the peace was subsequently rejected by the Portuguese Viceroy in Goa, Rui Lourenço de Tâvora, who reportedly objected to specific conditions of the treaty.\(^ {109} \) The inception of the document was evidently postponed until the objectionable clauses had been eliminated, but Teixeira fails to inform his readers whether these conditions were ever met. Most unfortunately, neither the draft nor the final treaty is featured among the monumental collection of treaties published in the nineteenth century by Julio Biker.\(^ {110} \) In a more recent study of the Portuguese treaty system, António Saldanha testifies that the document is now wanting altogether.\(^ {111} \) It transpires from a number of sources, including correspondence of the Spanish governor of the Philippines, Juan de Silva with the King of Johor, King Abdullah Ma’ayat Shah (previously known as Raja Bongsu) that a permanent peace was even-

---


ually concluded. (112) The Spanish-Philippine Governor passed through the Straits of Singapore with his armada in 1616 to join four vessels of the Portuguese navy for an operation against the Dutch, but a strike by the Acehnese that destroyed all four Portuguese ships slated for the Luso-Spanish operation, and the premature death of the Spanish Governor ensured that the ambitious plan would not be executed. (113) Nevertheless, the celebrated Governor used the opportunity of his passage through the Straits of Singapore to communicate in writing with the Johor monarch, admonished him that his assistance to the Dutch and Johor’s actions against Portuguese Malacca breached the capitulado (capitulation or treaty) and were also clearly contrary to good faith and friendly relations. (114)

Whatever the case may be, it is certain that only a few days after the signing of the 1610 peace arrangement in Batu Sawar, Raja Bongsu could have not known, or foreseen, the objections raised some months later by the Portuguese Viceroy in Goa. Yet it appears that the Luso-Johorean peace treaty was a setback for the ambitious prince who dreaded the dawn of a fresh, pro-Portuguese orientation in Johorean politics. It transpires that on November 23, 1610 – just weeks after the Luso-Johor peace was ratified in Batu Sawar – Raja Bongsu paid a highly unusual visit to the Dutch factory under the cover of darkness. (115) On that occasion, he apologized to the VOC agents present there for the peace, and expressed his grief that this agreement had been struck by his brother, the Prince of Siak. He implored with the company servants that Prince Maurice and the Heeren XVII not abandon him, reiterated his desire to renew the bonds of friendship and trust with the United Provinces, and repeated his wish that Portuguese Malacca be captured in war. (116) Raja Bongsu confirmed all of this in writing; translations from the Malay language were completed by one of the resident agents of the VOC at Batu Sawar, Cornelis Franck.

Things appeared to be going rather poorly for the pro-Dutch faction at the Johor court, but news of the definitive truce arrangements (ratified in April


114. Jonge, Opkomst, II, pp. 130-131, letter of Juan de Silva, Governor and Captain of the Philippines to King Abdullah Ma’ayat (Hammat) Shah of Johor, from the Straits of Singapore, dated 28 February 1616. (The letter is written and printed in Spanish) : “He entendido que V.A. da muy grande ayuda a los Olandeses contra la capitulado ... todo es contra lo capitulado y fuera e toda buena amistad”.


116. Ibid.
1610) between the Netherlands and the Iberian monarch, the rejection of the
treaty by the Portuguese Viceroy in Goa, and the subsequent attack by the
Acehnese on Johor were to reverse all of that again. The latter move tipped
the balance of power in the region once more, this time significantly in favor
of Aceh.

The first Acehnese attack on Johor in 1613 is a milestone event that has
been discussed previously in several learned discussions. Suffice it in the
context of this essay to refer to Lombard, Alves, Lobato and Sousa Pinto
who have all discussed this event and its broader implications at some
length. The exact reasons for the Acehnese attack on Johor have not been
established with any degree of certainty. It is likely, however, that the bal-
ance of power in the Straits of Singapore and Malacca, as well as on the
island of Sumatra, was in a constellation most unfavorable to Aceh and its
expansionist ambitions at the time. The prospective Luso-Johor alliance
can also be taken as a possible factor. The attack was well organized and a
massive operation by any early-modern standard. Batu Sawar was destroyed,
and the servants of the VOC buried their bullion and set the factory ablaze in
the hope of preventing the enemies from seizing any goods. These hopes
were in vain. Servants of the company were brought back to Aceh together
with orang kaya and members of the royal family, including significantly
Raja Bongsu. The erstwhile monarch, King 'Ala'udin Ri'ayat Shah, is
generally believed to have fled to Lingga (then commonly referred to as
Bintan or Bintão, as older maps of the region can also testify). He is reported
to have died there in exile. After marrying Raja Bongsu off to one of his
daughters, Iskandar Muda of Aceh set the prisoners free. It is believed that a
main condition of their release was that Johor resume its hostilities with
Portugal. Raja Bongsu, who then firmly held the reigns of the Johor
kingdom in his hands, maintained an unblemished anti-Portuguese record.

In the aftermath of the first Acehnese attack on Johor and the resumption
of Johor’s hostilities with Portugal, the plan for a Dutch fort in the Straits of
Singapore and the Johor River estuary was revived. The new Johor monarch
faced two pressing problems in his foreign relations management. First, he
was seriously concerned that earlier actions, such as the commercial and

118. Bouwstofsen, I, p. 67, letter of Jan Pieterszoon Coen to the Heeren XVII, dated Bantam,
119. Netscher (1879), p. 31, undated letter of Admiral Steven van der Hagen (assumed to be
written about 1616); also Carl Alexander Gibson-Hill, “The Alleged death of Sultan
'Ala'udin of Johor at Acheh in 1613”, JMBRAS, 29 (1956); Rouffaer (1921) p. 596.
120. Bouwstofsen, I, p. 60, letter of Jan Pieterszoon Coen to the Heeren XVII, dated Bantam,
1 January, 1614; Teixeira (1961), p. 245.
political rapprochement with Portugal, might have alienated the Dutch and their interest in Johor.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 67-68, letter of Jan Pieterszoon Coen to the Heeren XVII, dated Bantam, 10 November 1614.} Second, the Acehnese attack on Batu Sawar confirmed what the Dutch had feared, and who had warned the King’s brother and predecessor all along, that the capital was vulnerable to attacks and required some form of additional protection through a fort or citadel. While Batu Sawar was being reconstructed with the help of the Acehnese who also garrisoned the city, the Johor monarch dispatched a letter to Bantam. In this - supposedly muddled - message,\footnote{Ibid., p. 70, final report (\textit{Cort verhael}) filed by Adriaen van der Dussen with his superior Pieter Both, Governor-General of the East Indies (cf. below, note 126), dated Bantam, 10 November 1614, concerning his mission to the Johor court at Batu Sawar: “Nadaemael den Coninck van Johor al eenighen tijt geleeden een missive aent comptoir van Bantham met een joncke expressecken afgevaerdicht heeft, de welcke mits de obscuriteyt ende duysterheyt van dien niet volcommelicken ende conde verstaen werden, ende daerinne sijne Maj. te kennen gaff, een wichtige saecke de Hollandsche natie voor te draegen te hebben, indien wij de voorgaende verbintenisse van alliantie begeerden te continueren, soo ist dat bij den heer Ghenerael Pieter de Both, mitsgaders die vanden Rade goet ghevoden is geweest, mij met het schip den Groene Leeuw near Johor te seynden, omme de meeninghe vanden voorsz. Coninck volcomentlijcken te verstaen, ende verder alles te doene near luyt der instructie, mij bij den voorsz. Raede mede gegeven”\footnote{Ibid., pp. 67-68, letter of Jan Pieterszoon Coen, 10 November 1614: “Wij hebben alhier [i.e. in Bantam] vanden Coninck van Jhoor een missive gecregen. Ditto Magesteyt beclaecht daerinne zijn ongeluck, ende zeyt soo hij wiste dat wij hem nyet en souden verlaten ende de voorgaende vrientschappe wilden continueren, dat hij als dan een sake voor souden slaan van seer groote imporantie omme met ons ten effecte te geraken, sonder eenige ander opennghe daer van te doen”\footnote{Ibid., p. 68: “Soo den Coninck een plaetse tot een forteresse wilde geven, hebben wij goede ordre gegeven, dat wel werde geconsidereert off de plaetse alle alsulcke bequaemicheden is hebbende als aldaer bij een forteresse soude mogen werden verescht. Dit schip ende Van der Dussen zijn wij met het eerste nordelijck mouson wederom verwachtende”.}.”} the King expressed his sincere hopes of reviving former ties and claimed that he carried an important message for his friends and allies.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 67-68, letter of Jan Pieterszoon Coen to the Heeren XVII, dated Bantam, 10 November 1614.} According to a letter of Jan Pieterszoon Coen addressed to the Heeren XVII, it was speculated that the King might now consent to the project of building a fort.\footnote{Ibid., p. 68: “Soo den Coninck een plaetse tot een forteresse wilde geven, hebben wij goede ordre gegeven, dat wel werde geconsidereert off de plaetse alle alsulcke bequaemicheden is hebbende als aldaer bij een forteresse soude mogen werden verescht. Dit schip ende Van der Dussen zijn wij met het eerste nordelijck mouson wederom verwachtende”.} Two men were dispatched on August 11, 1614, from Bantam to treat with Raja Bongsu.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 70ff: “\textit{Cort verhael vant wederwaeren van Adryaen van der Dussen, Oppercoopman bij den Ed. Hr. Generael Pieter Both naer Johor aen den Coninck gesonden, ghelijk t’selve de voors. heer Generael bij den voornoemden van der Dussen schriftelick overgegeven is}” dated 10 November, 1614.} Jan Gommerszoon and Adriaen van der Dussen were invested with the authority to negotiate the construction of a fort in the event that the King was now willing to give his consent for such an enterprise. Shortly after arriving at Batu Sawar on August 25,\footnote{Ibid., pp. 70ff: “\textit{Cort verhael vant wederwaeren van Adryaen van der Dussen, Oppercoopman bij den Ed. Hr. Generael Pieter Both naer Johor aen den Coninck gesonden, ghelijk t’selve de voors. heer Generael bij den voornoemden van der Dussen schriftelick overgegeven is}” dated 10 November, 1614.} Gommerszoon passed away suddenly and...
mysteriously, leaving Dussen to conduct the negotiations alone. At the
time of their arrival, the King was waging war against Pahang and their ally
Portugal, and only returned to Batu Sawar on September 3. On the following
day the Dutch envoy presented the VOC’s gift consisting of “a piece of
artillery” and one vat of gunpowder.

The members of the Johor court, including notably the King, were
reassessing their options. A meeting was convened in Batu Sawar on
September 4 that included noblemen, orangkaya and even members of the
Chinese merchant community. Apart from talking about losses estimated
at 47,000 Pesos de a ocho incurred by the VOC as a result of the Acehnese
onslaught, the issue of building a fort in the region of the Singapore
Straits — four years after it was proposed and seriously pursued by Verhoeff —
was a key matter on the agenda. In fact, in a letter addressed to the Heeren
XVII written in late October after the return of Dussen from Batu Sawar,
Coen triumphantly exclaimed, that the King offered any location in his terri-
tory, be it on one of the Karimons, in the Johor River estuary, or else-
where.

Negotiations appear to have been focused but encountered some obsta-
cles. It transpires from Dussen’s testimony that the king, while apparently
inclined toward consenting to the fort project, was concerned that this would
give the Dutch the “keys to his river”, and the Johor monarch confessed
that in any case, such a decision could not be made rashly, but only in con-
sultation with his orangkaya. Dussen gave assurances to the king that

127. Ibid., p. 69, letter of Jan Pieterszoon Coen, 10 November 1614.
128. Ibid., pp. 70-71, Dussen, Cort verhael.
129. Ibid., p. 71, Dussen, Cort verhael: “Ende vermits in dese vergaderinghe verscheyden
Chynesen gecompareert waeren”.
130. Ibid., p. 67, letter of Jan Pieterszoon Coen, dated 10 November 1614; cf. also Ibid., p.
77, Dussen, Cort verhael, where a more detailed list of the losses is featured: “De schaede
die de Compagnie aldaer geleden heft sijn dese: 200 baharen peper a 14 R de baer; 31 picol:
65 cattij benjuwijjn a 26 3/4 R van 8 picol; ontrent 4000 gl. incoops aen catonee doucken;
40000 R van achte; 44 tael Gouts; eenige panden daer gelt op geleent was, ende 2 goude
crissen, twelcke de onse near t verlaeten vande logye begraven hebben, ende door sijne Maj.
onderdanen opgegraven ende als een buyt onder hemluyden gedeelt is”.
131. Ibid., p. 68, letter of Jan Pieterszoon Coen, 10 November 1614: “Van Jhoor hebben ver-
staen, hoe dat den Coninck den Ed. heer Generael is ontbiedende zijn geheele lant, ende alle
eylanden, omme daer op te moghen bouwen alsuclcken casteel, als sijn Ed. selffs gelief, tsij
opt eylandt Carimon off int incomen vande riviere [i.e. the Johor River Estuary], ofte elders”.
132. In other words of the Johor kingdom’s principal trade route.
133. Ibid., pp. 72-73, Dussen, Cort verhael: “De Coninck antwooride to noch toe vande con-
ditie der Hollander, daere eenighe forteresse ende gebiedt hebben, niet wel geinformed
getweest te sijne, ende dat eene saecke van sodanighe gewichte, daer mede hij de sleutel of
sijn stroomen in onse handen overleverde, niet lichtvaerdertlicken maer vorsichtiflicken ende
met gemeene bewillinghe ende advijs vande Orancayes behoorde te gheschieden...”.

Archipel 65, Paris, 2003
they would remain trustworthy allies and would not – as the monarch worried aloud – use the fort as a means of tyrannizing the Johoreans.

The outcome of the king’s consultation with his orangkaya was not only swift, but also positive. The king arranged for Adriaen van der Dussen to tour and inspect a few possible sites for the fort. He was taken on September 6, 1614, with a small fleet of Johor prahuş to several locations in the broader region of the modern Straits of Singapore. Together with his Johorean hosts, Dussen inspected unspecified locations along the shores of the Johor River estuary, on the island of Bintan, and the two Karimons. The latter two islands, to the Southwest of modern Singapore, were singled out as the best possible option. Three considerations appear to have influenced Dussen in his search for the ideal location. First, the islands belonged to the King of Johor and were generally uninhabited due to the continuing hostilities with Portugal. The king approved of the idea that, on account of the constant threat of Portuguese raiding, the inhabitants of Karimon be permitted to live with the Dutch in the premises of the fort.

Second, one of the chief purposes of building the fort was to monitor shipping through the Straits. The Karimons were ideally suited to this. According to old Portuguese naval charts, the Northern shores of great Karimon marked the navigation point that brought ships from Japan, China, Cochin China, Champâ, Siam, Patani, Borneo and the eastern shores of the Malay Peninsula through the Straits of Singapore. The other was the principal sea-lane that brought ships to or from the Straits of Malacca and the Straits of Sabam to ports in Eastern Sumatra, Java, the Moluccas and Timor.

Third, the Karimons were also a favored destination of visiting European vessels, because the islands not only possessed sources of fresh water, but also were reported to have growing on them tall, straight hardwood trees. These were prized by sailors for repairing broken masts.

134. Ibid., p. 73 : “Heeft derhalven datelicken twee fusten doen prepareren, om de omliggende eylanden bij de straet van Sincapoura te besichtigen, welcke de bequaemste soude sijn, omme eene fortresse te bouwen”.
135. Ibid., pp. 73-74, Dussen, Cort verhael.
136. Ibid., p. 75, Dussen, Cort verhael : “Naer mijn oordeel is dit de beste ende gelegenste plaetse, die ick in alle de omliggende eylanden hebbe connen vinden, om alle de Portugeesche scheepen ende andere seyltuich, die van alle quartieren van Jaeva, Celebes, China, Japon, near Malacca seylen, aen te halen, also alle scheepen van Malacca omme de suydt ofte oostwaerts seylen, dit eylandt moeten int gesichte coomen”. Cf. also : Gibson-Hill (1954), p. 179.
137. Ibid., p. 75, Dussen, Cort verhael.
138. Ibid.
139. Ibid., pp. 74-75.
Dussen returned to Bantam and filed his report with Pieter Both, the Governor-General on 10 November 1614. Further information about the negotiations in Johor and the proposed fort derive from a hitherto unpublished document of Dussen, entitled *Cort vertooch* filed with the new VOC Governor-General, Gerard Reynst, about six months later on 19 May, 1615. In this, Dussen explains to the Governor-General that Portuguese presence in Malacca and Spanish retention of Manila remained the two principal obstacles to the pursuit of profitable trade for the VOC. To turn this situation around, Dussen sees it as necessary to “close” the Straits of Singapore, Sabam and Malacca that would deprive the enemy from being able to conduct trade in key places such as Java, Makassar and Macau. He explains that “Raja Bongsu, presently in the place of his brother the Jang di Pertuan” is lending crucial help in closing the Straits to Portuguese shipping by granting permission to construct a fort on “one of the islands around the Straits of Singapore” or somewhere around the Johor River estuary between Johor Lama and Batu Sawar. Dussen subsequently proceeds to explain some of the principal advantages that derive from constructing the proposed fort on Karimom. The location could serve not only as a general warehouse (*generael magesijn*), it would also attract ships from around Malacca and even Chinese merchants. The latter would be attracted to Karimom because the tolls are meaningfully lower than in either Bantam or Patani. Also, thanks to the lumber industry in Johor, it would be easily possible to construct smaller craft such as galleys and foists on site.

Dussen also proposes the founding of a Dutch colony in Johor. The European soldiers in the employ of the VOC should be encouraged to marry women from different parts of Asia and Africa, who he expressly underscores, can be purchased on the markets in Makassar, Bali, Binia and Madagascar. Such marriages would not only assist the VOC in establishing itself on a sound foundation throughout the region, but would also contribute toward the spread of the Christian religion. The offspring from these marriages should ideally be bound to serve in the employ of the Company.

In a more sinister vein, Dussen also exhorts the Governor to station garrisons

140. Cf. above, note 126.
141. The Hague, Algemeen Rijksarchief, VOC 1058, fols. 48-56: “Cort vertooch van e nut- ticheeden en de proffiten die de Nederlandsche Oostindische Compagnie te verwachten staen in 't sluyten van de straten Sincapoura, Palimbam ende Sabam, mitsgaders de schaden, die de Portugesen daer door zullen coomen te lijden, overgeleverd door Adriaen van der Dussen...“. I would like to thank Dr. Martine van Ittersum for kindly providing me with her personal transcript of this highly informative document.
143. *Ibid.*., fols. 51 verso - 52 recto.
144. *Ibid.*., fol. 55 verso.
on Karimon and along the Johor River estuary to “reign in” the new Johor monarch and to ensure that he does not take any actions (under duress or political pressure from Portuguese Malacca) that would be detrimental to Dutch interests. (145)

Despite the sense of enthusiasm that might have prevailed among certain parties of the VOC at the time, the fact is and remains, that the fort or citadel was never built. Why this fort was never built derives from both Portuguese as well as from Dutch sources.

First, rumors pervaded Lisbon’s corridors of power that the Dutch were attempting to build a fort in the Straits of Singapore. It was first believed that the Dutch planned to construct the fort on the island located between the new and the old Straits of Singapore – in other words on de Coutre’s Ysla de Arenas or Sentosa. In a letter to his Viceroy Dom Jerónimo de Azevedo in Goa, dated 7 January, 1614, the King of Portugal and Spain, Philip II/III, vented serious concern about this Dutch plan and placed pressure on servants in India to halt this scheme at all costs. (146) The King underscores for his Viceroy how important the Straits and the whole region really are to the prosperity of the Portuguese Empire. Two years later, the Iberian monarch again wrote to his Viceroy in Goa. According to this letter, Archbishop Dom Frey Christóvão de Sá e Lisboa (147) had let His Majesty know that the Dutch “rebels” struck an agreement to construct a fortress “between the Straits of Sabam and Singapura, [namely] on Pulau Karimon” and that Raja Bongsu of Johor had given his consent to such a project. (148) The King again emphasized what ruin such a Dutch enterprise would mean to Portuguese shipping and commerce in the Southern Seas, and consequently exhorts his Viceroy, Dom Jerónimo de Azevedo, to do all in his powers to ensure that this fort never be built. Very similar instructions were issued to Azevedo’s successor, Dom João Coutinho. The King instructed him in no ambiguous terms to thwart the construction of the Dutch fort in the Straits “by all possible

145. Ibid., fol. 55 recto-verso.
146. Documentos Remetidos da Índia, vol. II, letter of King Philip II of Portugal to Viceroy Dom Jerónimo de Azevedo, dated Lisbon, 7 January, 1614, document no. 400, p. 473: “... e pretendiam fazer hua no estreito de Sincapura, em hua ilha pequena que divide o estreito novo e o velho, sobre que escrevevera [Manuel Mascarenhas] a el-rey de Jor que o não consentisse e que elle o ajudaria”. A translation of this passage into English is found in Gibson-Hill (1954), p. 179.
147. Dom Frey Christóvão previously served as Bishop of Malacca, prior to his investiture as Archbishop of Goa.
148. Documentos Remetidos da Índia, vol. III, letter of King Philip II of Portugal to Viceroy Dom Jeronimo de Azevedo, dated Lisbon, 6 February, 1616, doc. 635, p. 380: “... os rebeldes tratavem de fazerem fortaleza entre os estreitos do Sábão e Sincapura, em Pulo Carimão, para o que Raja Bonso tinha dado consentimento ...”.

Archipel 65, Paris, 2003
King Philip also hedged his serious doubts that the Johor monarch had ever given his proper approval to such a scheme.

From the correspondence between the Iberian monarch Philip II/III with his Viceroy of India, it is clear that the crown of Portugal was quite intent on taking whatever steps were necessary to prevent the Dutch from constructing their fort in the Straits. But that is only one side of the story. Within weeks of Dussen’s return to Bantam from Batu Sawar, Jan Pieterszoon Coen wrote to the Heeren XVII, namely on November 10, 1614. In this letter, the future Governor-General of the Dutch East Indies explained that, while it was important to find a stable rendez-vous location in the region, the Straits of Sunda are to be preferred over the location Johor. He cites a number of reasons for this. First, because a rendez-vous point has to represent a safe and secure place where the company could store cash for its purposes. The recent attack on Johor, the chronic problems with Portugal, and the company’s recent losses at Batu Sawar, no doubt, could be cited as evidence against Johor as a safe location. Second, the Chinese merchants will come and trade where it is safe. The market place may have been more predictable, given the regular imposition of Portuguese blockades on the Johor River. Certainly the waters around Western Java and the Straits of Sunda were comparatively safer than the Straits of Singapore and the pirate-infested Riau Archipelago.

Add to this the financial constraints faced by the VOC that very year. Pieter van Dam reports that the company received a cash subsidy from the States-General in 1614 in order to continue the war against the “Spaniards in East India”. This is symptomatic of the now growing concerns over the financial viability faced by the aggressive and expanding Dutch company. Lamenting high overheads and fixed costs, Dutch negotiators at the Indies
Conferences held in London in 1613 and again in The Hague in 1615 sought to break out of their financial constraints in their negotiations with the English, by proposing several cost-sharing schemes that included a possible merger of the Dutch and English East India companies, as well as “sharing” the financial burden incurred as a result of protecting native Asian princes against Iberian advances and generally sharing the cost of the war effort with the English.\(^{155}\) Negotiations did eventually lead to a co-operation agreement on commerce and security, which evidently did not work properly, and collapsed latest with the so-called “massacre of Amboina”.

Then, initial enthusiasm over the commercial significance of Johor had already faded by 1615. Like many regional ports that were frequented by VOC ships in the opening years of the seventeenth century, Johor faded in its perceived significance as the company’s operations were settled, and became centralized in Batavia. Fewer Dutch ships called at Johor, and this can be substantiated by consulting Bruijn, Gaastra and Schöffer’s comprehensive study: *Dutch-Asiatic Shipping in the 17th and 18th Centuries.*\(^{156}\)

Next, in view of the Acehnese invasions of Johor and Pahang during the second decade of the seventeenth century, and the move of Johor’s capital from Batu Sawar to Lingga around 1618, the patterns of economic activity within Johor, as well as between Johor and its regional neighbors, were significantly transformed. The move to Lingga also saw a shift in the security needs of the Johor Kingdom. If the Dutch fort was to protect both shipping through the Straits as well as the capital city from potential invasion by the Portuguese or any other enemy, then the latter was no longer a principal consideration after the shift of the royal residence to Lingga.

Also there is the fate of the Portuguese settlements in Malaya and the Archipelago as well as the fierce competition with the Dutch over the control of the Moluccas and the spice trade. But even joint efforts with the Spanish to expel the Dutch from the region – and specifically also the Straits of Singapore – proved increasingly futile. Admittedly, such moves were not initiated on the basis of perceived military strength, but because the Iberian powers recognized that they were beaten on a long retreat. The modern student of Iberian presence in Southeast Asia would probably conclude that the Portuguese Empire was more fragile than most key players would have recognized at the time, but this may just be the benefit of historical hindsight.

Last, the entrepôts such as Malacca and particularly Macao were seriously affected by Dutch activity in the region, and this was reflected in the level

\(^{155}\) Borschberg (1999), pp. 228-229.

and flow of trade to and from these ports. Roderich Ptak in his seminal *Outline of Macao's Economic Development, 1557-1640* contends that the systematic targeting of Portuguese shipping around the Malay Peninsula, seriously crippled Malacca’s role as a centre of trade, but this view is admittedly not shared by all scholars today.\(^{157}\) Its gradual decline, further, “almost cut off Macao’s ties to the West, and inasmuch as conditions worsened in India and Malacca, Macao preferred to trade with China and Japan, where profits were greatest anyway”.\(^{158}\) More recently, James Boyajian also confirms that Macanese *casados* also became prominent players in the trade with Makassar.\(^{159}\) But this proved a double-edged sword, for Macao now grew over-dependent on two regional markets, especially Canton and Nagasaki. The latter highly lucrative market, too, completely vanished when Japan forbade all connections with the Portuguese in 1639. Less than four decades later, in 1667, the VOC conquered Makassar. Asian and European competitors, who were active in that important insular entrepôt, were expelled.

**Conclusion**

Source material from Portuguese and Dutch archives and libraries clearly reveal that the European powers recognized the commercial and strategic significance of the Straits of Singapore and the Johor River estuary. In fact, between the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries the Portuguese, Spanish and Dutch devised schemes – usually overlapping with one another – to construct a fort or citadel in the region. The most comprehensive plan put forward by Jacques de Coutre on the Iberian side, proposed the construction of at least two forts around the Straits of Singapore, one located on Sentosa (*Ysla de Arenas* or later *Pulau Blakang Mati*), the other on the eastern shores of the *Ysla de la Šabandaria Vieja* (present-day Singapore Island). He also suggested the founding of an entrepôt or city on Singapore Island. Judging from the circumstances described in his *Emformación*, the recommendation addressed to the King of Portugal and Spain was written not too long after the Acehnese invasion of Johor in 1613.

---


Almost concurrently, the United Dutch East India Company (VOC) pursued concrete intentions since at least 1607 to do the same. A series of discussions and negotiations were conducted by Dutch Admirals with King 'Ala’udin Ri’ayat Shah III and his brother, Raja Bongsu (later known as Abdullah Ma’ayat Shah) between 1609 and 1614. After initial resistance, and in the aftermath of the Acehnese invasion of 1613, King Abdullah is reported on the Dutch side to have consented to the construction of a fort in the region of the Singapore Straits. Following consultations and a comprehensive feasibility study, the Dutch negotiator, Adriaen van der Dussen, selected a location on the Karimons. When news of this enterprise reached the corridors of power in Lisbon, the Iberian king instructed his viceroy in Goa to undertake all in his powers to prevent the Dutch from executing their plan, as a fort in the hands of the enemy would spell doom for Portugal’s trading interests in the East Indies.

It is probably against the backdrop of rapidly changing political and economic circumstances, and the financial constraints both on the Iberian as well as on the Dutch side, that none of the projects materialized. The fulfillment of such plans would be left to a third power, the British, who not only built a fort on Sentosa (Ysla de Arenas, Pulau Blakang Mati), but also founded a new entrepôt on the main island of Singapore. Thomas Stamford Raffles, in some respect and almost certainly without knowing it, fulfilled Jacques de Coutre’s vision some two centuries later. What would the native of Bruges say if he could see Singapore today?